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Abstract 
This thesis is about current Centrelink breach and appeal figures. It is also about 
the current conservative neo-liberalising climate of Australian social policy reforms, 
with which they are inextricably connected. It shows that while Centrelink breach 
numbers have increased more than three fold since 1996, formal appeals against 
Centrelink decisions have not increased similarly. This thesis asks: what might this 
mean? It answers this question through a single case study of a Centrelink office. Data 
was collected using individual focused interviews, documents collected from the site, 
and direct observation (including a map of the office drawn by the researcher). Various 
possible interpretations drawn from the social policy literature were evaluated in 
relation to the case study findings. Interpretations included the neo-liberals, advocates, 
new-contractualism, the view that surveillance is oppressive and an interpretation that 
draws from the work of Michel Foucault. The thesis found that Foucault's work on 
discipline and governmentality-particularly his ideas about surveillance and 
individualisation-was the most relevant interpretation of Centrelink breaching and 
appeals to the case study data. Much evidence was found for these governing 
techniques, and their imperfection. The thesis concludes that the current conservative 
neo-liberal based reforms, including the new breach regime, show undue confidence 
about their ability to govern individual Centrelink clients. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Background and Some Definitions 
Australian social security payments have had some form of activity requirement 
or proof of eligibility since 1945, and to some extent before this (Carney & Ramia 
1999). Requirements have varied from needing to provide proof of identity, to proof of 
need, to proof of actively looking for work. More recently, proof of actively 
participating in society is required to meet some payments. 
Linked with these requirements was some form of penalty for non-compliance. 
This may have involved the denial or reduction of payment. New Australian penalty 
rates were introduced in July 1997. They have since been the source of great 
controversy, culminating last year in a report from the Office of the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman (2002) and also the Report of the Independent Review of Breaches and 
Penalties in the Social Security System (Pearce, Disney & Ridout 2002). The new 
penalties are summarised in Figure 1. In most of the Australian literature, such penalties 
are referred to as 'being breached'. The term breach will therefore be used throughout 
this thesis to refer to the action or non-action for which a penalty is imposed, and being 
breached will refer to the penalty 1 • 
1 It is also important to remember that a Centrelink breach means non-compliance not 
fraud. Welfare fraud is a criminal offence in which dishonesty is intentional. Breaches 
rarely involve criminal intent and welfare fraud rates have not increased at the same rate 
as breach rates (ACOSS, 2000, p. 4). Indeed, according to the Australian Council of 
Social Service (ACOSS), in 1998-99, out of the 6 million Australians receiving social 
security, less than 0. 1 % were found to have fraudulently obtained benefits (ACOSS, 
2000, p. 4). 
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Administrative 
breach �-------� 
¢=J I Breaches I Q Activitybreach 
B 
16 per cent reduction for 13 
weeks. This reduces payment by $59.99 
to $3 14.91 per fortnight. This is a total 
penalty of $389.94. 
ALTERNATIVELY, 
a client could choose a 100 per 
cent reduction for 2 weeks. This would 
be a total loss of $374.90. 
B 
18 per cent reduction for 26 
weeks for the 1st Activity Breach. This 
reduces payment by $67.48 to $307.41 
per fortnight for this period. This is a 
total of $877 .3 7. 
B 
24 per cent reduction for 26 
weeks for the 2nd Activity Breach. This 
reduces payment by $89.98 to $284.92 
per fortnight for this period. This is a 
total loss of$1, 169.74. 
B 
100 per cent reduction for 8 
weeks for the 3rd Activity Breach. This 
reduces payment by $374.90 to $0.00 
per fortnight for this period. This is a 
total loss of$1,499.60. 
Figure 1. The financial penalties of different breaches, as applicable at 
28th October 2002 (FaCS, 2002, 3.2.11.20, 3.2.11.10). 
Payment amounts are calculated from the Newstart 
Allowance (NSA) single rate (FaCS, 2002, 5.1.8.20). 
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Currently, there are two major categories of breaches; administrative breaches 
and activity test breaches. An administrative breach occurs when a client refuses or 
fails, without sufficient reason, to comply with a notification requirement. Notification 
requirements include: 
• attending an office of Centrelink2 when asked to do so, 
• notifying Centrelink of changes to their circumstances, 
• replying to letters from Centrelink, or 
• providing a required tax file number (FaCS, 2002, 1. lB.90). 
An activity test3 breach occurs when a client does one of the following: 
• refuses or fails to attend a job interview without sufficient reason, 
• fails to complete a labour market program without sufficient reason, 
• is dismissed from a labour market program for misconduct, 
• refuses to declare, or fails to correctly declare, earnings from employment, 
• becomes unemployed voluntarily without sufficient reason, 
• becomes unemployed due to misconduct, 
• fails to accept suitable job offers without sufficient reason, 
• has not applied for a particular number of job vacancies (FaCS, 2002, 1. lB.90). 
The main difference between these penalties and the preceding rates4 is the 
incremental reduction of payment for an activity breach according to whether it is the 
first, second or third breach. Previously, an activity test breach incurred a non-payment 
period according to both the length of time on payment, and whether it is a first or 
second breach. 
2 Centrelink is the Australian government agency currently responsible for the day-to­
day administration and payment of most federal government income support payments. 
3 New Start Allowance and Youth Allowance recipients, both jobseekers and students, 
must satisfy an activity test to qualify for their payment. The activity test is different for 
NSA and YA recipients. (Faes, 2002) 
4 Here I mean the rates that the current rates have replaced, not all rates since 1945. 
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The previous system was criticised for two connected reasons. The first criticism 
was that it was too harsh because it left clients with no payment after a first 
infringement. The second criticism of the system was that it was ineffective because 
Centrelink officers were reluctant to breach clients when it meant they were 
immediately denied income for a period. The current penalty rates were designed to 
combat these two problems (Moses, 2000). 
However, advocacy agencies have been alarmed at an apparent explosion of 
breaches being administered by Centrelink (ACOSS, 2001a; 2001b; 1999; WRAS, 
2000). For example, the Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) report a 189% 
increase in the number of penalties over the three years from June 1998 (ACOSS, 
2001a). Reports with titles such as Kicking them while they 're down (Mullins, 2002) 
and Stepping into the breach (The Salvation Army Australia, 2001) are critical of the 
new penalty rates. They claim that the new regime makes it easier for a Centrelink 
officer to administer a breach. Further, they claim, this combines with the introduction 
of new complex activity requirements to effectively target the most vulnerable of 
Centrelink clients-particularly the homeless and the young (Mullins, 2002). Indeed, 
between 1996 and 1998 some significant additional requirements for payment were 
introduced, such as: 
• Activity agreements, now called preparing for work agreements, for all unemployed 
people were introduced in September 1996 (FaCS, 2002, 1.1.P.510), 
• Additional mutual obligation initiatives that certain job seekers aged between 18 and 
35 must meet while receiving income support were introduced in July 1998 (FaCS, 
2002, l. l .M.170), 
• The jobseeker diary (Centrelink, 2000c) in which some Youth Allowance (Y A)5 and 
Newstart Allowance (NSA)6 recipients must detail between 6 and 10 employers 
contacted per fortnight (FaCS, 2002, 6.2.1.80), 
5 A fortnightly income support payment for people generally aged between 16 and 20, 
and full-time students aged between 21 and 24 (FaCS, 2002). 
6 Newstart Allowance is an income support payment, payed fortnightly (FaCS, 2002). 
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• Work for the dole for some YA and NSA recipients between 18 and 34 years old 
(FaCS, 2002, 3.2.8.80), and 
• Employer contact certificates which provide written verification of a client's 
approach to a prospective employer (FaCS, 2002, 6.2. 1.50). 
Additionally, in March 1998 the Commonwealth Employment Service (CES), 
which had administered free job search assistance since the 1940s (Department of 
Employment Workplace Relations and Small Business, 2000), was replaced with a 
network of private and government run Job Network Agencies (JNA). Since then all 
YA and NSA Centrelink clients have been required to sign with one ( or more) of these 
agencies to receive payment (FaCS, 2002, 6.2.1.80). Such additional requirements, 
according to the advocacy agencies, have been difficult for many clients to cope with 
(ACOSS, 2001a; ACOSS, 2001b; Mullins, 2002; WRAS, 2000). 
Of particular concern to the Welfare Rights Advocacy Service (WRAS) in 
Western Australia was the apparent low number of Centre link clients who appealed in 
1998-1999 despite the increasing quantity of breaches. An appeal means a formal 
questioning of a Centrelink decision by a client. The WRAS state that "of the 165,492 
breaches imposed in 1998-99, only 2,393 ( 1.5%) were the subject of a review or appeal" 
(WRAS, 2000, p. 5). They conclude that this reflects the vulnerability of those being 
breached. WRAS assumes that those who are too vulnerable to avoid incurring a breach 
are also too vulnerable to seek a formal appeal of this breach. 
Such concerns have led to two independent reviews of current social security 
penalties-one by the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman (2002) and also the 
Report of the Independent Review of Breaches and Penalties in the Social Security 
System (Pearce et al., 2002). Both reports were critical of the unnecessary hardship 
caused to clients by Centrelink's administration of breaching penalties. For example, the 
Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman was concerned that clients were not being 
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notified prior to being penalised, and thus being denied the opportunity to explain their 
action.7 
However, since 1 996-1 997, the formal Centrelink appeals system8 in Australia 
has also met with controversy. The current three tiered formal appeal system is 
illustrated in Figure 2. The appeal structure is an hierarchical three tiered system of 
administrative review of increasing generality. The first level of appeal is an internal 
review of the decision by a Centrelink Officer called an Authorised Review Officer 
(ARO). A client who is still unhappy with this decision can lodge an external appeal 
with the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (SSAT). Finally, if the client is unsatisfied 
with this decision-and has the stamina-an appeal may be lodged with the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AA T), which deals with all Commonwealth 
administrative appeals. Appellants cannot skip a level of appeal; they must complete an 
ARO review before appealing to the SSAT. Similarly, they must have an SSAT 
decision before appealing to the AAT (SSAT, 1 997a). Centrelink clients are also 
expected to appeal to the original decision maker before they can lodge an appeal with 
an ARO. Clients may also approach the Commonwealth Ombudsman and their local 
Member of Parliament to resolve grievances. The Commonwealth Ombudsman and 
Member of Parliament may be approached at any time, in any order. 
7 Following these reports some minor changes were made to the breaching regime. 
Since July 2002, clients who failed to attend an interview with Centrelink no longer 
incurred an automatic administrative breach (Ziguras, Dufty, & Considine, 2003 , p. 1 1 ). 
They could now have their payments suspended and reinstated if they have a reasonable 
excuse. 
Further changes to the breaching regime were enacted in early 2003, including 
extending activity testing to parenting payment clients whose youngest child is over 12  
years old (Ziguras et al., 2003, p. 1 1  ). Also, from September 20, the amendments 
provided by the Australians Working Together and other 2001 Budget Measures Act 
2003 (Cwth) will allow people who receive a first breach, but comply with the relevant 
requirement within 4 weeks, would have the penalty reduced to 8 weeks. 
8 The appeals system is also often referred to as merits review. An appeal or merits 
review is the process whereby an administrative decision of the government is reviewed 
"on the merits": that is, the facts, law and policy aspects of the original decision are all 
reconsidered afresh and a new decision - affirming, varying or setting aside the original 
decision- is made (Administrative Review Council, 1 995, pp. 9-1 0). 
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Step three. External appeal to the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal (AA T) .... = � = = .... -a. = 
� 
'-= 
a. � 
Step two. External review to the Social Security 
,.Q = � 
Appeals Tribunal (SSAT) � = = .... -= 
� 
Q. 
Q. = .... 
CJ � a. .... 
Step one. Internal review to Authorised Review � 
Officer (ARO) 
Figure 2. The three tiered review of Centrelink decisions 
The current appeal system is the result of lobbying by the civil rights movement 
of the 1 970s and has not changed structurally since the 1 980s (Carney, 1 998). However, 
it is under pressure to reform. In 2000-2001 the government unsuccessfully proposed 
the Administrative Review Tribunal Bill 2000 and Administrative Review Tribunal 
(Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2000 (Hansard, 2000, p. 23494-
23505). This was an attempt to merge the SSAT, AAT and other external review bodies 
into a "one stop shop" that would be called the Administrative Review Tribunal (ART). 
It was argued that this was required for "fair, just, economical, informal and quick" 
external review of administrative matters, including social security matters (The 
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives, 2000, p. 1 68). 
While the SSAT and AAT provide multi-tiered review with routine representation by a 
lawyer or social worker, the ART was to provide a single tiered review, where 
appellants need special permission to be represented by either a lawyer or social worker 
(The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives, 2000). 
= = = 
r'-1 
,.Q = 
0 
.c .... -= 
� = = = = = u 
� .c .... = .... -= � 
Q. 
Q. = .... 
CJ � a. .... 
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Also, the matter would be heard by a single person rather than the current SSAT panel 
(The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives, 2000). 
Despite remaining structurally intact through such pressures to reform, clients' 
ability to access the formal appeal system has been effectively reduced. Clients' access 
to appeals has changed in two ways. First, only Centrelink decisions can be appealed 
formally, not JNA agreements or their other dealings with clients (Owens, 2001 ). Since 
clients must deal with at least one JNA to receive payment, this means that some of the 
requirements for payment are not subject to formal appeal. Second, Centrelink has 
changed the way clients access the first level of formal appeal-the ARO. Rather than 
have the AROs separate from the Centrelink offices that administer day-to-day 
payments, over the last five years most AROs have been moved into Centrelink offices 
(Centrelink, 2000a). Since a Centrelink client must appeal to an ARO before proceeding 
to an external appeal with the SSAT, the ARO plays an important gate-keeping role in 
the appeals structure. 
Thus, not only are breach numbers increasing significantly, but a Centrelink 
client's scope to appeal a breach has changed. It seems WRAS's (2000) observation 
about the low number of appeals in 1 998-1 999 was pertinent. However a low appeal 
rate in 1 998-1 999 partnered with an increase in breach numbers from 1 998 to 2001 is 
not sufficient data to claim that high breach and low appeal numbers are related to 
policy changes. The years do not correspond. More information from the period of 
policy change is required to make such claims. Because the new breach regime, new 
activity requirements and the changes in scope for seeking an external appeal have all 
occurred since 1 996-1 997, then an analysis of breach and appeal numbers since 1 996-
1 997 is required. 
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Breach and Formal Appeal Numbers from 1996-1997 to 2000-2001 
While breach numbers have increased markedly from 1 1 3 , 100 in 1 996-1 997 to 
346,078 in 2000-2001 , appeal numbers have not increased similarly. This will be shown 
using a comparison of breach numbers, and relevant ARO, SSAT and AAT appeal 
applications. Figure 3 represents breach and appeal numbers from 1 996-1 997 to 2000-
2001 graphically, while the actual figures are shown in Table 1 .9 
9 While I presented and analysed similar data in Sleep (2002), here the data is updated 
and reworked. 
U) 
iii 
GI 
3 5 0 , 0 0 0  _,__ _______________ _ 
3 0 0 ,0 0 0  
Q. 2 5 0 , 0 0 0  _,__ _________ ________ _ 
Q, 
ca ... 
0 
U) 
GI 
.s::. 
u 
ca 
!! .c 
0 ... 
GI .c 
E • T O T A L  
;i_ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  form a l  a p p e a l  a p p lica tio n s  
1 9 9 6 - 1 9 9 7  1 9 9 7 - 1 9 9 8  1 9 9 8 - 1 9 9 9  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 0  
Y e a r  o f  b r e a c h  o r  a p p e a l  
2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 1  
• T O T A L  
b re a c h e s  
Figure 3. Centrelink breach 10 and appeal numbers from 1996-1997 to 2000-2001 
1 0  Data represents the number of breaches, not the number of people breached. 
22 
23 
Table 1. Centrelink breach1 1  and appeal numbers from 1996-1997 to 2000-2001 
1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001 
ARO 33,462 (DSS, 43,074 (FaCS, 47,375 (FaCS, 36,043 (FaCS, 40,920 
applications 1997, p. 296) 1999, p. 134, 1999, p. 274) 2000, p. 145, ( Centrelink, 
received 268) 274) 2001, p. 104) 
SSAT 11,353 (DSS, 9214 (FaCS, 9246 (FaCS, 7766 (FaCS, 7,651 
applications 1997, p. 296) 1999, p. 134, 1999, p. 274) 2000, p. 145, (Centrelink, 
received 268) 274) 2001, p. 104) 
AAT 1328 (DSS, 1797 (FaCS, 1797 (FaCS, 1592 (FaCS, 1,375 
applications 1997, p. 296) 1999, p. 134, 1999, p. 274) 2000, p. 145, ( Centre link, 
received 268) 274) 2001, p. 104) 
TOTAL formal 46, 143 54,085 58,418 45,401 49,846 
appeal 
applications 
TOTAL 
breaches 
1 13,100 120,718 (Office 212,900 (Office 302,078 (Office 346,078 (Office 
(Moses, 2000, ofthe of the of the of the 
p. 5) Commonwealth Commonwealth Commonwealth Commonwealth 
Ombudsman, 
2002, p. 1) 
Ombudsman, 
2002, p. 1) 
Ombudsman, 
2002, p. 1) 
Ombudsman, 
2002, p. 1) 
Figure 3 and Table 1 show total breach numbers. It is important to note that the 
number of breaches is represented rather than the number of people actually breached. 
Also, the current incremental breach regime was not implemented until March 1997 
(DSS, 1997, p. 108) and the figures are drawn from various sources so are not reliable 
for accurate statistical anal"ysis. Nevertheless, the general pattern is striking-the total 
number of breaches almost tripled over this period. 
However, the number of appeals shows a different pattern. Figure 3 shows total 
formal appeals while Table 1 shows formal appeals as ARO applications received, 
1 1  As for Figure 3, the data here represents the number of breaches, not the number of 
people breached. 
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SSAT applications received, AA T applications received and total formal appeal 
applications. The formal appeal rate appears flat when juxtaposed to the increase in 
breach numbers since 1 997-1 998. However, the ARO, SSAT and AAT data in Table 1 
reveals some subtle patterns. The greatest proportion of formal appeals are lodged at the 
ARO level. This is not surprising because all appeals to the SSAT and AA T must first 
pass through the ARO level. However, while the number of ARO appeals has been 
generally stable from 1 996-1 997 until 2000-2001 , in 1 996-1 997 and 1 997-1 998 the 
ratio of ARO appeals to breaches imposed was almost one formal appeal to three 
breaches. This drops to almost one formal appeal to four imposed breaches in 1 998-
1 999 and then one appeal to eight breaches in 2000-2001. Even if we note that each 
appeal is not necessarily about a breach, the pattern is striking. Fewer and fewer 
breaches seem to be appealed formally from 1 996 to 2001. 
The greatest number of SSAT appeals were lodge in 1 996-1 997. The 1 996-1 997 
SSAT Annual Report observed that this was an unprecedented high (SSAT, 1 997b, p. 
18), but neglected to explain it. The report described the figures as dropping back to 
normal despite "expecting a further increase in appeal lodgements in 1 997-1 998" 
(SSAT, 1 997b, p. 1 8 ). SSAT appeal numbers then dropped slightly from 1 998-1 999 
until 2000-200 1. 
The pattern of AA T application numbers is even more subtle. Here the greatest 
number of appeals were in 1 997-1 998 and 1 998-1 999. However the more subtle pattern 
and slight peak in 1 997-1 998 rather than the SSAT's peak in 1 996-1 997 and 1 997-1 998, 
are not surprising when two important points are considered. First, the changes were 
less obvious because all social security payments are represented, not just those subject 
to activity breaches like the SSAT data12 • Consequently, the pattern is effectively 
12 For the SSAT data, only appeal applications pertaining to activity tested payments 
such as YA, NSA and Austudy are included. However, AAT data includes all social 
security matters, not just payments which involve breach penalties. Therefore, the AA T 
data also includes such payments as family support payment, single parent and old age 
pensions. It is also important to note that the payments have changed name over this 
period. For example, Job Search Allowance and NSA were amalgamated in September 
1 996. Also, YA was introduced from 1 July 1 998. It replaced Austudy for 1 6  to 24 year 
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diluted. Secondly, AAT appeals peaked a year later than SSAT appeal numbers due to 
the time required for matters to reach the higher level AAT, usually 3-6 months (AAT, 
1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001). It is highly likely that many people who 
appealed to the SSAT in 1996-1997 did not reach the AAT level until 1997-1998 (AAT, 
1997; 1998). Due to this time lag effect the peak in AAT appeal numbers in 1997-1998 
corresponds with the peak in SSAT appeal numbers in 1996-1997. Also, like the SSAT 
appeal numbers, the AAT rates decreased slightly from 1998-1999. 
Thus, while Centrelink breaches have increased from 1997-1998 to 2000-2001, 
formal appeal numbers have effectively stagnated. This disparity has been shown by 
comparing breach and appeal numbers from 1996-1997 to 2000-2001. During this 
period major social security policy changes have been implemented. Centrelink and the 
JNAs have replaced the Department of Social Security (DSS) and CES, and the new 
breach regime, new activity requirements and the changes in scope for seeking an 
appeal have all been implemented. This thesis asks the apparently simple question­
what might this mean? 
Outline of Thesis 
This thesis is about current Centrelink breach and appeal numbers. Put simply, 
it is an interpretation of these figures. It attempts to interpret the breach and appeal 
figures through a case study of a Centrelink office, which includes semi-structured 
interviews with Centrelink clients. 
However, interpreting breach and appeal numbers is more complex than it may 
first seem. This is for two reasons. The first reason is that, with the exception of WRAS 
(2000), a sustained analysis of the relationship between the current increase in breaches 
but not appeals has not, to my knowledge, been attempted. The second reason is that 
olds, Youth Training Allowance for 16 to 17 year olds, and NSA and Sickness 
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neither breach nor appeal numbers occur in a political or social vacuum. Indeed, 
different approaches to social policy can be used as the basis of differing interpretations 
of current breach and appeal numbers. For example, one might argue that an increased 
breach rate but stagnation of appeal numbers means that the current system is 
working-it's catching the 'bludgers' (Howard, 1 999). In contrast, ACOSS (2001 a; 
2001 b; ACOSS & NWRN, 2000) argues that the current increase in breaches reveals an 
overly harsh regime, while the stagnating number of formal appeals indicates that few 
income support recipients are able to protect their rights. Consequently, different 
approaches from the social policy literature will be considered. 
However, an analysis should go even deeper than this. This is because it is 
impossible to separate interpretations of breach and appeal numbers from ideas about 
what welfare is and should be, and what humans are and should be. Indeed, is welfare a 
citizenship right (Marshall, 1949/2000) or a hindrance to entrepreneurial success 
(Hayek, 1 959/2000)? If welfare is a citizenship right, then should Centrelink clients be 
coerced into doing certain activities in order to receive income support (Lawrence M. 
Mead, 1 991/2000)? If welfare is a hindrance to personal freedom, then should clients be 
punished for not complying with Centrelink procedure? Are economic markets the best 
way to distribute wealth and provide welfare (Smith, 1974), or do people need to be 
protected from the violence of these markets through state based redistribution of wealth 
(Titmuss, 1 968/ 1979)? If economic markets are the best distributor of resources, then a 
low number of formal appeals against Centrelink decisions is not a concern, the number 
of people on welfare is. If people need to be protected from the market, then the few 
formal appeals against Centrelink is a serious concern because it means people have no 
state protection against the increasingly market orientated Centrelink. Therefore, an 
analysis of the current breach and appeal rate should consider different possible 
interpretations, with consideration of their foundational assumptions, about social 
welfare and humanity. This thesis will attempt to do this. 
Therefore, this thesis is essentially exp/orative. It aims to explore different 
approaches' interpretations of the current breach and appeal figures. It hopes to 
Allowance for 1 6  to 20 year olds. (Faes, 2002) 
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contribute to the study of Centrelink: breaches and appeals by conducting an explorative 
case study of a Centrelink: office, interviewing Centrelink: clients about the breach and 
appeal regime, and drawing from an interdisciplinary battery of social policy and 
sociological approaches. I hope this shows possible interpretations of the current 
disparity of breach and appeal numbers that may not have been considered by scholars 
and policy makers in the area. More modestly, I hope anyone interested in the current 
breach and appeal regime will benefit from a review of some relevant literature on 
breaches and appeals, and some modest original research on this topic. 
This thesis is comprised of eight chapters which are organised into three parts­
Part A, Part B and Part C. Chapters One to Three incorporate Part A, which sets the 
ground work for the analysis of the remaining sections. 
Chapter One has shown that there is a disparity of Centrelink: breach and appeal 
numbers between 1996-97 and 2000-01. It also outlined the current breaching system, 
and the current appeals structure. 
Chapter Two demonstrates that simply showing that there is a disparity of 
breach and appeal numbers is insufficient evidence with which to argue that there is any 
meaningful relationship between these numbers. It thus shows the need for more 
information about the social context of breaching and appealing. In other words: what it 
is like to be breached and to seek ( or decline to seek) a formal appeal. A case study of a 
single Centrelink: office is justified as an appropriate method to explore the social 
context of breaching and appealing. It explains how data was collected using various 
techniques-individual focused interviews, documentation, and direct observation. The 
method for analysing this evidence is then outlined. Since this is an explorative study, it 
is shown that the most effective analytical method is to evaluate different theoretical 
frameworks according to the case study data. In other words, the study sets out to see 
which theory fits the case best. Approaches evaluated in relation to the case study 
findings include the neo-liberals, advocates, new-contractualism, the view that 
surveillance is oppressive and an interpretation that draws from the work of Michel 
Foucault. 
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However, before different theoretical perspectives are evaluated according to the 
case study findings, the nature of the current Australian welfare regime must be 
established. This common ground is required for the different perspectives to be 
comparable. Chapter Three considers various methods of categorising welfare states. 
These include levels of expenditure, residual and institutional welfare systems, levels of 
citizenship (civil, political and social), the "three worlds of welfare capitalism" (Esping­
Anderson, 1990/2000), and contemporary flavours of neo-liberalism (Hayek, Mead and 
Murray). Through considering these different categorisations, Chapter Three establishes 
that the current-Australian welfare regime is essentially neo-liberalising. The remaining 
chapters work on this basic assumption to evaluate different possible explanations for 
the disparity of breach and appeal numbers in the light of the case study data. 
Chapter Four and Five comprise Part B of this thesis. Part B concentrates on 
mainstream political views about breaches and appeals-neo-liberal-and its most 
public opposition-the advocates. It moves the analysis beyond the neo-liberals and the 
advocates to an emerging analysis known as new-contractualism. 
Chapter Four deals with the neo-liberals and the advocates. The neo-liberals 
represent the mainstream view of social policy in Australia (2000a; McClure, 2000b ). 
They hold the 'hard line' that breaches are necessary to ensure Centrelink clients 
comply. In contrast to the neo-liberals, the advocates include organisations who aim to 
advocate on behalf of the disadvantaged. Exemplar organisations include WRAS (1999; 
2000), ACOSS (2001a; 2000) and The Salvation Army of Australia (2001). They are 
particularly concerned about the frequency and size of the financial penalty borne by 
those already living in poverty under the current Centrelink breaching regime. In 
Chapter Four the neo-liberals' position is outlined, their interpretation of current breach 
and appeal numbers is described, and then evaluated. The advocacy view is then given 
the same treatment. 
Chapter Five considers new-contractualism accounts. They argue that the current 
breach and appeal numbers reflect a new fetish for contractualism in Australian public 
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policy, especially in welfare provision. Within this perspective, two influential accounts 
seem to be emerging-an account influenced by Terry Carney's (1998; 1994; 1999; 
2001; 2001) analysis, and one influenced by Anna Yeatman ( 1997; 1998; 1999). This 
chapter deals with these different accounts separately. Carney's account is outlined, his 
interpretation of current breach and appeal numbers clarified, and then evaluated in light 
of the case study evidence. Yeatman's account is then treated similarly. 
The remaining three chapters make up Part C of this thesis. They focus on the 
role of surveillance and individualisation in Centrelink breach and appeal numbers. 
Chapte:t," Six deals with accounts that view surveillance as oppressive, including that of 
William De Maria ( 1992). De Maria argues that the appeal system is one of the many 
methods by which the powerful oppress. These approaches are outlined, and their 
interpretation of current breaches and appeals indicated, and then evaluated. 
Chapter Seven draws from Michel Foucault's (1977; 1991) influence and 
considers his interpretation of surveillance and individualisation, which has been 
developed by Mitchell Dean (1995; 1998; 1999) and others. This analysis draws from 
studies on discipline and govemmentality. These terms are outlined, their interpretation 
of breach and appeal numbers clarified, and finally evaluated according to the case 
study findings. According to this view, surveillance and individualisation are 
disciplinary techniques that create particular types of Centrelink clients. Other 
disciplinary techniques include normalisation and distribution. According to this 
approach, these disciplinary techniques are also inevitably incomplete. The evaluation 
shows that there is much evidence for these disciplinary techniques in the case study 
findings, and also much evidence of their failure. 
Chapter Eight then concludes the thesis. Through exploring some different 
interpretations of the current Centrelink breach and appeal numbers, and evaluating 
their relative strengths and weaknesses, this thesis argues tentatively in favour of an 
approach that draws from Foucault's work on discipline and govemmentality. The 
increase in breach and but not appeal numbers since 1996 is shown to reflect both the 
success of disciplinary techniques in creating governable Centrelink clients, and the 
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failure of these techniques. It demonstrates how governable Centrelink: clients are 
trained not to seek appeals. Most alarmingly, it demonstrates how the breach and appeal 
system does not always create compliant active jobseekers, but also creates cynical 
individuals who expect their basic rights to be violated. This results in individuals who 
associate being breached with the random incompetence of Centrelink rather than any 
action of their own. It concludes that the techniques for making a Centrelink: client into 
an active jobseeker are imperfect and, thus, the conservative neo-liberalising Australian 
social policy reforms are over confident. 
Clients, Customers or Latent poor? 
However, before continuing, I must justify my use of the term Centre link clients. 
This term has implied meaning, as any term used to describe this group of people does. 
For example, American neo-liberal writer Charles Murray refers to this group of people 
as the "latent poor" because they "would be poor if it were not for government help" 
(Murray, 1982/2000, p. 100). In contrast, left leaning writer Margaret Conley prefers to 
use the term "unemployable" (Conley, 1982). She explains that: 
The terms "undeserving", "unworthy", and "vicious" have been applied 
to paupers, vagrants, drunks, beggars and homeless, but what makes this 
group so undeserving and so prone to attracting derogatory labels, is that 
they do not work. Most have not chosen a life of non-work, for unlike 
those born into wealth, people born into poverty usually find a life of 
unemployment pays very badly. Most of the paupers, the undeserving, 
belong to a group known as the unemployable, and what makes them 
unemployable is that their particular skills (or lack of skills) are either no 
longer, or never have been, marketable commodities. (Conley, 1982, p. 
281) 
I could have chosen to use one of these terms rather than Centrelink: clients. I 
could also have used the term welfare recipients or beneficiaries. However, few of these 
terms are used in current debates. The terms recipients and beneficiaries were common 
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in the 1970s and 1 980s, but they are now considered too passive. Some current writers 
use the term ' underclass' to refer to people who may have never worked in their lives 
and who don't expect to. They perceive an underclass of helplessness and 
intergenerational dependency on welfare (compared to Dean & Taylor-Gooby, 1 992}­
similar to the "jobless families" and "job poor communities" that McClure (2000a, p. 2) 
finds "disturbing". However, it is the underclass analysis that misunderstands the 
constitution of Centrelink clients. Research has found many Centrelink clients do 
experience short bursts of casual work between periods of unemployment-a 
phenomenon known as "job churning" (Le & Miller 1 999). This was a phenomenon 
experienced by many of the clients interviewed. Centrelink clients could also be seen as 
a ' labour pool' or ' reserve work force'. However, the terms ' underclass', ' labour pool' 
and ' reserve work force' do not distinguish between those working poor who may be 
breached by Centrelink and those who have no relationship with Centrelink and, as 
such, cannot be breached by them. 
Advocacy agencies like ACOSS and WRAS use the term 'Centrelink client' to 
indicate a service based relationship. The federal government takes this service 
relationship even further and uses the term ' customer' in its official documents13 
(Centrelink, September 2000) to indicate a consumer relationship between customers 
and government service providers. The use of both of these terms reveals a shift in 
rationality in governing the unemployed in Australia, and will form an important part of 
the analysis of this thesis, particularly in Chapter Seven. For now, let it suffice to say 
that by using the term Centrelink clients as the default term, we allow this shift to be 
perceptible. 
13 Although the terms ' bludgers' and 'people living on handouts' have been used by 
politicians when addressing the nation (Howard, 1999), the term customers is more 
common in official departmental documents. 
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Some Notes on Language 
Some of the language used by the interviewees might offend some people. 
Although I could have edited this 'bad' language to make it less colourful, I decided to 
leave it unaltered. As Jim, one of the interviewees explained: 
If you're scraping all that [bad language] you're you're not 
understanding . . .. Use it. Otherwise you're, you're not getting my 
frustration, you're not getting how I feel. And I've been feeling it for a 
long time. 
Thus, both as an attempt to help us understand how some interviewees felt, and as a 
respectful gesture to Jim, the more colourful language used by some interviewees 
remains unaltered in this thesis. I mean no disrespect by including it, and I hope no one 
is offended. Also, being aware of the gender dimensions of conventional grammar, I 
have chosen to use the plural 'their' rather than 'his' or the clumsy 'his/her' when 
referring to individuals. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
METHOD: EXPLORING CENTRELINK BREACH AND APPEAL 
FIGURES 
Chapter One showed a disparity between current Centrelink breach and appeal 
figures. This chapter outlines the methods used to explore these figures. First, it justifies 
the use of a case study of a single Centrelink office. It then outlines the data sources 
used, which included interviews with Centrelink clients as they were leaving the office, 
documentation collected from the office, and direct observation. Third, it outlines the 
techniques used to analyse the data to explore the significance of the current Centrelink 
breach and appeal numbers. Finally, it outlines some ethical considerations, explains 
some ways the validity and reliability of the study were facilitated, and some limitations 
of the study methods. 
A Case Study of a Centrelink Office: Justification 
There is currently a disparity of Centrelink breach and appeal numbers. 
However, simply describing the contrast between breach and appeal figures is not 
sufficient evidence to claim there is a relationship between them. To claim a 
relationship with this data alone commits the same logical fallacy as claiming there is a 
relationship between an increase in media interest in crime and an increase in the actual 
crime rate (Jupp, 1989). The two figures do not necessarily correlate. More data is 
needed. To my knowledge, the only research that has attempted to investigate a possible 
relationship between the current breach and appeal numbers has been done by WRAS 
(2000). However, they point out that their data is limited by its reliance on anecdotal 
evidence rather than a systematic inquiry into the relationship. Consequently, to 
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understand if there is a relationship between breach and appeal numbers, more evidence 
is required. 
Furthermore, the Centrelink breach and appeal figures described in Chapter One 
are not just abstract numbers-they happen to people. It is Centrelink clients who are 
breached, and who officially have access to the formal appeals structure. Despite this, 
no systematic research has attempted to explore a possible relationship between clients 
being breached and possible reasons for seeking a formal appeal. While some important 
research has investigated the experience of being breached (ACOSS, 200 1a; ACOSS, 
2001b; Lackner, 2001 ; Moses, 2000; Mullins, 2002; Office of the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman, 2002; Pearce et al., 2002; The Salvation Army Australia, 200 1 ;  WRAS, 
2000; Ziguras et al. ,  2003), this research does not link the breaches to appeals. While 
this research is useful and valuable, it offers insufficient evidence for any relationship 
between current breach and appeal numbers. 
The Wallis Consulting Group (2001), funded by FaCS, does link concerns about 
the breach rate with appeals. Their concern, however, is perfunctory. Their analysis 
consists of a six line paragraph (Wallis Consulting Group, 200 1 ,  p. 62), and research on 
appeals consisted of two closed-ended survey questions. Their concern, however, does 
not extend to the appeal numbers over the period that the breach figures increased so 
markedly. It also is not particularly interested in the experience of being breached or 
seeking an appeal : the Wallis Consulting Group (200 1 ,  p. 5) surveyed 3003 NSA and 
YA (unemployed) Centrelink clients over the phone using primarily closed-ended, short 
answer questions. This research alone does not provide sufficient evidence for any 
relationship between breach and appeal numbers. 
It is from the social context that evidence of any relationship between these two 
figures can be obtained. In other words, more data about the phenomenon of the 
disparity of breach and appeal numbers in its social context is needed. According to Yin 
( 1 993, p. 3 1) this constitutes a case study. An exploratory case study method was used 
in this research. 
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So, what case did I study, why was this case chosen and how did this proceed? 
The case used in a case study can be a person, a town or even a country. In this research 
the case was a particular Centrelink office-this included the clients that visited the 
office and the layout of the office. It also included the forms and fliers used by that 
office to communicate with clients (although these were produced in Canberra, they 
were collected from the site). A Centre link office is one of the few places where 
Centrelink clients congregate in one place, and where they all experience Centrelink 
decisions (including breaching) and can collect information about seeking a review and 
also lodge an appeal. Although a Centrelink office is by no means the only place where 
Centrelink clients experience Centrelink decisions or can seek a formal appeal, it is a 
place where these processes are linked. 
Another possible case might have been the SSAT or AAT. This would have 
allowed collection of contextual data about seeking a formal appeal, however a 
Centrelink office was preferred. This is because it allowed the social context of all 
Centrelink decisions and appeals to be studied at a single site. For a similar breadth of 
data both the SSAT and AAT would need to be studied-leading to many cases rather 
than one. Also, the AAT and SSAT would not allow the context of actual Centrelink 
decisions to be analysed, just appeals. To study a Centrelink office was a more resource 
efficient and effective approach. 
Another possible case might have been a JNA office. Indeed, this is where much 
of the management and surveillance of Centrelink clients occurs, for example, through 
negotiated agreements. However, JNAs do not administer breaches nor allow Centrelink 
clients to appeal their decisions (Owens, 2001). To study a Job Network office to 
explore Centrelink breaches and appeals would miss the phenomenon entirely. A 
Centrelink office is a more appropriate site to study the social context of Centrelink 
breaches, Centrelink decisions and formal appeals. 
Also, although a number of offices throughout Perth could have been sampled, 
this would not have significantly increased the representativeness of the sample­
especially nationally. Perhaps if offices could be randomly selected from each state and 
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territory a nationally representative sample could be obtained. However, this type of 
generalisation is not the aim of this project. As Stake ( 1995, p. 7-8) wrote, "the real 
business of case study is particularisation, not generalisation. We take a particular case 
and come to know it well". It is through a deeper contextual understanding of a 
Centrelink office that a deeper understanding of the significance of the current breach 
and appeal figures can be obtained. To concentrate on a single Centrelink office does 
not detrimentally limit an exploratory project such as this. To study any more offices, at 
this stage, would be an inefficient use of limited resources. 
The particular Centrelink office was selected according to the pragmatic criteria 
explicated by Stake: "time and access for fieldwork are almost always limited. If we 
can, we need to pick cases which are easy to get to and hospitable to our inquiry" 
(Stake, 1995, p. 7-8). The particular office chosen was close to the researcher's base. 
Further, its layout was suitable for conducting interviews with Centrelink clients 
without needing permission from Centrelink. It had an appropriate area on the footpath 
outside the office to conduct interviews. There was a metal bench that was obscured 
from the Centrelink officers working inside. The bench was also close enough to the 
exits to approach potential participants and obscured from the road so participants 
didn't need to be embarrassed to be seen outside the Centrelink office. It was also 
sheltered from the sun and rain. These factors were shown to be important when I 
attempted to conduct interviews outside another Centrelink office. Although one 
interview, with Jed, was completed, a Centrelink officer who could see the interviewee 
and myself from inside the office interrupted it. I was concerned about the interviewee's 
privacy. It was also physically uncomfortable for potential interviewees and myself 
outside the other Centrelink office, as there was nowhere to sit down, no shelter and too 
much traffic noise. 
Data was collected from the selected office usmg a variety of sources­
interviews with Centrelink clients after they visited the office, documents such as forms 
and fliers found in the office, and direct observation inside the office which included 
drawing a map of the office layout. According to Yin ( 1989, p. 84-95) these are 
common sources of evidence for case studies. Each source is elaborated below. 
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Individual Focused Interviews 
Individual focused interviews of Centrelink clients were conducted. Although a 
particular set of theoretical frameworks were being evaluated, including neo-liberal, 
advocacy, new-contractualism, one that views surveillance as oppressive and one 
derived from the work of Michel Foucault, I still needed to provide room for 
unexpected responses. This is because the study was essentially explorative. According 
to Minichiello et al. ( 1995) individual focused interviews permit this exploration and 
flexibility, within a broad framework. This is because in individual focused interviews 
"the topic area guides the questions being asked, but the mode of asking follows the 
unstructured interview process" (Minichiello et al. 1995, p. 65). Clients' accounts of 
Centrelink decisions, payment postponements, breaches, appealing, and their account of 
the appeal system itself were sought. Please see Appendix A for the interview schedule. 
Information about Centrelink clients' accounts of the appeal system was 
obtained through a series of open-ended and closed-ended questions. An example of a 
closed-ended question is: 
"To what extent are you aware that you have a right to have decisions of 
Centrelink subject to a review by an Authorised Review Officer?" 
I I I I ------- -------
Very aware Somewhat Aware Not Sure Not Aware 
An example of an open-ended question about appeal system knowledge is: 
"What rights do you think you have when you disagree with a decision 
taken by Centrelink?" 
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Demographic information was also collected. 14 Also, room for unforseen information 
was allowed through broad questions such as "would you like to add anything else to 
this conversation?" The interviews were taped and interviewees were encouraged to 
speak freely if they wished-all did to some extent. Interview duration ranged from 1 0  
minutes to almost an hour. 
As Minichiello suggests (Minichiello et al. 1 995, p. 80), the interviews consisted 
of three main sections-an opening, topical sections and a closing. A "funnelling" 
process of questioning was used (Minichiello et al. 1 995, p. 84). This means "as the 
participants engage in conversation, the interviewer guides the informant's view 
towards more specific" and personal issues (Minichiello et al. 1 995, p. 84). This gently 
built rapport with participants and encouraged them to discuss their experiences with 
Centrelink. This is especially important for research with income support recipients. 
Brewer found in his interviews with Australian unemployed people that some were 
initially "wary and defensive" when discussing feelings about their situation (Brewer, 
1 980, p. 47). 
Sampling 
Interviewees were sampled from the population of Centrelink clients who visited 
the Centrelink office, and might incur an activity or administrative breach. Although the 
topic of the thesis is Centrelink breach and appeal numbers, clients were interviewed 
regardless of whether they had been breached. This is for two main reasons. First, this 
research aimed to explore interpretations of the breach and appeal figures. An answer to 
this question required information about all Centrelink clients' knowledge of the 
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appeals system, not just those who have been breached. Second, it was difficult to 
discern who was breached before the commencement of an interview. I believe it would 
have discouraged people from participating if they were approached with a question 
about their breach record (following the experience of Brewer, 1980, p. 47). This would 
also preclude the funnelling questioning technique outlined above. Also, to find out that 
someone had not been breached while conducting the interview, and then discard his or 
her contribution, would be inappropriate. Further, as will be shown later, some clients 
seemed confused about whether they had indeed been breached. 
Three techniques were used to try to obtain a random sample of potentially 
breached Centrelink clients leaving the Centrelink office. First, following a technique 
described by Neuman ( 1991), every seventh person exiting the Centrelink office was 
invited to participate in the research. Second, I aimed for a balance of different 
demographic groups, such as age and gender, following Lowenstein's ( 1997) study. 
Lowenstein obtained this balance through a somewhat organic process; simply 
continuing interviewing until a loose balance emerged. The male/female ratio of 
participants in this project was 13/9. Please see Table 2 for the age groups sampled. At 
least one member of each age group indicated participated in the study; unfortunately no 
one over 5 5  participated. Aged pensioners and disability support recipients used another 
entrance and were thus not sampled. Since people receiving these payments cannot 
incur either an activity or administrative breach, they are not relevant to the study. 
While most of the interviewees were under 35 years old, this may reflect the general 
population of clients who used the Centrelink office and might incur a breach rather 
than sample bias. There are more Centrelink clients who are under 35 years old 
receiving payments that are subject to the breach regime than older clients (FaCS, 2003, 
p. 28, 30, 32, 36). Third, time stratified sampling-Monday morning first week, 
Monday afternoon second week, Tuesday morning third week, and so on (similar to 
Carrington, 1993 )-was used. 
14 This was a requirement of the Western Australian WRAS, who I worked with in the 
early stages of this project. The Western Australian WRAS also helped develop the 
interview schedule. 
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Table 2. Age group of participants 
Age group Number of participants 
1 5-2 1 3 
2 1 -24 7 
25-34 8 
35-44 3 
45-54 1 
Total 22 
A total of at least thirty Centrelink clients was originally anticipated, continuing 
until I reached a point of theoretical saturation, end of research time, or no more willing 
participants. Twenty-two interviews were sufficient for this exploratory project. A brief 
description of each interviewee is listed along side their pseudonym in appendix C. 
Recruiting interviewees 
Recruiting Centrelink clients has proved problematic for many researchers since 
they are a geographically decentred group. However, researchers who have conducted 
immediate, in-situ interviews outside government offices (Fitzpatrick, 1 987; Turner, 
1983), or job clubs (Brewer, 1980; Fitzpatrick, 1 987) have experienced the most 
success. Indeed, no person approached by Turner ( 1 983) outside DSS offices declined 
to be interviewed. In contrast, advertising in local newspapers seems the least successful 
technique employed, with Fitzpatrick ( 1987) receiving only one response, and that 
being abusive. In the light of past successes and challenges, I recruited people from 
directly outside the Centrelink office, and avoided advertising in newspapers. 
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I was concerned that Centrelink clients may be reluctant to talk with me if they 
thought I worked for Centrelink. Therefore, I needed to distinguish myself from 
Centrelink. I wore smart-casual clothing Geans and a t-shirt, not a business suit), 
introduced myself as a Masters student from Edith Cowan University doing research on 
Centrelink breaches and appeals, reassured them of my independence from Centrelink 
and gave them a declaration and consent form to read (see Appendix B). 
It is important to consider that not all people who enter or exit a Centrelink 
building are Centrelink clients (they may be staff for example). However, a sufficient 
percentage of the human traffic were Centrelink clients and this approach to recruitment 
was successful. Most people approached participated, which reflects past research that 
recruited unemployed people directly from the office (Fitzpatrick, 1 987; Lowenstein, 
1 997; Turner, 1 983, p. 2-3). 
Ethical considerations 
The Edith Cowan University ethics committee for research on humans approved 
the interview research methods. Interviews were only conducted after the interviewee 
gave informed consent. Informed consent meant that, after I informed the participant of 
the nature of the research, their anonymity, and freedom to decline at any time without 
giving reasons, the interviewee signed the informed consent form (see declaration and 
consent form in Appendix B). It was essential that the participants understood that the 
research was independent from Centrelink. This means that participation involved no 
financial benefit or punishment, nor could it be used for mutual obligation. 
Since some YA recipients are minors, special consideration of their rights was 
required. Before the potential participant signed a consent form, I established whether 
they were a minor. I asked them ifin doubt. No one I approached was a minor. 
42 
Each participant's confidentiality was maintained by using pseudonyms on the 
cassette tapes and transcripts of interviews, and in the research report. No participant' s  
real name or actual contact details were recorded on the tapes, transcripts, interview 
schedules or in the final research report. 
If any interviewee stated they wished to seek an appeal of their breach, or asked 
for information about appealing breaches, then I referred them to relevant services. I 
carried brochures produced by local community legal centres, and phone numbers for 
the SSAT and Ombudsman. This documentation was not available from the Centrelink 
office. However, other documents that were available from the office were important 
sources of evidence for this thesis. 
Documentation 
The documents collected from the Centrelink office for this research are 
described below. All documents, except for the customer charter (Centrelink, September 
2000), were obtained through a Centrelink officer because they were not available 
without this contact. According to Yin ( 1 989, p. 86) documents should not be seen as 
unbiased accounts of the working of, for example, a Centrelink office or action of a 
Centrelink client. Rather, they should be understood to be a particular view point. Also, 
"for case studies, the most important use of documents is to corroborate and augment 
evidence from different sources" (Yin, 1 989, p. 86). The documents used in this thesis 
included: 
Application for payment of Newstart Allowance (Centre/ink, 2 May 2000) 
( also known as the 'fortnightly ' form). This is a double sided A4 sheet which must be 
completed personally by NSA clients every fortnight and returned to a Centrelink office 
to ensure payment continues. Mitchell Dean ( 1998, p. 95) used the 'fortnightly' form to 
demonstrate how the ethical lives of the unemployed are governed. 
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The jobseeker guide (Centre/ink, 2000d) and jobseeker diary ( also known as 
the 'dole ' diary). Together they comprise a small stapled aqua and purple printed 
booklet, in which The jobseeker diary (Centrelink, 2000c) is a removable insert. The 
jobseeker diary (Centrelink, 2000c) (37 pages) is where the client records job search 
activity in detail . It is removable so it can be lodged at a Centrelink office after twelve 
weeks of diary keeping. A new diary is then collected by the client for completion over 
the next twelve weeks. The jobseeker guide (Centrelink, 2000d) ( 1 8  pages) is for the 
Centrelink client to keep private job search notes and contains job search tips, similar to 
the "Job Search Kit" referred to in Mitchell Dean's research ( 1998, p. 95). 
What we can do to help each other: customer charter (Centre/ink, September 
2000). This is an information pamphlet. It is glossy and printed in green and orange 
ink. They are very common-laminated copies of this pamphlet were on the counters of 
the Centrelink office. The pamphlet outlines appropriate behaviour for both Centrelink 
and its clients. 
Claim for Newstart Allowance (Centre/ink, 2000b) and Notes for Newstart 
Allowance (Centre/ink, 2000e). An A4 sized booklet, matt printed in purple and green 
ink. The Claim for Newstart Allowance (Centrelink, 2000b) is a 23 page form that must 
be completed by a client, often in an interview with a Centrelink officer, in order to 
apply for NSA. The 8 page Notes for Newstart Allowance (Centrelink, 2000e) is a 
smaller booklet insert of instructions for completing the NSA application form. 
Direct Observation 
As Yin ( 1 989, p. 9 1 )  suggests, direct observation ranges "from formal to casual 
data collection activities". The formal observation in this study included a map of the 
office layout drawn by the researcher during a visit to the office in early 2002. Casual 
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observations were also noted throughout the research, particularly when interviewing 
Centrelink clients. 
Analysing Evidence 
Data was analysed according to different possible explanations of current breach 
and appeal figures in the Australian social policy literature-from neo-liberalism, to 
advocacy, to new contractualism, to surveillance as oppressive, to an approach drawn 
from the work of Michel Foucault. This process was similar to Yin's "explanation 
building" where "the case study evidence is examined, theoretical positions are revised, 
and the evidence is examined once again from another perspective" (Yin, 1989, p. 1 13-
115). Different evidence was used to evaluate different possible explanations. For 
example, interviews with Centrelink clients were invaluable for evaluating the neo­
liberal, advocacy, and new-contractualism approaches, while the documents and map 
derived from direct observation were most useful for evaluating the approach drawn 
from the work of Michel Foucault. Like most existing case studies, this analysis will 
proceed in narrative form (Yin, 1989, p. 113)-through critically applying and 
evaluating each approach according to the evidence. The neo-liberal and advocacy 
approaches will be the first to be evaluated, then the new-contractualism approach, then 
the oppressive surveillance approach, and finally an approach that draws from Michel 
Foucault's ideas. 
Validity and Reliability 
According to Yin (1994, p. 92), case studies that use multiple sources of 
evidence curbed potential validity (or accuracy) problems. Using different data sources 
also allowed me to triangulate these different sources to corroborate findings. Further 
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validity was enhanced by analysing the data according to different possible 
explanations, and evaluating these different possibilities (Yin, 1993). 
I reduced the chance of a biased sample of interviewees, and thus improved the 
validity of the research, in four ways. I attempted to obtain a balance of different 
demographic groups, used time-stratified sampling methods, interviewed as many 
people as possible, and consulted with industry professionals such as WRAS. 
The reliability ( or reproducible nature) of the research was facilitated by keeping 
a research diary, and describing my research and analytic method. Also, using the same 
interviewer (myself) and following the same research schedule at each interview 
enhanced the reliability of the interview findings. 
Methodological Limitations 
However, any conclusions made through this research should be tempered with 
an understanding of some methodological limitations of the study. We must remember 
that a single case study was used. A single Centrelink office was studied in detail. While 
this allowed detailed information about a particular office to be collected-such as the 
indiscriminate nature of breaching and many clients' attitudes to appealing-this was 
only one case. This means that any attempt to extrapolate these findings to the entire 
population must be cautious. I have no reason to assume the particular office studied 
was representative of all Centrelink offices. However, I have no reason to assume it was 
significantly different either. As Stake (1995) explains, inferences can be made from a 
small number of cases; however they must be made with caution and with consideration 
of other possibilities. I hope I have done this through considering different 
interpretations of the breach and appeal numbers. 
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The data collection techniques also had potential limitations that should be 
recalled here-particularly the interviews. Some of these limitations are listed below. 
• Despite all my efforts, interviewees ( also people who declined to be interviewed) 
may still not have believed I was independent from Centrelink and may have altered 
their responses accordingly. 
• My age and gender may have influenced people's responses to my questions. Since 
I was the only interviewer, I was very sensitive to this while conducting the 
interviews and also during the analysis of their transcripts. 
• I was only able to interview unemployed people who could access the Centrelink 
office; my sampling excluded people from regional Australia, and people who were 
too ill to attend Centrelink. 
• Since I conducted the interviews in English, I am aware that non-English speakers 
were excluded from the sample. 
Conclusion 
Numerical figures alone provide insufficient evidence for a relationship between 
breach and appeal figures. More data on the social context, which links Centrelink 
decisions such as being breached to the formal appeals structure, is required. An 
exploratory case study of a single Centrelink office, incorporating documentary 
evidence, individual focused interviews, and direct observation, was used. The case was 
analysed according to an evaluation of different social policy interpretations of the 
current breach and appeal figures. Chapter Four explores and evaluates the neo-liberal 
and advocacy interpretations of current Centrelink breaches and appeals. Chapter Five 
explores and evaluates the new-contractualism writers' interpretations. Chapter Six . 
explores and evaluates some oppressive surveillance accounts. Finally, Chapter Seven 
evaluates the discipline and govemmentality analyses of current Centrelink breach and 
appeal figures. 
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However, as Esping-Anderson (1990/2000, p. 155) postulated in his seminal 
taxonomy of welfare regimes, "we cannot test contending arguments unless we have a 
commonly shared conception of the phenomenon to be explained". In the context of 
exploring possible explanations of the current breach and appeal numbers through a 
case study of a Centrelink office, the specific phenomena are breaches and appeals. 
These breaches and appeals exist within the context of the Australian welfare regime. 
Therefore, we must establish an understanding of the Australian welfare regime before 
different interpretations of the breach and appeal figures can be tested against the case 
study findings. The Australian welfare regime is the topic of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE AUSTRALIAN WELFARE REGIME 
This chapter will establish a conception of the current Australian welfare regime. 
This will be used as a basis for the pending evaluation of different explanations of 
current breach and appeal numbers. As explained in the previous chapter, without this 
the pending evaluation will be less convincing. However, establishing a conception of 
the Australian welfare state is a complex task. 
A very general definition of a welfare state is a state that accepts "responsibility 
for securing some basic modicum of welfare for its citizens" (Esping-Anderson, 
1990/2000, p. 154). According to this definition, Australia could be considered to be a 
welfare state. However, this definition is too general for three reasons. 
First, this definition is too general because it does not address questions about 
the level of state responsibility, how this responsibility is administered and whether this 
is a desirable method. In short, it ignores the diverse ways that different governments 
have attempted to guarantee welfare. For example, social democratic governments like 
the Scandinavian countries have a different approach to welfare than Australia, America 
and Britain which are often referred to as liberal welfare regimes (Esping-Anderson, 
1990/2000). 
Second, the above definition is too general because even within a particular 
welfare state there are different forms of service provision. For example, Richard 
Titmuss (1968/1979) famously extended the common sense definition of welfare as 
income relief to include all social benefits from governmental redistribution of wealth. 
He perceived direct income relief to be the equivalent of the tip of an iceberg of the 
entire social spending by government. The submerged bulk of the iceberg of social 
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spending, according to Titmuss, is enjoyed by the middle and upper classes through tax 
breaks, industry subsidies and general infrastructure like roads. 
Similarly, more recent Australian writers (such as Bryson, 1 992; McMahon, 
Thomson, & Williams, 2000; Williams, 1 989) distinguish different types of welfare 
within the Australian welfare state. They distinguish social welfare from occupational 
and fiscal welfare. Social welfare, according to McMahon (2000, p. 1 0) includes 
"government-individual benefits redistributed from taxation to those who are eligible in 
relation to defined and strictly evaluated need". It is applied mostly to the poorer 
sections of the population. In contrast occupational welfare is defined as welfare that 
includes benefits paid "to wage and salary earners over and above their pay, including 
those referred to as fringe benefits" (Bryson, 1 992, p. 1 3 1  ), such as company cars and 
travel expenses. And fiscal welfare "is the use of the taxation system to reduce the 
amount of taxes paid on certain approved goods and services" (McMahon et al. 2000, p. 
1 0) such as investments. Both occupational and fiscal welfare benefit the middle and 
higher income earners more than the poor. They continue to explain that: 
In addition, the welfare state also delivers education, health, policing, 
cultural and recreational services. Like occupational and fiscal welfare, 
these services also favour those who are already better off. (McMahon et 
al. 2000, p. 1 0) 
Third, the above definition of the welfare state is too general because it ignores 
that the Australian welfare regime has changed over time. For example, in the 
nineteenth century social welfare provision was handled by voluntary organisations, 
such as the Benevolent Society of New South Wales (Conley, 1 982), while in the post 
war period social provision was administered primarily by the Federal Government of 
Australia. 
Consequently, the general definition of a welfare state offered above is over 
simplistic. It does not consider differences among welfare states, different welfare 
provisions within welfare states, or historical changes. Another definition is required. A 
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taxonomic system helps to establish the best way to conceptualise the current Australian 
welfare regime. Different writers, however, offer different categorisations of welfare 
states. For example, some writers distinguish among welfare states according to the 
level of expenditure, others according to the type of welfare provision-residual or 
institutional, and others according to citizenship rights. Therefore, an understanding of 
the current Australian welfare regime should consider different categorisations of 
welfare states. Consequently, this chapter will consider the distinctions made by the 
level of expenditure writers, then Richard Titmuss, then TH Marshall, then Esping 
Anderson, then some neo-liberal writers. These different categorisations will form the 
organisational structure of this chapter. 
Categorising Welfare States 
Levels of expenditure 
One taxonomy of welfare states focuses on the level of social expenditure, 
assuming that more expenditure indicates a greater commitment to welfare (Esping­
Anderson, 1 990/2000, p. 1 55). However, relating this to Australia is problematic. On 
the one hand, Peter Saunders (then Director of the Australian Institute of Family 
Studies) paraphrases the then Senator Jocelyn Newman, Minister for Family and 
Community Services, "that rising rates of welfare dependency were . . . placing an 
increasing burden on government expenditure" (Saunders, 2000, p. 1 ). Saunders and 
Newman might argue, according to the levels of expenditure taxonomy, that Australia 
currently has an exorbitantly high commitment to welfare. On the other hand, many 
writers observe that as poverty and unemployment are increasing, the scope for people 
to actually obtain services from the state is decreasing (McMahon et al. 2000). Hence, 
while total expenditure may seem to be increasing, the actual level of support is not. It 
seems that Esping-Anderson (1 990/2000, p. 1 55) was correct to criticise the 
categorisation of welfare states according to their level of expenditure because they 
ignore important structural and political issues. For example, he states that the "focus on 
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spending may be misleading" because "some nations spend enormous sums on fiscal 
welfare in the form of tax privileges to private insurance plans that mainly benefit the 
middle classes" (Esping-Anderson, 1 990/2000, p. 1 55). 
Residual and institutional welfare 
Another approach derives from Richard Titmuss's (1 968/2000) classical 
distinction between institutional and residual welfare states (Esping-Anderson, 
1 990/2000, p. 1 56). In an institutional welfare state, the state universally addresses the 
entire population, and embodies an institutionalised commitment to welfare. Also, "it 
will, in principle, extend welfare commitments to all areas of distribution vital for 
societal welfare" (Esping-Anderson, 1 990/2000, p. 1 56). In contrast, residual welfare 
"assumes responsibility only when the family or the market fails; it seeks to limit its 
commitments to marginal and deserving social groups" (Esping-Anderson, 1 990/2000, 
p. 1 56). According to this distinction, the Australian welfare state has been residual 
throughout its history, but to different degrees. Before federation welfare in Australia 
was administered by voluntary community agencies, like the Benevolent Society of 
New South Wales (Dickey, 1 987). These societies provided basic relief to marginal, 
deserving groups (Conley, 1 982). Under the Whitlam Labor Government in the 1 970s, 
welfare in Australia was the closest to universal it has ever been. McMahon et al. (2000) 
refers to this period as a "high water mark" of democratic socialism in Australia. 
Education (including tertiary education) became free and Medibank (universal public 
health insurance) (van Krieken et al. 2000, p. 1 59, 1 90) was introduced. Both of these 
services were available without means testing. However, since a fiscal crisis was 
declared in the late 1 970s the Australian welfare regime has become increasingly 
residual. A student loan scheme for university fees has been introduced (the Higher 
Education Contribution Scheme) (Australian Taxation Office, Department of 
Employment Education and Training, & Department of Employment Education 
Training and Youth Affairs, 1 989) and more recently high-income earners have been 
financially penalised through tax for using the public health system rather than private 
health insurance (see A New Tax System (Medicare Levy Surcharge - Fringe Benefits 
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Amendment) Bill 2000 (Cwth)). This might surprise Titmuss because he writes about 
residual welfare in the 1950s in the past tense. For example, according to Titmuss: 
In the past, poor quality selective services for poor people were the 
product of a society which saw 'welfare' as residual; as a public burden. 
The primary purpose of the system and the method of discrimination 
was, therefore, deterrence (it was also an effective rationing device). 
(Italics not in original R. Titmuss 1968/2000, p. 47) 
While this "universal versus residual" distinction is useful, it is not a simple 
dichotomy. Titmuss (1968/2000, p. 46) believes "those students of welfare who are 
seeing the main problem today in terms of "universal versus selective" services are 
presenting a naive and oversimplified picture of policy choices". Indeed, such 
oversimplifications do not account for other diverse characteristics of welfare states 
such as citizenship rights or social structure (Esping-Anderson, 1990/2000, p. 157). 
Three levels of citizenship: civil, political and social 
Another approach derives from TH Marshall's classical division of citizenship 
into three parts-"civil, political and social" (Marshall, 1949/2000, p. 32). TH Marshall 
( 1949/2000, p. 32) explains that the "civil element" of citizenship: 
is composed of rights necessary for individual freedom-liberty of the 
person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property 
and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice . . . The 
institutions most directly associated with civil rights are the courts of 
justice. 
The "political element" of citizenship to TH Marshall ( 1949/2000, p. 32) is: 
the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of 
a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members 
of such a body. The corresponding institutions are parliament and 
councils of local government. 
To TH Marshall (1 949/2000, p. 32) the "social element" of citizenship is: 
the whole range, from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and 
security to the right to share the full social heritage and to live the life of 
a civilised being according to the standards of the prevailing society. The 
institutions most closely connected with it are the educational system and 
the social services. 
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According to Marshall social rights are both the newest part of citizenship to be 
extended, and have been separated from citizenship in certain periods. For example, the 
Poor Law1 5  in England from 1 834 to 1 918 :  
treated the claims of the poor, not as an integral part of the rights of the 
citizen, but as an alternative to them-as claims which could be met only 
if the claimants ceased to be citizens in any true sense of the word. For 
paupers forfeited in practice the civil right of personal liberty, by 
internment in the workhouses, and they forfeited by law any political 
rights they might possess ... The stigma which clung to poor relief 
expressed the deep feelings of a people who understood that those who 
accepted relief must cross the road that separated the community of 
citizens from the outcast company of the destitute. (Marshall, 1 949/2000, 
p. 34-35) 
Many writers have used this separation of citizenship into civil, political and 
social to map changes in the Australian welfare state. In particular, some writers point to 
a current divorce of social citizenship, in the form of rights to welfare, from general 
citizenship rights (Bessant, 2000a; Camey & Ramia, 1 999; Camey & Ramia, 2001 ; 
Harris, 1 999; Shaver, 2001 ). They point to the increasing requirements that claimants 
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must meet to receive payment, including voluntary work under mutual obligation and 
work for the dole, as evidence for this change. Further, some writers even argue that 
large segments of the population have been effectively denied citizenship due to the 
biases of the Australian welfare state. For example, Carol Pateman (1 989/2000) argues 
that women have never been considered full citizens under the Australian welfare 
system because they have never been considered independent (see also, Bryson, 1 992; 
Bussemaker & Voet, 1 998; Shaver, 2001 ). However, while focusing on different types 
of citizenship may offer a useful basis of critique for current trends in Australian social 
welfare policy16, it does not account for all variations among different types of welfare 
states. For example, it does not accommodate different types of social stratification to 
consider inequalities among those with similar citizenship rights such as tax breaks (that 
is, occupational welfare) for a white collar working man compared to a blue collar 
employed gent's occupational welfare. 
The three worlds of welfare capitalism 
Another approach to categorising welfare states is the well-known taxonomy 
developed by Esping-Anderson (1 990/2000) in The three worlds of welfare capitalism. 
He attempted to account for "qualitatively different arrangements between state, market 
and the family" (Esping-Anderson, 1 990/2000, p. 1 61 ). He identified three clusters of 
regime types-liberal, corporatist and social democratic (Esping-Anderson, 1 990/2000, 
p. 1 62). 
Corporatist welfare regimes, Germany for example, focus on contributory social 
insurance. As Robert E. Goodin (2000, p. 1 72-1 73 ) summarises, in a corporatist regime 
"you get what you pay for and you pay for what you get. Furthermore, what insurance 
pays you when you are unable to work is a direct function, and a large fraction, of what 
you used to earn when you were in work." Here "what predominated was the 
15 Poor Laws were laws designed to regulate the poor in England. See Chapter Six for 
more information about the English Poor Laws. 
16 As will be shown in Capter Five. 
55 
preservation of status differentials; rights, therefore, were attached to class and status" 
(Esping-Anderson, 1 990/2000, p. 162). 
pursue: 
Social democratic welfare regimes include the Scandinavian countries. They 
a welfare state that would promote an equality of the highest standards, 
not an equality of minimal needs as was pursued elsewhere . . .  manual 
workers come to enjoy rights identical with those of salaried white-collar 
employees or civil servants; all strata are incorporated under one 
universal insurance system, yet benefits are graduated according to 
accustomed earnings. This model crowds out the market. (Esping­
Anderson, 1 990/2000, p. 1 63) 
Finally, in liberal welfare regimes: 
means tested assistance, modest universal transfers or modest social 
insurance plans predominate. Benefits cater mainly to clientele of low 
income, usually working class, state dependants. In this model, the 
progress of social reform has been severely circumscribed by traditional, 
liberal work-ethic norms: it is one where the limits of welfare equal the 
marginal propensity to opt for welfare instead of work. Entitlement rules 
are therefore strict and often associated with stigma; benefits are 
typically modest. In tum, the state encourages the market, either 
passively-by guaranteeing only a mm1mum--or actively-by 
subsidising private welfare schemes. (Esping-Anderson, 1 990/2000, p. 
1 62) 
Esping-Anderson locates Australia, along with the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom, in the liberal cluster (1 990/2000, p. 1 62). 
This taxonomy accounts for many variations among different types of welfare 
state. However, Esping-Anderson (1 990/2000, p. 1 63) qualifies this taxonomy with a 
caution that "welfare states cluster, but we must recognise that there is no single pure 
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case ... Neither are the liberal regimes pure types". Indeed, there are variations among 
liberal states which are not accommodated by the large category "liberal welfare 
regimes". The next section extends Esping-Anderson's taxonomy to include some 
contemporary interpretations of liberalism apparent in western welfare states. 
Contemporary flavours of neo-liberalism-Hayek, Mead and Murray 
There are many contemporary flavours of liberalism that are becoming 
increasingly influential in western liberal welfare states. These ideas are often 
collectively called neo-liberal or new-right ideas. For convenience, this thesis will refer 
to such ideas as neo-liberal. Traces of the neo-liberal ideas of Friedrich von Hayek, who 
wrote 40-50 years ago, and Lawrence M Mead and Charles Murray, who are more 
current writers, can all be found in the Australian welfare regime. 
Hayek's  ideas about welfare and freedom, for example, have been very 
influential in Australia. He interprets the ideal liberal welfare state as one that does not 
impinge on individual liberty. Although Hayek does not argue against all state based 
welfare provision, he does believe that certain "methods of government action" (Hayek, 
1 959/2000, p. 91 ) deny individuals their freedom. He claims that: 
The reason why many of the new welfare activities of government are a 
threat to freedom, then, is that, though they are presented as mere service 
activities, they really constitute an exercise of the coercive powers of 
government and rest on its claiming exclusive rights in certain fields. 
(Hayek, 1 959/2000, p. 91 ) 
Hayek (1 959/2000, p. 92) does not consider redistribution of wealth to be the primary 
aim of welfare because "it is bound to lead back to socialism and its coercive and 
essentially arbitrary methods". He continues to warn against giving government 
"exclusive and monopolistic powers" because "the chief danger today is that, once an 
aim of government is accepted as legitimate, it is then assumed that even means 
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contrary to the principles of freedom may be legitimately employed" (Hayek, 
1959/2000, p. 92-93). 
Hayek's ideas have become increasingly influential in Australian social policy. 
For example, the Liberal-National coalition government's replacement of the state 
based CES with many competing JNAs fits well with Hayek's concern about the 
monopoly and coercion of government. Similarly, Newman, when she was Minister for 
Family and Community Services, expressed Hayek type concerns about how the erosion 
of individual enterprise means the national market economy is compromised: 
Long-term worklessness and welfare dependency tends to reduce 
people's opportunities to participate fully in society. This means the 
productive capacity of the nation is not as great as it could be. (Newman, 
1999, p. 6) 
Even Hayek's argument that government services are socialist and threaten individual 
freedom is mirrored by Vanstone when she was Minister for Family and Community 
Services: 
Liberal social policies, which are based on a recognition of the primacy 
of the individual, which see choice as a better motivator than 
compulsion, and which see the community rather than government as the 
natural builder and owner of social capital were the victors of the 
twentieth century ideological war. (Vanstone, 2001) 
She continues later in the same address: 
The victory has been the triumph of liberal democracy with its focus on 
the individual over communism, socialism and any other system which 
does not acknowledge the primacy of the individual. (Vanstone, 2001) 
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Mendes (1 998) maps the influence of Hayek's ideas (along with Adam Smith's 
and Milton Friedman's) on the Liberal Party of Australia from 1 983 to 1 997. He shows 
that concerns "to reduce government interference with free market outcomes by 
restricting access to social security payments" have gained influence from the early 
1 980s on (Mendes, 1 998, p. 74). Mendes calls this a "neo-liberal takeover of the Liberal 
Party" (Mendes, 1 998, p. 68). This was in response to the defeat of the Fraser Liberal 
government. However, in response to further election defeats the Liberal Party made a 
pragmatic compromise by adding to concerns about market interference some social 
conservative concerns "to reinforce traditional institutions such as the family" (Mendes, 
1 998, p. 74). Mendes claims that this compromise of the small government, freedom 
focused agenda of Hayek is the platform that led the Liberal and National Parties to 
form a coalition government in 1 996. This demonstrates a small departure from the 
freedom focused agenda ofHayek's, who expresses disdain for governments that decide 
what people need and should be like (Hayek, 1 959/2000; 1 976; 1 979). 
Since the Liberal and National Parties' coalition government has extended its 
term in office, the influence of Lawrence Mead's ideas has become clear (Mendes, 
2000). This is to the extent that, during the debate about welfare reform that led to the 
McClure report (2000a; 2000b ): 
[t]he government brought Lawrence Mead to Australia to extol the 
virtues of US-style reform. Mead was the keynote speaker at the annual 
conference of the quasi-independent research body the Australian 
Institute of Family Studies (AIFS) .. .  The AIFS, then under the research 
direction of British neo-liberal academic Peter Saunders, lauded the 
views of Mead and their relevance to the Australian situation. (Mendes, 
2000, p. 3) 
In contrast to Hayek's focus on freedom, Mead (1 997a; 1 997b) supports a mutual 
responsibility in which welfare recipients must be forced to be free, or, coerced into 
being competent citizens. This is because, according to Mead, despite fewer structural 
barriers to good paid employment since the 1 960s and early 1 970s, poverty has become 
entrenched amongst those who work little because they do not have the competence, 
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confidence or motivation to sustain full time employment. He (Mead, 1 991/2000, p. 
1 07) believes that this has formed an underclass whose "poverty stems less from the 
absence of opportunity than from the inability or reluctance to take advantage of 
opportunity". 
Newman, when she was Minister for Family and Community Services, reflected 
Mead's ideas about the need to force people to be selfreliant. For example, she said: 
We do welfare recipients no favours by simply paying their benefits and 
being content to leave them on welfare indefinitely. They have both the 
right and the obligation to share in the benefits of economic and 
employment growth and to participate in th�ir communities to the full 
extent of their capacity (Newman, 1 999, p. 6). 
Further, the influential McClure report (2000a; McClure, 2000b) reflects Mead's 
position with its dire warnings about welfare dependence and "entrenched economic 
and social disadvantage" which led to "an intergenerational cycle of significant 
joblessness" (McClure, 2000a, p. 3). McClure recommends we "re-think and re­
configure our approach to social support". He claims that a "social support system 
should seek to optimise their [clients'] capacity for [social and economic] participation" 
(McClure, 2000a, p. 3-4). McClure thus recommends a focus on "participation support" 
rather than income support. 
Further, Mead (1 991/2000, p. 1 1 1 ) argues that, in the United States, and 
increasingly in the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe, "the drift is towards policies 
that address [the lack of] motivation by seeking to direct the lives of those dependent on 
government" so they can eventually help themselves. Newer paternalistic programs, 
such as workfare in the United States, have this aim (Mead, 1 991/2000). So too do the 
post-1 997 Australian Liberal/National coalition government's policies of mutual 
obligation, work for the dole, and increased surveillance though the jobseeker diary 
(Mendes, 2000, p. 26). Indeed, in The challenge of welfare dependency in the 2151 
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century (1 999) released by the then Senator Newman, welfare dependency is seen as 
best combated by mutual obligation (see O'Connor, 2001 ). Indeed, according to 
Newman (1 999, p. 9, 1 0), one of "a number of key principles that will underpin the 
reform of the welfare system" is: 
expecting people on income support to help themselves and make a 
contribution to society, through increased social and economic 
participation reflecting mutual obligation. (Original is in bold type) 
Similarly, Tony Abbott, Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, justifies 
work for the dole along Mead like lines: 
Work for the Dole is starting to change· the culture of welfare and work. 
Work for the Dole demonstrates to unemployed people that they have not 
been abandoned to quiet despair in front of the television set. It reassures 
wider society that they are pulling their weight in a largely shirker proof 
system. Most significantly, it helps to overcome the impact of a 
regressive tax transfer system by creating a strong non-monetary 
incentive to find work. If the alternative to working for a wage is 
working for the dole, even part-time work at modest rates of pay 
becomes considerably more attractive. There's nothing ' punishing' about 
Work for the Dole projects but participation invariably involves turning 
up on time, attention to detail, taking responsibility and working in a 
team (like a normal job) and failure to perform can involve a failure to be 
paid (like a normal job). (Abbott, 2003) 
Mead's agenda has thus been deeply influential in Australian social policy since the 
Liberal/National coalition government has been in power. However, as Mendes (2000, 
p. 24) points out, Mead's big state approach has not been complemented by the 
increased welfare spending required to force Centrelink clients to be free. Rather, much 
government talk suggests the need to reduce government spending. For example Prime 
Minister John Howard's 1 999 Federation Address titled The Australian way criticised 
the then welfare system for passivity and over-generosity as follows: 
The dole system we inherited sent the worst possible message to young 
Australians. It told them that dropping out of school, out of their 
communities, escaping personal responsibility, was acceptable and that 
the taxpayer would foot the bill. (Howard, 1 999) 
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Hayek's concern about the problems of budget and big government have been 
shown to be shared by the current Liberal/National coalition government; so too was 
Mead's  concern about making welfare dependents behave more independently. Charles 
Murray shares these two concerns and has, along side Hayek and Mead, influenced 
current directions in Australian welfare reform. Charles Murray is both concerned with 
budget issues, and making 'welfare dependents' behave more independently. Indeed, 
Murray agrees with Hayek that the government should be as small as freedom allows 
and not redistribute wealth. In fact, he claims that increased ·government spending has 
led to an increase in the "latent poor" (his term for social security recipients)1 7, while 
periods of less spending have decreased it (Murray, 1 982/2000). Tony Abbott recently 
expressed similar concerns about government spending increasing welfare dependence 
in his address to the Young Liberals: 
Comprehensive social security is part and parcel of modem civil society 
but has had a range of harmful side-effects. Failure to acknowledge the 
way universal, more-or-less unconditional welfare changes people' s  
behaviour has seriously compromised Australian government' s effort to 
deal with unemployment. The Hawke Government cut basic award 
earnings by 7 per cent in real terms between 1 983 and 1 990 (while 
increasing unemployment benefit by nearly 20 per cent). Unemployment 
averaged more than 7 per cent over the period and at its end the Minister 
for Social Security told cabinet that his department had just identified the 
first Australian family with three generations simultaneously on welfare. 
(Abbott, 2003) 
However, Murray also agrees with Mead that welfare recipients must be made to be 
good, independent citizens. Indeed, like Mead, Murray seems to have the support of the 
1 7  According to Murray ( 1982/2000, p. 96-106) social security recipients should be regarded 
as the "latent poor" because if they were not receiving assistance they would be living 
in poverty. 
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quasi-independent AIFS. O'Connor (200 1 ,  p. 230) observes that a recent edition of their 
journal Family Matters (1 999), "promotes Murray as a welfare expert whose ideas have 
considerable merit". Murray's ideas are also reflected in the social conservative strain of 
the contemporary Liberal Party's focus on family and community (see O'Connor, 200 1 ). 
He (Murray, 1 982/2000, p. 1 03 )  links increases in latent poverty to "the decline in the 
intact husband-wife family unit, especially among blacks". Murray (1 982/2000) claims 
the Great Society reforms in America under Kennedy and Johnson during the 1 960s link 
poverty to the decline of the family. Newman reflects similar neo-conservative concerns 
in her view of the impact of long term welfare dependency on families: 
New evidence is also emerging about the impact of long term welfare 
dependency on the next generation. Research by the Department of 
Family and Community Services has shown that young people from 
income support recipient families are much more likely than other young 
people to leave school early, to become unemployed and' to become 
teenage parents. About one in six young people from income support 
recipient families are themselves highly dependent on income support 
between the ages of 1 6  and 1 8. (Newman, 1 999, p. 6) 
Neo-liberal based reforms in context 
However, to simply say the current Australian welfare regime is essentially neo­
liberal is over simplistic. This is because it does not account for the various 
manifestations of these ideas in different contexts. Indeed, as Mark Considine observes: 
While these [neo-liberal type] common themes and justifications suggest 
the workings of a single ' enterprising' imagination driving the definition 
of public service, in practice, the organisational reforms produced 
according to these various imperatives are fashioned from local 
institutional material and born of political compromise. The same 
enterprising urge can beget different offspring, even if the gene pool is 
much the same. (Considine, 200 1 ,  p. 1 4) 
63 
In Enterprising states: the public management of welfare-to-work Considine shows that 
similar contemporary neo-liberal ideas like the need for citizen responsibility for their 
own welfare provision have been implemented differently in the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand and Australia. For example, according to Considine, (2001, 
p. 16) while Australia and the Netherlands brought private organisations into the centre 
of the service delivery role, New Zealand and the United Kingdom attempted to make 
their existing public service organisations more neo-liberal. 
Further, to simply say the Australian welfare regime is neo-liberal oversimplifies 
the process of current policy change. In Mark Considine' s idea of the enterprising state, 
he really means the "enterprising of the state" [italics in original] because "this 
transformation is something less than a final accomplishment. Process is often more 
revealing than structure" (Considine, 2001, p. 1). Indeed, whether the contemporary 
Australian welfare state is neo-liberal/neo-conservative or not is not the point here, but 
the influence of such ideas on current policy change cannot be denied. The Australian 
welfare state is currently neo-liberalising. 
This section concludes that the current Australian welfare reforms reflect 
elements of general-liberal influence. However, these ideas manifest themselves 
differently in different contexts, and indicate a process rather than a finished product. 
Hence, this thesis will thus accept that the current Australian welfare regime is neo­
liberalising. The possible explanations for the current Centrelink breach and appeal 
numbers will thus "have a commonly shared conception of the" current Australian 
welfare regime to allow "contending arguments" to be tested (Esping-Anderson, 
1990/2000, p. 154). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has established that the current Australian welfare regime can be 
understood as essentially neo-liberalising. This will provide a basis for the pending 
evaluation of different understandings of Centrelink breach and appeal numbers. 
This was established through accommodating various complexities in 
categorising welfare states including the different ways welfare states are administered, 
different types of welfare provision within welfare s.tates, historical variation, and 
different categorisations of welfare regimes. Categorisations of welfare regimes that 
were considered include one based on levels of expenditure, another based on residual 
or institutional welfare, another based on TH Marshall' s  three level of citizenship, 
another based on Esping-Anderson's three worlds of welfare capitalism, and a final 
categorisation based on contemporary flavours of neo-liberalism. 
The next chapter will begin evaluating different explanations of the current 
disparity of Centrelink breach and appeal numbers with the help of the case study 
findings. It seems fitting that the neo-liberal approach should be considered first, since it 
is the most influential in current policy formation. It also seems fitting that the neo­
liberals be followed by their most public opposition, the advocates. 
PART B 
BEYOND THE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NEO-LIBERALS, 
THE ADVOCATES, AND THE NEW-CONTRACTUALISM 
WRITERS 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
BEYOND THE NEO-LIBERALS AND THE ADVOCATES 
The previous chapter established that the current Australian welfare system is 
essentially neo-liberalising. However, it does not automatically follow that a neo-liberal 
framework offers a convincing understanding of the current disparity of Centrelink 
breach and appeal figures. While awareness of the ideas behind current policies is 
important, such ideas may not offer a convincing understanding of what actually 
happens to Centrelink clients when these ideas are applied through specific social 
policies. Hence, this chapter will evaluate the neo-liberals' interpretation of current 
Centrelink breach and appeal figures in the light of the social context of neo-liberalising 
policies-particularly the case study of a Centrelink office. This chapter will first 
outline the dominant neo-liberal approach to social policy in Australia, describe its 
interpretation of the relationship between the current breach and appeal figures, and 
evaluate this interpretation according to some of its strengths and weaknesses. 
The most vocal opposition to the neo-liberal view in Australia is provided by 
various organisations which aim to advocate for the disadvantaged. ACOSS (ACOSS, 
1997a; ACOSS, 1997b; ACOSS, 2000a; ACOSS, 2000b; ACOSS, 2001a; ACOSS, 
2001b; ACOSS & NWRN, 2000) and the welfare rights movement (WRAS, 1999; 
WRAS, 2000) have been particularly active. The writers whom I will collectively call 
the advocates (following Moses, 2000), will also be considered in this chapter. Their 
view will be evaluated after the neo-liberals', and in a similar manner. 
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Beyond the Neo-Liberals 
Outline 
As shown in the previous chapter, neo-liberal ideas permeate current Australian 
social policy. Hayek's (1959/2000; 1976; 1979; 1984/1948; 1994/1944) trust in market 
forces and individual self-reliance, Mead's ( 1991/2000; 1997a; 1997b) wish to help 
people be more self-reliant, and Murray's (1982/2000) neo-conservatism have all been 
shown to flavour current reforms. Mutual obligation, work for the dole, increased 
surveillance and the replacement of the CBS with the JNAs are examples of neo­
liberalising policies. 
Interpretation of current breach and appeal numbers 
An important element of this dominant neo-liberal approach in Australian social 
policy is the use of compliance measures to ensure that Centrelink clients 'participate'. 
For example, John Howard, in his The Australian way address, stressed the importance 
of "improving compliance" (Howard, 1999). Improving compliance was also the 
justification given by Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Philip 
Ruddock in the second reading speech for the Social Security Legislation Amendment 
(Activity Test Penalty Periods) Bill 1997. Ruddock cited the Organisation for Economic 
and Cultural Development Job Study's conclusion that "a priori reasoning and historical 
evidence both suggest that if benefit administration can be kept tight, the potential 
disincentive effects [for self reliance] of benefit entitlement will be largely contained" 
(Hansard, 1997, p. 3 191-3 192). McClure reinforces this dominant neo-liberal approach. 
The report states that: 
The stark reality is that those who most need assistance are often those 
who have few opportunities to participate and are often the least 
motivated to pursue them. For this reason, the new system must engage 
people more actively, and to be successful that engagement must be 
reciprocal. Consequently, the Reference Group believes that some form 
of requirement is necessary. (McClure, 2000a, p. 5) 
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It follows from this perspective that some regime, like the breach regime, is 
needed to ensure compliance. Indeed, the breach regime ensures taxpayers' generosity 
is reciprocated by Centrelink clients' participation in social and economic activities 
through financially punishing those who do not (McClure, 2000a, p. 40). Thus, 
according to this view, the increase in breaches since 1997-1998 is good and necessary. 
It is a process for weeding out the 'deadwood' and minimising abuses to ensure only 
those who 'participate' are assisted. 
Further, according to the neo-liberals, the stagnating number of appeals despite 
the increase in breaches is not necessarily a problem. Rather, it is used as evidence that 
the new breaching regime is working (Moses, 2000, p. 15)-that is, it is catching those 
with no grounds for appeal. Indeed, the Department of Family and Community Services 
(FaCS) has reasoned that "on a very conservative estimate, 27% of people who are 
breached do not reclaim within 6 weeks" (Moses, 2000, p. 16). They conclude that "a 
significant proportion must have an alternative source of income" (Moses, 2000, p. 16) 
and, therefore, were not legitimate recipients of payments. Further, FaCS (2001) 
positively views changes to the AROs because they have decreased appeal numbers. 
Since around 1997 AROs were placed in Centrelink offices rather than grouped together 
in area support offices. According to FaCS (2001, p. 106) "this puts them closer to both 
the customers they are making decisions about, and the decision making process itself'. 
They explain that: 
The new approach helps customers to understand why Centrelink acted 
as it did, and also ensures that original decisions are made properly. In 
the long run, this will help cut down the number of appeals and 
dissatisfied customers. Feedback from the CSCs where AROs are now 
based suggests the new arrangement is working well. (FaCS, 2001, p. 
106) 
Evaluation 
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The dominant neo-liberal derived perception of the relationship between breach 
and appeal figures has some attraction. Indeed, it does provide a strong link between 
current breach and appeal numbers and a policy framework for future developments 
(McClure, 2000a). However, this strength is overshadowed by some serious limitations. 
First, the neo-liberals tend to incorrectly assume all breaches are accurately 
administered. However, as both WRAS (2000, p. 5) and ACOSS (2000) have observed, 
43.8 per cent of Activity Test breach cases that were appealed at the SSAT in 1998-99 
were over-ruled. This means that Centrelink does err. It is not administratively 
infallible. 
Second, this approach incorrectly assumes that only those Centrelink clients 
with no grounds for appeal will be caught because all clients who are unhappy with a 
decision will appeal. However, WRAS (2000) provides anecdotal evidence that 
Centrelink clients with grounds to appeal do not always push for an appeal of a 
Centrelink decision. Interviews with Centrelink clients that were conducted for this 
thesis support WRAS's finding. While 19 out of 22 participants were unhappy with a 
decision taken by Centrelink about their case, only 11  were happy with the eventual 
outcome. This means that 8 Centrelink clients who participated in the study remained 
unhappy with both the Centrelink decision and the eventual outcome. Of those who 
were unhappy with both the Centrelink decision and eventual outcome, 4 said that they 
did not seek any appeal. Of the others who said they did seek an appeal but were still 
unhappy with the outcome, none had exhausted all avenues for appeal, although one 
was awaiting the outcome of his SSAT appeal and may continue if still unsatisfied. 
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Third, this approach underestimates the hardships breaches can cause. Indeed, it 
assumes many people who are 100 per cent breached and do not reapply have some 
other source of income. This is contradicted by WRAS ( 1999; 2000) and The Salvation 
Army of Australia's research (2001). For example, a census of Salvation Army clients 
found that every second person requesting emergency relief who had been breached by 
Centrelink said that this breach had caused their need to ask for assistance (The 
Salvation Army Australia, 2001, p. 10). This finding is supported by the case study 
findings. At the time of interview Jonathan was waiting for his SSAT hearing, which 
was in a few weeks. Jonathon said he had suffered a 100 per cent breach, and had 
already spent 8 weeks without pay while he was seeking an appeal. According to 
Jonathon he was surviving on "food hand outs from Saint Pats, one of them, I've only 
had one of them. And mainly off parents, borrowed money". 
Jaques' experience provides another example of the hardship being breached can 
cause an individual. He spent six weeks with reduced pay, during which he was evicted 
and was homeless for 50 days. Although he was unhappy with the outcome, Jaques did 
not appeal beyond the original decision maker or Ombudsman, nor was he aware that he 
could. Below is his description of his experience: 
when I expected this years payments, they weren't there, and um, I was 
relying on, I needed them, um, to cover [ renting?] costs, and it took them 
six whole weeks to sort it out. During that time 'cause I couldn't even 
afford rent I just lived on the street for fifty days. Fifty nights on the 
street 'cause I couldn't afford rent. 
Jaques continued: 
I was on their case. I was, um, I was, um, basically in here every single 
day telling them to hurry up and sort it out. They just kept saying yeah 
they would, and I'd ring back in a couple of days and say what's 
happening and nothing ever got done, and it took them, four to six weeks 
to, um, get it sorted out, and to get my payments back on schedule. 
In summary, the neo-liberals dominate Australian social policy. They draw from 
a belief in market forces and individual enterprise to criticise the post World War Two 
7 1  
welfare state for creating welfare dependence. They argue that compliance measures 
like breaching are needed to ensure a more participatory system. They perceive the 
current breach and appeal figures as a positive indicator that this approach is working. 
While the neo-liberal view does provide a strong link between current breach and 
appeal figures and a policy framework for future developments, it has serious limits. It 
ignores the possibility of administrative error, down plays the personal and social cost 
of depriving a client of an income, and wrongly assumes that Centrelink clients appeal 
whenever possible. Consequently, its interpretation of the current breach and appeal 
numbers is wanting. 
The Advocacy View 
Outline 
The advocacy approach to social welfare policy and breaches and appeals draws 
from the optimism of the classic post war welfare approach of TH Marshall 
( 1949/2000), and Richard Titmuss ( 1968/1979) who consider access to welfare to be a 
basic right of social citizenship. Examples include ACOSS's ( 1997a; 1997b; 2000a; 
2000b; 2001a; 2001b; 2000), WRAS's ( 1999; 2000), and The Salvation Army of 
Australia's (2001) responses to the breach regime. The advocates argue that welfare 
recipients are some of the most vulnerable people in our society. They aim to protect 
people's basic right to welfare by advocating in their defence. 
Interpretation of current breach and appeal numbers 
Rather than view the current increase in breaches as necessary, like the neo­
liberals, the advocates argue that the current increase in breach numbers reflects an 
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overly harsh breaching regime. They point out that since NSA and YA payments are 
already under the Henderson poverty line1 8, breaching financially penalises those who 
are already living in poverty (ACOSS, 2000b; 2001a; 2001b; 2000; 1999; WRAS, 
2000). Furthermore, they suggest the current breach regime targets the most vulnerable 
of those living in poverty, such as youth. For example, Susan Lackner (2001, p. 3) 
observed that "young people aged under 18 to 24 are the group most affected by 
Centrelink breaches, with 53% of all breaches occurring in this age range". Further, 
these writers observe that the most vulnerable recipients are more likely to become 
homeless or tum to emergency relief when state funds become unavailable (ACOSS, 
2001 a; The Salvation Army Australia, 2001; WRAS, 2000). 
Parallel to concerns about breaches, the advocacy approach regards the current 
low appeal numbers as a serious problem. This is because, according to the advocates, 
under-utilisation of the SSAT and AA T reflects that fewer people may be protected 
from government error or abuse of power (WRAS, 2000). 
Further, the advocates argue that the current increasing breach rate combined 
with the consistently low appeal rate reflects two factors. First, unlike the neo-liberals 
who view these figures as an indication that the breach and appeal systems are working, 
they argue that these figures reflect the vulnerability of the people being breached. 
Vulnerable people do not tend to seek an appeal of Centrelink decisions (WRAS, 2000). 
Second, according to this approach, the relationship between steady appeal 
numbers and the increased number of breaches relates to recent policy developments. 
The increase in breaches since 1997- 1998 reflects new, confusing policy requirements 
that recipients find it difficult to meet. Since 1997 there has been a steady increase in 
mandated activities for the unemployed especially the jobseeker diary, work for the 
dole, increased fortnightly employer contacts (from 2 to 8), negotiating between job 
1 8 The Henderson poverty line is a measure of relative poverty that has been particularly 
influential in Australia. It was first used by the 1975 Commission of Inquiry into 
Poverty (Henderson, 1975) -also known as the Henderson Report and has been indexed 
since to be relevant to the current cost of living. 
73 
network providers and Centrelink and mutual obligation (ACOSS, 2000c ). All these 
require the ability to perform complex negotiation between agencies, mobility and a 
good standard of oral and written communication skills which Centrelink clients often 
lack (AAT, 1995 ; ACOSS, 1997b; ACOSS, 2001a). 
Evaluation 
The advocacy approach highlights some important relationships between breach 
and appeal figures. It points out that the breach and appeal regime has caused great 
hardship for Centrelink clients, especially those who do not seek an appeal when 
breached. As indicated earlier, this is a more convincing account of the case study data 
than the neo-liberal account that plays down this hardship. Further, unlike the neo­
liberals, the advocates understand that Centrelink clients do not always seek an appeal 
when they disagree with a breach. As discussed earlier, this fits well with the case study 
findings. 
The advocacy approach also points out that the breach rate increased after new, 
confusing activity requirements were introduced. This view is supported by the case 
study findings. For example, some Centrelink clients that were interviewed even 
seemed confused about whether they had been breached. Some clients believed they had 
not been breached, when, in fact, it seems they have been. For example, Jasmine said 
her pay had been delayed a few days because Centrelink misplaced her form. She 
resubmitted the form, but incorrectly did not consider it a breach. Another example is 
Jeff who also said his pay was delayed until he returned a form. This is despite him not 
receiving the letter requesting the form. This would normally incur a breach. However, 
when asked whether Centrelink had ever penalised or breached him for any reason, he 
replied "No". 
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In contrast, other participants seemed to think they had been breached when, in 
fact, they had not. For example, Jenny thought a delay when applying for her allowance 
might be a breach: 
Lyndal: And has Centrelink ever penalised or breached you or cut your 
allowance at all? 
Jenny: Um, Yeah, kind of. 
Lyndal: What happened? 
Jenny: Um, they (unclear) had to come back a few times to because they 
didn't think the um identification that I has was correct or something 
they made me get all the signed signatures and stuff from school. 
Lyndal: Okay. So were they paying you at all when that happened? 
Jenny: No, to get the payment that I wanted I had to go back and get. 
Lyndal: Okay, so were you receiving payment and then they stopped it 
until you. 
Jenny: No, I wanted to go get Austudy or something like that and the 
identification I had wasn't sufficient, what's that word, yeah it wasn't 
enough and so I had to go back and get signatures and stuff from school 
to say that I was going to school, yeah. 
There are a number of possible explanations for this confusion. One possibility 
is that participants did not say they were breached when they actually were because they 
were embarrassed to admit this to me. However, if this was a general pattern, other 
participants would not say they were breached when they were not. Another possibility 
is that my questions were unclear or confusing. However, I explained the meaning of 
breach, and also asked separate questions about whether their payment had been 
postponed, reduced or cut. So I do not believe this is the case. I think the most likely 
explanation is that participants were actually confused about whether they were actually 
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breached, and that this evidences the advocates' view that the new policies are too 
complex and confusing. 
The advocates also point out that the low appeal numbers reflect the 
government's  targeting of the most vulnerable people, because they are the least likely 
to have the skills and knowledge necessary to navigate the appeals process (WRAS, 
2000). This is more convincing than the neo-liberals who incorrectly assume that all 
those who have grounds to appeal do so. However, the case study found the clients 
interviewed were articulate, intelligent and had a reasonable knowledge of the appeals 
structure. Of the 22 participants, 1 8  were aware of some appeal body. This means only 
4 of the 22 participants did not know of any avenue of appeal. Of the 1 8  participants 
that were aware of some appeal body, 7 were aware of one appeal body, 7 were aware 
of two, 5 were aware of three and 3 were aware of four appeal bodies. Also, 1 8  
participants were aware of the possibility of appealing to the original decision maker, 14  
were at least somewhat aware of the ARO, 8 were at least somewhat aware of the 
SSAT, 5 were at least somewhat aware of the Commonwealth Ombudsman, and 2 were 
aware of the possibility of approaching their local MP with grievances. 
Thus most of the Centrelink clients that were interviewed had at least some 
awareness of the possibility of appeal and the appeals structure itself. The Wallis 
Consulting Group (200 1 ,  p. 62) found similar results after surveying 3003 NSA and YA 
(unemployed) Centrelink clients. They found that two thirds of their respondents who 
had been breached were aware of their right to appeal their breach. In contrast to the 
advocates' assumption, ignorance of the formal appeal structure does not seem to be the 
reason for the relatively low number of formal appeals. 
Rather than being ignorant, many interviewees perceived their relationship with 
Centrelink to be paternalistic. For example, Joan was perplexed and amused when asked 
what rights she thought she had when she disagreed with a Centrelink decision: 
Lyndal: OK. Um, what rights do you think you have when you disagree 
with a Centrelink decision? 
Joan: (5 second silence, then shrugs, pulls face and laughs) 
Lyndal: (laughs) Is that because you don't want to say or you don't know 
what to say? 
Joan: Huh? (3 second pause) Rights? 
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Joan was cynical despite being aware of the Ombudsman, original decision maker, and 
somewhat aware of the ARO and SSAT. Some Centrelink clients were concerned about 
what Centrelink might do to them if they sought an appeal. For example, Josh, who was 
aware the possibility of seeking an appeal with both the original decision maker and the 
ARO, explained that: 
I think the more you try to push your rights the harder they'll be on you, 
and the more they'll try and penalise you and breach you and they'll do 
things to you. Make it tough for you. So you're best off, I think they 
make you just want to go in there and keep your mouth shut, and not 
argue. 
Another interviewee, Jeff, who was aware of the possibility of appealing with the 
original decision maker and somewhat aware of the ARO and Commonwealth 
Ombudsman, replied when I asked whether Centrelink had ever made any decisions that 
he disagreed with: "No use arguing---don't get paid". 
Furthermore, the advocates' emphasis on the vulnerability of Centrelink clients, 
who are assumed to be unskilled and unintelligent individuals, suggests paternalism. 
This is a problem because, as Carol Pateman (1 989/2000) observed in 1 979, paternalism 
comes at a price. Protection is offered in return for loss of autonomy. Sheila Shaver, in 
2001 , agrees with Pateman. Shaver states that "most troubling about Australian welfare 
reform is the separation it presumes between political and social policy citizenship . . .  
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Hidden in the shift from rights to conditional support, and from sovereignty to 
supervision, is a withdrawal of the freedom of selthood as the price of welfare 
assistance" (Shaver, 2001, p. 290). 
The advocate's approach has further important limitations. Assuming that clients 
do not seek an appeal because they lack the knowledge or skills, rather than because 
they are aware of their paternalistic relationship with Centrelink, reflects a general 
problem with this approach-that their pragmatic approach to social policy leads them 
to ignore deeper political dimensions. It does not reflect about why these harsh 
breaching penalties were implemented in the first place. Their policy recommendations 
tend to react to current government policy by advocating incremental rather than more 
substantial social change. For example, rather than questioning the existence of a breach 
regime, they accept the new incremental regime and only criticise the hefty financial 
penalties and complex new activity requirements (ACOSS, 2000b ). 
In summary, the advocacy view provides many valuable insights into how the 
current breach and appeal numbers reflect the vulnerability of Centrelink clients to 
administrative error or misuse of power in an unnecessarily harsh breaching regime. 
However, it has two serious limitations. It incorrectly assumes that the relatively low 
formal appeal rate is due to Centrelink clients lacking the necessary knowledge and 
skills to seek an appeal and ignores deeper political questions such as why such a harsh 
breaching regime exits. 
Conclusion 
Both the neo-liberal and advocacy approaches represent contemporary pragmatic 
responses to welfare in Australia and have significant strengths, but serious weaknesses, 
for explaining breach and appeal numbers. The neo-liberal account of current breach 
and appeal figures was shown to be limited because it did not account for the vulnerable 
position of Centrelink clients to the market. Their assumption that clients who do not 
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reapply after being cut have other sources of income, otherwise they appeal-was 
shown to be false. 
On the other hand, the advocates' interpretation of breach and appeal figures 
was found to be limited because it dealt with the vulnerability of Centrelink clients in a 
paternalistic manner. It thus did not account for the vulnerability of Centrelink clients to 
the state, or advocacy agencies themselves. It ignores deeper political questions such as 
why such a harsh breaching regime exits. It also incorrectly assumes that the relatively 
low formal appeal rate is due to Centrelink clients lacking the necessary knowledge and 
skills to seek an appeal. This assumption contrasts with the case study finding that 
Centrelink clients may not seek an appeal for an unsatisfactory decision even if they are 
aware of the possibility to do so 
However, other approaches go beyond the pragmatism of the neo-liberal and 
advocacy approaches to offer deeper and more detailed analysis of current breach and 
appeal figures, and the research findings. The new-contractualism writers focus on the 
detail of administrative changes in current Australian welfare reform. In particular, they 
explicate a new or quasi-contractualism in current policy changes-although different 
writers have different views about the utility and appropriateness of the new­
contractualism. These writers are dealt with in the next chapter. 
In all, three further approaches will be considered in this thesis-the new­
contractualism approach, some oppressive surveillance approaches, and an approach 
which draws from Foucault's ideas of discipline and govemmentality. Each of these 
approaches will be outlined, applied and evaluated over Chapters Five, Six and Seven. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
BEYOND NEW-CONTRACTUALISM ACCOUNTS 
This chapter will consider the new-contractualism writers' contributions to 
understanding current Centrelink breach and appeal figures. Much recent scholarship 
has been concerned with explicating a new-contractualism in Australian welfare policy. 
According to this scholarship contemporary contractualism in social policy uses the 
language of classical legal contract theory, but reinterprets it. However, the nature of 
contemporary new-contractualism is interpreted differently by different writers, 
resulting in different interpretations of breach and appeal numbers. Terry Carney (1998; 
1986; 1994; 1999) writes particularly about the Australian social security appeal 
structure, so will be considered here. Anna Yeatman has debated directly with Carney 
(Carney, Ramia & Yeatman, 2001, p. 1) and so will provide a contrasting approach. 
Carney's approach will be considered first, followed by Yeatman's. Each approach will 
be outlined, and its interpretation of the current disparity of breach and appeal numbers 
explicated. It will then be evaluated in the light of the case study findings. 
Terry Carney's New-Contractualism 
Outline 
Carney's analysis concentrates on the growing use of individual behavioural 
contracts in Australian welfare provision. He links this development to the emergence 
of neo-liberalism in English speaking countries (Carney, 1998; 1999; see also Kerr & 
Savelsberg, 1999; Owens, 2001 ). He is particularly concerned about this development's 
impact on the citizenship status of welfare recipients. In particular, according to Carney, 
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neo-liberal based new-contractualism retracts TH Marshall type social citizenship to a 
citizenship based on individual agreements, such as individual activity agreements. He 
argues that the dominant discourse of Australian welfare policy has shifted from 
focusing on a citizen's right to an economic safety net with administrative safeguards of 
this right through the SSAT and AAT, and towards attaching payment to an individual 
behavioural contract. Camey is critical of this change because it is not a classical legal 
contract as the parties are neither equal nor particularly free. Indeed, clients are 
effectively coerced into maintaining certain behaviour, under threat of financial 
retribution, using the language and ceremony of a classical liberal legal contract. 
Interpretation of current breach and appeal numbers 
According to Camey's view, increased breaching by Centrelink since 1997-1998 
correlates with an increased fervour for monitoring clients' behaviour through an 
individual contract. Indeed, although monitored social security payments are not new in 
Australia19, 1997-1998 marks both a new level of monitoring and the introduction of 
new welfare architecture to facilitate it (Camey, 1998, p. 26-35). In 1997-1998 three 
connected major reforms occurred-the public CES was replaced with privately 
contracted JNAs, the DSS was absorbed into the new Centrelink, and the current 
incremental breach regime was launched. The JNAs were particularly important in this 
final change from entitlement to contract. This is because clients must now negotiate an 
activity agreement with a JNA case manager to qualify for income support. Previously, 
such contracts were not individually negotiated. Furthermore, if the client does not 
comply with this contract, the case manager is required to recommend that Centrelink 
breach them. 
Following Camey's interpretation of new-contractualism, the introduction of the 
JNAs is also important for understanding the current consistently low appeal numbers. 
While the JNAs personalise client treatment, they deny clients' administrative 
19 For example, Camey ( 1 999) observes that the work test in 1933 was a behavioural 
requirement for payment 
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safeguards. Indeed, while recipients could previously appeal CES and DSS decisions to 
the SSAT, AAT or the Commonwealth Ombudsman (Owens, 2001 ), they can now only 
appeal Centrelink decisions. This is because while Centrelink is a government body 
subject to statutory review to the SSAT, AAT, and Ombudsman, the JNAs include 
private organisations that are outside the appeal structure. This means that while a 
Centrelink decision to breach a client is appealable, the JNAs negotiation and 
monitoring of the activity agreement and reporting about a client is not. Thus, the space 
in which recipients can appeal decisions has effectively been constricted (Owens, 2001 ). 
Therefore, the corresponding stagnating number of formal appeals indicates a decline in 
administrative safeguards for Centrelink clients as private agencies administer 
individual clients' contracts and monitor their behaviour. 
Consequently, according to Camey's approach to new-contractualism, the 
relationship between increasing breach numbers and low appeal figures is connected to 
the increasing use of quasi-contractual agreements in Australian social security 
provision. In particular, the increase in breaches after 1 997-1 998 corresponds with the 
introduction of Centrelink and the JNAs and their more individualised quasi-contract 
approach, while the decreasing scope for administrative appeal of welfare matters has 
prevented a corresponding increase in formal appeals. 
Evaluation 
Camey's approach to new-contractualism offers a compelling interpretation of 
current breach and appeal figures. Indeed, it allows the increase in breaches and 
stagnation of appeals to be clearly linked with changing fundamentals of social policy. 
In particular, he allows the increasing breach rate since 1 997-1 998 and the continuing 
low appeal rate despite the rise in breaches to be linked with new welfare architecture in 
Australia-especially the introduction of the JNAs and constriction of Centrelink 
clients' opportunities to appeal decisions that affect them. 
82 
However, Camey's new-contractualism approach has some serious limitations. 
While the retraction of the scope to appeal since the introduction of the JNAs might 
partially explain the relatively low external appeal rate, it does not accommodate the 
case study finding that Centrelink clients may not seek an appeal even if they are aware 
of the possibility to do so. It may explain why more Centrelink clients seem to appeal to 
the ARO than the external SSAT and AA T20-because appeals are lodged with the 
ARO but rejected because they are JNA matters rather than Centrelink matters. 
However, this is only a partial account because it focuses on the general limits of the 
policy framework rather than its contextual embodiment. While it can show how 
seeking an appeal for a Centrelink decision might be more difficult for a client, it does 
not account for the actual effect of that difficulty on the client's behaviour. No 
participant said that they declined to seek an appeal because the matter they disagreed 
with was a JNA action rather than a Centrelink decision. Further, only 21 per cent of 
breaches imposed in 1 998-1 999 and 24 per cent in 1 999-2000 were attributable to 
JNAs; in both years fewer than 50 per cent of all breaches recommended by the JNAs 
were administered by Centrelink (Moses, 2000, p. 8). Camey's account is, at best, a 
partial one. 
Another limitation of Camey's new-contractualism approach is that while 
Camey (1 999) does qualify that the Australian welfare system has always been 
oppressive, he ignores two ways in which this oppression is administered to welfare 
recipients. First, he seems to glorify a golden age when TH Marshall's idea of social 
citizenship was taken seriously. For example, he says that: 
The overriding effect of the transition toward contractualism has been to 
partially de-legalise the system, to de-legitimate the rights of its 
beneficiaries, and thereby to add to the socio-economic marginalisation 
of the unemployed. (Camey & Ramia 1 999, p. 1 1 8) 
This statement implies that before current policy changes the system was legalised and 
legitimate. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, Fox Piven and Cloward (1 971 ) 
20 See Figure 3 and Table 1 in Chapter One. 
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question the existence of such golden periods of social welfare2 1 • Further, as we shall 
also see in the next chapter, Carol Pateman (1 989/2000) and Sheila Shaver (2001 )  
remind us that the paternalism reflected in Marshall's ideas offers protection in return 
for loss of individual autonomy, especially for women. 
Second, the formal appeals process, including the AAT and SSAT, is perceived 
by Camey as one of the last precious remnants of this golden period. In his lament at the 
threatened nature of the AAT and SSAT, he implicitly accepts that they safeguard 
welfare recipients' right to income support. While the overt aim of the appeal system is 
to safeguard this right, it is in fact limited in this capacity. Indeed, the SSAT and AAT 
can only overturn a Centrelink decision on the individual merits of the matter 
(Administrative Review Council, 1 995). Neither the SSAT nor the AAT can overturn a 
Centrelink decision because the legislative framework on which the decision is based is 
unfair or unnecessarily harsh. Therefore, while the SSAT and AAT can interpret both 
the relevant legislation and the individual merits of the matter, they are ultimately 
required to apply social security law-even if it might be unjust. 
The appeal system itself can even be perceived as oppressive to Centrelink 
clients (see H. Dean, 1 991 ). Indeed, De Maria reminds us that the social security appeal 
regime in Australian is not concerned about Centrelink clients, rather it is a tool of the 
powerful. He puts it "bluntly" as follows: 
The Australian community which has fully supported the AA T since its 
birth could not rely on it to cut across, contradict, or question 
government policies which hurt the ordinary Australian . . .  Rather, as 
many would argue, Australia's history is a history of oppression 
perpetuated through iron-structured partnerships between government 
and the judiciary. (De Maria, 1 992, p. 1 1 8)  
2 1  Although Fox Piven and Cloward ( 1971) focus their analysis on the US, where the 
rights of social welfare recipients were less formally recognised than in Australia, the 
general argument that the social welfare apparatus is controlling for the poor is still 
relevant to an Australian context (see, for example, Bessant, 2000a). 
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This view is reflected in the case study findings. Centrelink clients that were 
interviewed by the author were mostly cynical about the appeals system's ability to 
protect their rights. Despite most participants being at least somewhat aware of avenues 
of appeal, they were generally negative when asked about their rights. When asked 
"what rights do you think you have when you disagree with a Centrelink decision?", 1 
participant answered that she had many rights, 7 that they felt they had some rights, 6 
that they had few rights, 4 that they had no rights, and 3 felt that they had variable 
rights. One participant's response was unclear. The only participant, Jillian, who 
answered positively that she had many rights, however, did not know what they were. 
Jillian answered that "there's plenty [of rights], but I've just never read all the garbage 
they send ya . .. I'll read it one day if l need to". In contrast, Jonathon had appealed to 
every level except his local MP, which was the only appeal avenue he was unaware of. 
Despite being the participant with the most knowledge and experience of the appeal 
system, he still felt he had few rights. When I asked him what rights he thought he had 
when he disagreed with a Centrelink decision, he answered "Oh it's a government 
department so you think whoop/what? you can't go really any further than that because 
everything' s government really". 
Jasmine's response provides another example of feeling powerless despite 
having knowledge about the appeals system. Although Jasmine was aware of 3 avenues 
of appeal-the original decision maker, the ARO and the SSAT-she was unclear of 
her rights. When asked what rights she thought she had when she disagreed with a 
Centrelink decision, she said: 
Well I think that, um, you should have at least fifty per cent of the rights, 
as a human, birthright, to be able to, um, have something reassessed that 
you disagree with. Um, you know, it's not saying that the department is 
one hundred per cent wrong, but, you should certainly be heard, you 
should certainly be satisfied with your meeting with them about the 
issue. 
Thus, some Centrelink clients were, despite knowledge about the appeal system, cynical 
about the appeal system's ability and intention to protect their rights. 
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Conclusion 
In summary, Camey's critique of new-contractualism offers a compelling and 
detailed analysis of the relationship between the increase in breaches and consistently 
low appeal numbers. However, like the approaches in Chapter Four, it is limited. The 
neo-liberals problematically assumed that all breaches were legitimate, and 
underestimated the hardship a breach can inflict on a person. The advocacy view 
ignored deeper political issues and did not account for why some clients did not seek an 
appeal even if they disagreed with a Centrelink decision and were aware of the 
possibility of appeal. Camey's new-contractualism critique also failed to account for 
this case study finding. Also it problematically assumed that there was a golden age of 
TH Marshall type citizenship in Australia where social security provided a safety net for 
all, and that the appeals structure in Australia, as a final precious remnant of this period, 
successfully protects the rights of social security recipients. Yeatman offers a different 
interpretation of new-contractualism in Australian welfare. 
Anna Yeatman's New-Contractualism 
Outline 
While Camey is critical of the increasing use of quasi-contracts in Australian 
social welfare provision, Yeatman (2001 , p. 2-3) is a little more supportive of a general 
culture of broad ideas of contract in social welfare as negotiated social agreement. 
Yeatman (2001 , p. 5) says that: 
If there is to be a genuine alternative to neo-liberalism, it will have to be 
one that is post-patrimonial [ not paternalistic] in nature, one that 
genuinely invites all those who cannot achieve self-reliance to be 
individualised participants in the relationships that govern their lives. 
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Like Camey, Yeatman (2001, p. 3) sources the current contractualism in social welfare 
in neo-liberal pressure to provide choice for Centrelink clients so they can develop their 
capabilities to be effective citizens. However, unlike Camey, Yeatman explicates a 
second source of pressure for a new-contractualism in Australian welfare: social 
movements on behalf of the clients who are vulnerable to abuses of state power, such as 
the welfare rights movement. Indeed, according to Yeatman (2001, p. 3): 
Unlike neo-liberalism, these movements do not think in terms of market 
models of freedom . . . They argue for a democratisation of the 
relationship between the state and service users and, in particular, for 
policy development and design that involves users as a major stakeholder 
of the service relationship. 
Here, Yeatman goes beyond Camey's lament about the retreat of TH Marshall's social 
citizenship. She attempts to accommodate Pateman's critique of Marshal as paternalistic 
to reach a more favourable evaluation of neo-liberalism-although Yeatman falls short 
of full support of neo-liberalism. According to Yeatman (2001, p. 5) "neo-liberalism, 
after all, works with these standards in setting up the liberal structures of self-reliance to 
women and to people with disability". 
Interpretation of current breach and appeal numbers 
Yeatman's account of the increase in Centrelink breaching since 1997 would be 
similar to Camey's in some instances. She would analyse it in terms of the neo-liberal 
based changes in Australian welfare provision-such as the replacement of the DSS and 
CES with Centrelink and the Job Network-and the corresponding increase of 
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individual work agreements. She might even agree that the stagnating number of 
external appeals is due to a demise of the old 'welfare as right' ideas. However, here the 
similarities cease. 
While Camey might perceive the increasing breach numbers since 1 996-1 997 as 
an inherently negative phenomenon, Yeatman would be less pessimistic. This is because 
she links breaching to the "deeper preferences" (Yeatman, 1 999, p. 267) of clients. 
While the TH Marshall type paternalism often ignored clients' vulnerability to the state, 
the aim of the new-contractualism agreements between the case worker and the client is 
to further the client's individual needs. While Yeatman does concede that this is a new 
form of paternalism-she argues that it is defensible if: 
The agent of government is both actually working with the deeper 
preferences of the client . . .  and actively engaging the client in the design 
and delivery of his/her program of activity. It is morally defensible 
policy only as long as both this premise holds and government commits 
sufficient policy effort and resources to enable the programs concerned 
to be effective. (Italics in original Yeatman, 1 999, p. 267) 
She continues to explain how "the deeper preferences of the client" can involve 
some coercion. This is because: 
most welfare recipients want to work, this is their deeper preference, but 
their lack of positive work experience together with the non-work­
orientated structuring of their everyday existence mean that they find it 
hard to act on their deeper preference. (Yeatman, 1 999, p. 266) 
She quotes the following extract from Mead to elaborate: 
Why do requirements cause recipients to participate and work when 
simply offering them the chance usually does not? Most staff of welfare 
employment programs I have interviewed say that participation in a work 
program must be mandated to get recipients' attention. Most adults on 
welfare would in principle like to work, but they are preoccupied with 
day-to-day survival. Few will make the effort to organise themselves for 
regular activity outside the home unless it is required. Starting to work or 
look for a job must also be enforced, many staff members say, because 
recipients are often reluctant to seek work on their own. They may want 
to work, but they have usually failed to find or keep a job before, 
especially good jobs, and they fear to try again. Many prefer education 
and training because it is less threatening. It postpones the day when they 
must reckon with the labour market. Meanwhile, remaining on welfare is 
secure. (Mead in Yeatman, 1999, p. 266) 
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It follows that an increase in Centrelink breaching is not inherently bad, but 
might reflect the "deeper preference" (Yeatman, 1999, p. 267) of Centrelink clients. In 
other words, the post-1997 increase in Centrelink breaches might be due to the 
identification of clients' "deeper preference" (Yeatman, 1999, p. 267) to be encouraged 
to work and discouraged from behaviour which does not increase their chances of 
obtaining paid employment. Further, the absence of a corresponding increase in external 
appeals might be used as evidence that clients' "deeper preferences" (Yeatman, 1999, p. 
267) are being recognised. Indeed, if they disagreed with the breach, wouldn't they 
appeal in greater numbers? Further, even if clients do disagree with a Centrelink 
decision due to its day-to-day inconvenience, perhaps they do not seek a formal appeal 
because they believe that it meets their 'deeper preferences' to be forced to actively seek 
work-while the 'welfare as right' basis of formal appeals does not. 
Evaluation 
An interpretation of current breach and appeal figures based on Yeatman' s 
explication of new-contractualism is compelling in many instances. First, it does not 
suffer for lamenting the decline of TH Marshall's paternalism like Camey's approach. 
A second compelling factor in Yeatman's interpretation is that, unlike Camey, she does 
offer a contextual account for why Centrelink clients do not seek a formal appeal 
despite disagreeing with a Centrelink decision and being somewhat aware of the appeal 
structure. She might argue that this occurs because they know it is not in their "deeper 
preference" (Yeatman, 1999, p. 267) to fight their activity agreement. Some clients that 
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were interviewed expressed similar sentiments-while they often found Centrelink 
requirements inconvenient, they also saw their necessity. For example, Jackie 
complained about the large amount of paperwork when dealing with Centrelink, but saw 
it as necessary: 
All the paper work, it's ridiculous. I understand that they have to do it 
because, um, there's a lot of people who probably are on the dole that 
shouldn't be on the dole. But, um, the amount of paperwork is just 
ridiculous that you've got to fill in all the time. 
Some research has shown that many Centrelink clients support the new breaching 
regime, with 78 per cent of respondents supporting a reduction in payment for those 
who fail to meet their activity test requirements (Tann & Sawyers 2001 , p. 9). 
However, these strengths also indicate some serious limitations. While Yeatman 
criticises old bureaucratic approaches to welfare for their paternalism, she claims 
agencies that advocate on behalf of the vulnerable such as welfare rights groups are 
somehow exempt from similar paternalism. The previous chapter shows otherwise. 
Further, although this approach does offer an explanation for a client not seeking 
an external appeal even when they know this is possible and disagree with a Centrelink 
decision-it is a flawed explanation. If Centrelink clients must be coerced to follow 
their own "deeper preferences" (Yeatman, 1 999, p. 267) in one area-active job 
seeking-how can we be sure they are acting in their own higher interests by not 
appealing when breached. To claim any action which causes immediate harm to be a 
higher good is risky and potentially arbitrary. For example, the McClure report suggests 
that single parents with children over "the stipulated ages" should be coerced to seek 
work (McClure, 2000a, p. 38-41 ). To draw such arbitrary lines reflects a paternalism 
that Carol Pateman (1 989/2000) would be alarmed at. 
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Although many clients that were interviewed did agree with the need for 
enforcing compliance, this agreement should not be considered in isolation from their 
other comments. They also felt that they had few or no rights when dealing with 
Centrelink. 
Conclusion 
Therefore, neither Carney's or Yeatman's account of a new-contractualism in 
current Australian social welfare provision provide an adequate analysis of the case 
study findings or current breach and appeal figures. Camey is critical of the increasing 
use of quasi-contracts in social welfare administration which he views as neo-liberalism 
writ-large. Yeatman is more optimistic about new-contractualism-although she stops 
short of full support. Yeatman explicates new-contractualism as not just neo-liberal­
but also derived from Centrelink client advocacy groups and thus focused on clients' 
interests. However, she neglects that advocacy groups are often organised by social 
service professionals rather than the clients themselves. This reflects the paternalism 
that Yeatman criticised in TH Marshal type welfare. Further, Yeatman's claim that 
coercion (such as breaching) is needed, provided it furthers clients' deeper interests, is 
dangerously arbitrary. She considers the clients to be more concerned with short term 
issues than their long term greater good-so sometimes clients must be coerced to do 
something such as search for work. Even this 'tough love' style of new-contractualism 
does not seem to protect clients' interests-unless the short term concerns of clients are 
ignored as against their "deeper preference" (Yeatman, 1999, p. 267). 
Perhaps the issue is not exactly what type of contract we have, as Carney and 
Yeatman assume, but why people seemed to have accepted this contract in the first 
place. This point is made by Michel Foucault about the idea of a classical social 
contract: 
The question is often posed as to how, before and after the [French] 
Revolution, a new foundation was given to the right to punish. And no 
doubt the answer is to be found in the theory of the contract. But it is 
perhaps more important to ask the reverse question: how were people 
made to accept the power to punish, or quite simply, when punished, 
tolerate being so. The theory of the contract can only answer this 
question by the fiction of a juridical subject giving to others the power to 
exercise over him the right that he himself possesses over them. It is 
highly probable that the great carceral continuum, which provides a 
communication between the power of discipline and the power of the 
law, and extends without interruption from the smallest coercions to the 
longest penal detention, constituted the technical and the real, 
immediately material counterpart of that chimerical granting of the right 
to punish. (Foucault, 1977, p. 303) 
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The power of discipline that Foucault is referring to includes surveillance and 
individualisation. Both Camey and Yeatman (2001) observe surveillance and 
individualisation in the new-contractualism of Australian welfare. Surveillance is the 
continual observation of Centrelink clients. Individualisation is the process where 
clients are treated as individuals and expect to be treated as such. According to Yeatman 
(2001) these can be positive-supervision can ensure a client's needs are being met and 
individualisation can ensure their unique circumstances are considered. Camey (2001) 
is more sceptical. He considers surveillance to be a violation of Centrelink clients' basic 
rights, and individualisation to be a means by which neo-liberalism reinforces not just 
individual responsibility but individual fault. Individualisation, according to Camey, 
effectively blames the Centrelink client for their predicament and suggests it is their 
ultimate responsibility to change it. 
Increased surveillance of Centrelink clients could lead to an increase in 
breaches. Further, the combination of surveillance and individualisation might lead to 
clients being reluctant to formally seek an appeal of a Centrelink decision for fear of 
blighting their record. They may fear future retribution for their challenge. Indeed, as 
shown in Chapter Four, many interviewees expressed this concern. Although both 
Camey and Yeatman mention surveillance and individualisation, they do not provide a 
detailed account of these concepts. This is the topic of Part C, the remainder of the 
thesis. 
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PART C 
SURVEILLANCE AND INDIVIDUALISATION 
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CHAPTER SIX 
BEYOND SURVEILLANCE AS OPPRESSION 
Surveillance generally means continual monitoring (Delbridge & Bernard 1994, 
p. 1013), while individualisation means, generally, giving individual character to 
someone or something (Delbridge & Bernard, 1994, p. 489). It is possible that 
Centrelink clients do not appeal because they are afraid it will be recorded on their 
individual record and have future negative repercussions. If this is so, then it would 
make little difference whether the client was aware of the possibility of appeal. Here it 
is the fear of future reprisal that discourages the client from appealing rather than lack 
of knowledge of the appeal system. 
As yet, no interpretation of current Centrelink breach and appeal figures 
considered in this thesis has been flawless. A particular challenge for them has been to 
explain the following finding of the case study interviews: Why don't some Centrelink 
clients appeal a Centrelink decision when they are both unhappy with the decision and 
aware of the possibility of appeal? Neither the neo-liberal nor the advocates in Chapter 
Four could explain this. Further, although both new-contractualism approaches in 
Chapter Five offered explanations-they were either incomplete or flawed. The 
surveillance and individualisation of Centrelink clients might hold a key to explaining 
why some clients don't seek an appeal, despite being both unhappy with a Centrelink 
decision and aware of the possibility of appeal. Part C will explore these terms' 
relevance to understanding the case study data. 
Two general approaches to understanding surveillance and individualisation will 
be considered in Part C. Chapter Six will consider some accounts of surveillance as 
oppressive. Chapter Seven will evaluate an approach that is derived from Michel 
Foucault' s  understanding of discipline and governmentality. 
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Chapter Four's evaluation of the neo-liberal and advocacy explanations of 
current Centrelink breach and appeal numbers showed that Centrelink clients are 
vulnerable to both market forces and state agencies. This would be no surprise to writers 
who focus on the link between social welfare provision and oppression. This chapter 
will explore and evaluate some possible explanations for the current disparity of breach 
and appeal numbers, which view surveillance as oppressive. 
Outline 
These writers generally understand surveillance in social welfare provision to be 
controlling (Beilharz, Considine & Watts 1 992; Berreen & Wearing 1 989; Conley, 
1 982; Considine, 1 999; McMahon et al. 2000). Unlike Yeatman, these writers view this 
negatively as oppressive. They do not see it as oppressive in the sense that social 
welfare violates peoples freedom to thrive in a market economy, as neo-liberals 
following Hayek might argue, but oppressive in a way that serves and perpetuates 
structural social and economic inequalities. Hence, rather than argue that social welfare 
harms the ability of the market to allow its invisible hand (Smith, 1 974) to distribute 
wealth to all levels of society, some of these writers generally argue that the particular 
way social welfare manifests actually helps the market keep certain people oppressed 
and that this is to other people's advantage. However, these writers interpret oppressive 
surveillance in varying ways. 
For example, Carol Pateman (1 989/2000) offers an understanding of the 
relationship .between welfare provision and patriarchal oppression. She argues that 
women, as the primary care givers in society as mothers, wives and daughters, 
effectively subsidise the welfare state through providing caring for free. Further, 
Pateman argues that the welfare state is so focused on the male bread winner, paid work 
and financial independence, that women are effectively denied social citizenship in the 
classical TH Marshall sense. In other words, women were effectively denied 
independent access to social security. In particular, personal relationship details are 
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often recorded because a woman is assumed to be economically dependent on a man if 
she is living with him in a sexual relationship. Indeed, the surveillance of personal 
relationships has even extended to home visits by welfare officer "sex snoopers" 
(McIntosh, 1981/2000, p. 1 19). 
Other writers interpret social welfare as an oppressive function of capitalism, 
where the poor are oppressed by the wealthy in the interests of the market. In a seminal 
work in 1971, Fox Piven and Cloward (1971 ) demonstrated the link between social 
welfare provision and capitalism. Their study focused on the welfare provisions of the 
great depression and New Deal period in the United States of America. They argued 
that welfare provisions regulated labour by preventing revolution in periods of market 
down-tum, and depressing wages in more comfortable periods. Surveillance, through 
gathering information about people while they were receiving welfare provision, was 
one way of insuring they either accepted any work available-including very low paid 
work which depressed wages-during more comfortable periods, or would not revolt 
when unemployed during periods of market down-tum. 
Many writers have argued that social welfare in Australia also favours market 
interests. For example, some writers show how neo-liberal values of hard work and 
independence but disapproval of laziness and dependence are reinforced through the 
social welfare system (McMahon et al. Conley, 1982; 2000, p. 1 66). Social welfare, 
according to these writers, manifests so as to distinguish between the 'deserving' and 
the 'undeserving'. Those considered 'deserving' receive support while the 
'undeserving' do not, and may even be punished. There are many examples of such 
social welfare policy. Many writers point to the English Poor Laws as the starting point 
for these policies in Australia. The Poor Laws were nineteenth century (and earlier) 
English statutes that regulated the poor 22• Although Australia has never had an explicit 
22 The first Poor Law was in 1 534 after the black death and was designed to quarantine 
unemployed labourers and encourage them to take any locally available work (McMahon 
et al., 2000, p. 1 65- 167). Further amendments in 1531 ,  1536, 1572, 1 597 and 1 598 
"combined repressive punishments for the idle and the beggar (the undeserving) with 
alms for the aged and the needy and work for those who were able (the deserving)" 
(McMahon et al., 2000, p. 1 65-167). These measures were formally codified in the 
Elizabethan Poor Law of 1 601 (Trattner, 1984). From 1795, beginning in Speenhamland in 
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Poor Law, these writers argue that these laws have provided a legacy that is still 
perceivable in Australian welfare policy. Of particular significance is the distinction 
between the deserving nature of hard work compared to the undeserving nature of 
idleness, and offering social welfare in relation to whether a person is considered 
'deserving' or 'undeserving' (McMahon et al. Conley, 1982; 2000, p. 166). 
A very early example, from before Australia's federation, is the Benevolent 
Society of New South Wales, founded in 1818. Their benevolence was carefully 
monitored in the following manner: 
For an outlay of one guinea per year, respectable persons could be 
subscribers, and this entitled them to recommend an applicant for relief. 
The Society sent its members to visit applicants in their homes, to 
interview them, determine whether or not their homes were respectable 
and well-kept, and to discover whether or not they were deserving of 
the south of England, parishes supplemented low wages from parish taxes. These 
supplements were known as outdoor relief (McMahon et al., 2000, p. 1 66). However, "it was 
argued that the allowance system forced down wages, undermined self-help, made 
people dependent and drove them to pauperism" (McMahon et al., 2000, p. 166). So, a new 
much tougher Poor Law act was introduced in 1834. "The New Poor Law assumed that 
poverty and destitution were the individual's fault. Underlying this act were two 
important elements-the principle of less eligibility and the workhouse test" (McMahon et 
al., 2000, p. 1 66). The principle of less eligibility: 
required that welfare benefits should only be offered on terms designed 
to make the condition of the unemployed less desirable than the 
condition of the lowest paid self-supporting worker in the labour market 
. . .  This principle was reinforced by a stringent workhouse test designed 
to force recipients to re-enter the labour market in preference to 
depending on charity or on the workhouse. (McMahon et al., 2000, p. 1 66) 
The aim, according to McMahon was, to be "cruel to be kind". McMahon continues to 
explain that: 
The allowance system, it was said, had offered the social cripple a pair of 
crutches and so permanently disabled him; the new Poor Law offered 
him nothing and so he walked again. (McMahon et al., 2000, p. 1 66) 
relief . . .  The Society ... actively discouraged persons providing welfare 
relief without the proper scientific investigation, for it was argued that 
indiscriminate almsgiving encouraged pauperism by removing the 
incentive to work. (Conley, 1 982, p. 282-283) 
The stated aims of the society were: 
The following ... : "That the Object of this Society be to relieve the Poor, 
the Diseased, the Aged and Infirm; and thereby to discountenance as 
much as possible, Mendicity and Vagrancy, and to encourage industrious 
habits amongst the indigent Poor, as well as to afford them Religious 
Instruction and Consolation in their Distress". (Conley, 1 982, p. 282-
283) 
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Windschuttle (1 980, p. x) points out another example of a Poor Law based 
policy in Australia. The social benefit provided in Australia during the great 
depression-known as the "susso"-was given in return for willing labour-"road 
works, forestry projects, or simply digging holes and filling them up again" 
(Windschuttle, 1 980, p. x). Here the ' deserving' were distinguished from the 
' undeserving' by whether they were willing to labour, and the ' deserving' thus received 
support which those who did not work were denied. 
Similarly, McMahon (2000) suggests that The Harvester Judgement in 1 907, the 
White Paper on Full employment in 1 945, The Accord and state child care in 1 9 72 also 
reflect the Poor Law work ethic. He states: 
Just as in the British Poor Law, those who are deemed to be deserving 
within the welfare state are essentially those who are in work or those 
whose capital creates wealth. (McMahon et al. , 2000, p. 1 67) 
More recent Australian social policy changes have also been criticised for their 
oppressive surveillance and for distinguishing the ' deserving' from the ' undeserving' 
poor. For example, Robert E. Goodin (2001 ) criticises welfare-to-work reforms like 
Australia's work for the dole for claiming to apply a type of strong paternalism where 
people are forced to behave deservingly. Inherent in these policies claim for legitimacy 
98 
is "a view that work is intrinsically good, and welfare is second best" (Goodin, 2001, p. 
197). This view reflects the values of the Poor Laws. However, according to Goodin 
(2001, p. 189-190, p. 198), such a claim is like a "fig leaf' which conceals a more 
oppressive intention. This is because the stated moralistic intention is "clearly not" 
sincere: 
If we seriously believed that work was good for you and that it is the 
state's legitimate role to force you to do it, then we would have no 
grounds for confining our paternalism to the poor. Patemalistically 
speaking, it would be equally important to make the rich work too. 
Goodin goes on to suggest that more oppressive aims like reducing public expenditure 
might be the real intention of contemporary work for the dole schemes, rather than 
justice (Goodin, 2001, p. 199-200). Or in other words, that saving taxpayers money is 
the real aim, at the expense of emancipative justice for welfare recipients. 
Judith Bessant (2000a; 2000b) also criticises the current Australian work for the 
dole program. Bessant (2000a, p. 29) says it is "destructive of the unemployed person's  
sense of autonomy and agency", particularly for youth. Bessant (2000a, p .  28) argues 
that increased youth unemployment relates to structural economic factors like a 
decrease in industrial jobs, rather than young people's lack of any work ethic. Further, 
she suggests that policy makers are aware of this, but admitting this means they cannot 
control youth through such programs as work for the dole. Bessant writes that: 
If policy-makers and politicians recognise that unemployment results 
from structural changes in the labour market and so on, why then insist 
that job seekers be forced to work for unemployment benefits? (Bessant, 
2000a, p. 28) 
Bessant then answers this question: 
Acknowledging that jobless people are disadvantaged by ' structural' 
changes in labour market ( changes over which they have no personal 
control) weakens government claims about there being a need to 'police' 
young unemployed people on moral grounds (ie: to teach the lessons of 
reciprocation). (Bessant, 2000a, p. 28) 
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Interpretation of Current Breach and Appeal Numbers 
According to this approach, the current disparity of Centrelink breach and appeal 
figures relates to welfare's relationship with oppressive forces like patriarchy and 
capitalism. In particular, the disparity might be due to the oppressive surveillance of 
Centrelink clients which distinguishes the 'deserving' from the 'undeserving' poor. It 
could be argued that more Centrelink clients are being punished for being 'undeserving' 
to ensure they accept even the poorest working conditions during a period of relatively 
comfortable market conditions (following Fox Piven & Cloward 1971). New 
requirements such as mutual obligation, work for the dole, and The jobseeker diary 
(Centrelink, 2000c) mean there is more intense surveillance of Centrelink clients' 
activities (McMahon et al., 2000, p. 170). These new requirements have been 
introduced gradually since 1996. This recent increase in oppressive surveillance of 
Centrelink clients' daily activities could be reflected in the increased number of 
breaches since then. According to Goodin (2001, p. 199): 
The more cumbersome the process, the more people will fail to satisfy 
some requirement or other and be 'breached off the program. The more 
times they are supposed to tum up for interviews, the better the chances 
they will miss one or more of them . . . The more letters they have or 
forms they have to fill in, the more opportunities they have for failing to 
comply. 
The view of surveillance as oppressive can also be applied to formal appeal 
numbers. The stagnating formal external appeal numbers, according to this approach, 
reflect the increased surveillance and oppressive nature of the system. In other words, 
Centrelink clients do not tend to seek formal appeals because they are too oppressed. 
Goodin (2001, p. 199-200) reflects on how oppressive surveillance applies to all 
Centrelink clients, not just the 'undeserving' but also the 'deserving' :  
Of course, there is no reason to think that only the 'right' people (the 
undeserving, and only the undeserving) will necessarily be the ones 
breached off Quite the contrary . . . Campaigns against welfare cheats 
reduce the errors of giving people benefits they don't really deserve, but 
only at the cost of increasing the number of cases in which people don't 
get the benefits they do deserve. 
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Further, the scope for Centrelink clients to appeal has effectively retracted as the JNA 
(many of which are community organisations) have taken over the role of the state 
based CES. This is because, as explained earlier, a client cannot formally appeal 
against a JNA decision, as only Centrelink decisions are appealable. 
The formal social security appeals system in Australia can also be understood 
according to its relationship with the powerful (De Maria, 1992, p. 1 18). As explained 
earlier, the formal appeal system can only attempt to ensure that Centrelink officers 
have not made an error in the assessments of whether recipients are 'deserving' or 
'undeserving' of payment. Formal appeal rulings do not question the bases of these 
Poor Law type judgements. 
Evaluation 
This approach's interpretation of current Centrelink breach and appeal figures is 
compelling for many reasons. First, its interpretation of surveillance as oppressive might 
explain why some Centrelink clients do not seek a formal appeal when they disagree 
with a Centrelink decision, even if they are aware of the appeals process. According to 
this approach, they do not seek a formal appeal because they are too oppressed. This 
explanation does seem to fit with the powerlessness clients expressed in interviews. For 
example, Jim felt so surveyed and marginalised that he said being a Centrelink client is 
"like being in gaol". Second, unlike the approaches in Chapter Four, this approach 
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draws on broader power inequalities. Indeed, this is the very basis of their analysis of 
the relationship between welfare and oppressive forces like capitalism and patriarchy. 
Despite these strengths, however, this approach is limited. It does not explain 
why people let themselves be so oppressed. Conley, however, does offer a partial 
explanation: 
After 1 50 years of daily practice under the Australian economic system, 
the unemployable have thoroughly internalised their labels, so they now 
believe they are hopeless cases and that the reason for their situation is 
quite possibly their own fault. Our first unemployables were much more 
likely to have blamed the economic system and its attendant class system 
for their plight. (Conley, 1 982, p. 281 ) 
However, this explanation is insufficient because it does not explain how the 
"unemployable have thoroughly internalised their labels" or how "daily practice under 
the Australian economic system" does this. She suggests that it might have something to 
do with "1 50 years of daily practice". However, since few "unemployables" are 1 50 
years old this does not explain how individuals have internalised these labels! Although 
many writers who consider surveillance as oppressive prefer to focus on collectivity to 
show the class (Fox Piven & Cloward 1 971 ), gender (Pateman, 1 989/2000), or race 
based nature of individuals' experiences (Williams, 1 989), this does neglect questions 
about how these processes work on the level of the individual. The case study found 
much evidence of processes working at the level of the individual. For example, in the 
Notes for Newstart Allowance booklet (Centrelink, 2000e) words referring to individual 
obligations, such as "you", "your", "you'll", "you're" and "yourself', occur 1 86 times 
over the 7 pages ( excluding the cover). The greatest number on one page is 51 times, the 
smallest 1 5. Over the 7 pages of type the average number per page that "you" or "your" 
occur is 26.5 times per page. These words are also used thickly in The jobseeker guide 
(Centrelink, 2000d) and The jobseeker diary (Centrelink, 2000c)-an average of 1 1  
times per page (excluding the blank jobseeker diary forms from pp. 6-37). Common 
phrases in the documents are "your jobsearch", "your plan", "your interview", "your 
performance", "your efforts to find work", "your payment", "your Diary", and "your 
102 
obligations". It seems being a Centrelink client is very individually focused. Indeed, 
when interviewed the Centrelink clients commonly used similar phrases. They often 
used phrases like "my interview", "my first interview", "my pay", "my work diary", 
"my application", "my payments", and "I'm on the dole". Hence, this approach's 
account is, at best, a partial one. An approach, which engages with both surveillance and 
individualisation, is required. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has considered some explanations for the current disparity of 
Centrelink breach and appeal figures that focus on surveillance as oppressive. These 
approaches to social policy have been concerned with the surveillance and control of the 
poor through social security provision. Particularly important to approaches that focus 
on surveillance as oppressive are various manners of distinguishing between the 
'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor that are the historical legacy of the English Poor 
Laws. While this approach has many strengths, it has one serious weakness-it neglects 
to address individualisation in its analysis. It thus cannot explain how oppressive 
surveillance works at the level of the individual. 
Erving Goffman studied the effects of oppressive organisations on individuals. 
He focused on what he called "total institutions" such as mental asylums and prisons to 
show how individuals were stripped of their identities through degradation ceremonies 
when they entered the institution, and then reprogrammed. He explains the oppressive 
effect, or mortification, of this type of individualisation below: 
In total institutions these territories of the self [such as body, immediate 
actions, thoughts] are violated; the boundary that the individual places 
between his being and the environment is invaded and the embodiments 
of self profaned. (Goffman, 1961 , p. 3 1-32) 
And: 
There is, first, a violation of one's informational preserve regarding self. 
During admission, facts about the inmate' s social statuses and past 
behaviour-especially discreditable facts-are collected and recorded in 
a dossier available to all staff. Later, in so regulating inner tendencies of 
the inmate, there may be group or individual confession-psychiatric, 
political, military, or religious, according to the type of institution. 
(Goffman, 1 961 , p. 32) 
He goes on: 
New audiences not only learn discreditable facts about oneself that are 
ordinarily concealed but are also in a position to perceive some of these 
facts directly. Prisoners and mental patients cannot prevent their visitors 
from seeing them in humiliating circumstances. Another example is the 
shoulder patch of ethnic identification worn by concentration-camp 
inmates. Medical and security examinations often expose the inmate 
physically, sometimes to persons of both sexes; a similar exposure 
follows from collective sleeping arrangements and doorless toilets. An 
extreme here, perhaps, is the situation of a self-destructive mental patient 
who is stripped naked for what is felt to be his own protection and placed 
in a constantly lit seclusion room, into whose Judas window any person 
passing on the ward can peer. (Goffman, 1 961 , p. 32) 
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Although I have found no evidence of Goffman's more extreme examples of 
mortification in my case study, there is evidence of violating people's personal 
information. Indeed, Centrelink clients are required to provide evidence of failed job 
applications, employment history, and past and current personal relationships. However, 
Goffman argues that it is the lack of individualisation that causes the problem. The 
processes he describes are a form of de-individualisation. However, the reverse seems to 
be occurring in current social welfare policy in Australia. Yeatman argues that 
increasing surveillance allows individuals' special cases to be considered. Carney 
argues that increased individualisation has led to more marginalisation of Centrelink 
clients. Although Yeatman and Carney differ in their approval, they agree that the 
current Australian welfare system is experiencing increased individualisation rather than 
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Goffman-like de-individualisation. As already discussed, there was evidence for 
increased individualisation in the case study. For example, the documents studied gave 
individual character to Centrelink clients. They did this by heavily using words like 
"you", "your", "you' 11", "you' re" and "yourself'. Hence, if the concepts of surveillance 
and individualisation are to be useful for understanding the current disparity of 
Centrelink breach and appeal figures, they need to account for the increased 
individualisation of Centrelink practice. They also need to account for both surveillance 
and individualisation-unlike the oppressive surveillance writers discussed above. That 
is, it needs to account for how Centrelink clients accept such oppressive individual 
surveillance. This is the topic of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISCIPLINE AND GOVERNMENTALITY 
Much current work on surveillance and individualisation in social welfare draws 
from the work of Michel Foucault. Although some do consider him to be essentially a 
writer who deals with oppression23 , his approach is very different to those generally 
considered to be critical, like Marxist writers (Ransom, 1 997). Foucault's  criticism is 
not grounded in relationships to capitalism, or social collectivity in the orthodox critical 
manner (Ransom, 1 997). Rather, through focusing on the level of the individual and 
individual subjectivity, he concentrates on the how rather than the who for or who 
against of the orthodox critical writer who tends to view surveillance as oppressive. 
This is illustrated by Foucault' s particular view of power. While Foucault does argue 
that power may be oppressive, he says that it is also creative. According to Foucault, 
power, through such techniques as surveillance and individualisation, creates individual 
subjectivity. Perhaps Foucault's  understanding of surveillance and individualisation will 
provide that which was lacking in the orthodox surveillance as oppressive approach of 
the previous chapter-an account of how Centrelink clients allow themselves to be 
breached. Consequently, we might finally be offered the previously elusive explanation 
for why (or how) some Centrelink clients do not appeal a Centrelink decision when they 
disagree with it, even if they are aware of the possibility of a formal appeal. 
There are two general areas of scholarship that claim Foucault's influence and 
consider surveillance and individualisation-those who focus on Foucault's disciplines 
and those who focus on govemmentality. Although these two areas could be considered 
23 Interestingly, other writers consider Foucault to be essentially conservative (see Harris, 
1999, p. 27) 
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separately24, they do overlap and interconnect and, for clarity, will be considered 
together in this chapter. 
Outline of Discipline and Governmentality 
Studies that concentrate on Foucault's understanding of discipline view 
surveillance and individualisation as forms of disciplinary power. Disciplinary power, 
according to these writers, is a small, intricate, micro-power which " 'makes' 
individuals" (Foucault, 1977, p. 170). As Foucault explains, disciplinary power "is not a 
triumphant power . . .  it is a modest, suspicious power" (1977, p. 170). Individuals are 
made through "a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, 
[and] targets" (Foucault, 1977, p. 215). These techniques include surveillance and 
individualisation. 
Foucault is most famous for his account of surveillance, in particular "pan optic 
surveillance" (Foucault, 1977, p. 195-230). This term is derived from Jeremy 
Bentham's ideal prison-the Panopticon. It focuses on the continual surveillance and 
"correct training" of prisoners. Prisoners are housed in isolated cells surrounding a 
central surveillance tower and continually modify their behaviour because they know 
they may be watched at any time. Eventually, prisoners internalise this new behaviour. 
Or, in other words, the disciplinary power of surveillance recreates the prisoner. 
24 The approach taken in this thesis may not be considered properly F oucaultian by 
some. However, it is not the aim of this chapter, nor this thesis, to be so. Nor is it 
desirable to attempt to follow Foucault doctrinally. Here, please keep in mind Hunt and 
Wickham's ( 1994, p. 3) position that there "is no single starting point or grounding of 
Foucault's thought; it can be approached from a number of different perspectives. One 
particularly important consequence is that there is no 'real Foucault' who can be 
summoned. Rather, we argue that it is a useful strategy to insist that there are many 
'Foucaults' who coexist and interact with one another. No amount of synthesis can yield 
a unitary body of knowledge let alone a single theory". 
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Individualisation creates individuals in a similar manner, according to Foucault 
(1 977, p. 1 92-1 94). To use the example of the Panopticon, prisoners are continually 
surveyed m isolated cells. Each prisoner is individually watched. They are thus 
individually judged and are, individually, changed into reformed law abiding 
individuals. By focusing the gaze of surveillance on the individual, the disciplinary 
power of surveillance can recreate an individual prisoner. 
Other disciplinary powers also create and recreate individuals, according to this 
approach. These include normalisation and distribution. Normalisation provides the 
means by which individual prisoners are trained to know how they are expected to 
behave in the Panopticon and change themselves accordingly (Foucault, 1 977, p. 1 78-
1 80). Distribution refers to how the position of bodies and objects in space makes 
individuals (Foucault, 1 977, p. 1 41 -1 45). To use the Panopticon example again, the 
distribution of the cells around the central surveillance tower, and the distribution of 
prisoners' bodies in these cells so they can view the tower but no other prisoner, allows 
the other disciplinary powers to work. These walls isolate bodies and thus allow 
individualisation. Similarly, the distribution of the central surveillance tower and 
corresponding transparent front wall allows surveillance. 
However, Foucault's  concept of disciplinary power goes beyond the prison wall. 
For example, to Foucault, the disciplinary instrument called panoptic surveillance 
pervades all society. Indeed, to Foucault "wherever one is dealing with a multiplicity of 
individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behaviour must be imposed, the 
panoptic schema may be used" (Foucault, 1 977, p. 205). Further, disciplinary 
techniques of power are very relevant in the context of current Centrelink breach and 
appeal figures in Australia. Judith Bessant observed that Centrelink clients are treated as 
needing correction: 
Jobless people allegedly failed to become employed due to their 'bad' 
attitudes towards work, because they lacked discipline, could not 
successfully present themselves at interviews, or because they lacked the 
necessary skills in literacy and numeracy. (Bessant, 2000a, p. 26) 
1 08 
However, Foucault was criticised by his contemporaries for ignoring broader 
political processes such as the power of the nation state. Indeed, these critics ask: what 
about power inequalities, legal coercion, and economic inequalities? Foucault rebutted 
these criticisms with an account of politics, often called govemmentality, which 
accounted for both intricate micro-power and wider politics (Burchell, Gordon & Miller 
1 99 1 ). Most political analysts only saw part of the wider picture, according to Foucault. 
This is because they continue to understand modem politics in terms of a sovereign or 
crown-despite this being outdated. Most political theory, according to Foucault (1 980, 
p. 1 21 ), had yet to "cut off the King's head". While most accounts of political power are 
concerned with laws, coercion and who is sovereign, Foucault is also concerned with 
methods of counting and managing the population. Foucault envisages a triangle of 
contemporary govemmentality which has in each comer-sovereign, discipline and 
government (management) (Foucault, 1 991 ). Hence, the analysis offered by studies of 
govemmentality differs from the type of analysis used in earlier chapters of this thesis. 
The approach developed by Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller (1 992) has been very useful 
here. 
In very general terms, govemmentality studies analyse the "conduct of conduct" 
(M. Dean, 1 999, p. 2). Govemmentality is concerned with the "problematic of 
government" (Foucault, 1 991 ,  p. 87)-the how of governing (M. Dean, 1 999, p. 2,1 0-
1 1 ;  Foucault, 1 982, p. 220-1 ). The problematic of government may be analysed in terms 
of political rationalities and governmental technologies (Rose & Miller 1 992, p. 1 75-
1 76). 
Political rationalities are "the changing discursive fields within which the 
exercise of power is conceptualised, the moral justifications for particular ways of 
exercising power by diverse authorities, of the appropriate forms, objects and limits of 
politics, and conceptions of proper distribution of such tasks" (Rose & Miller 1 992, p. 
1 75). Or, in other words, political rationalities are the changing understandings of 
acceptable management practice. For example, Rose and Miller call the political 
rationality of the Keynesian welfare state "welfarism" and describe it as championing 
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mutual social responsibility as the pref erred conduct of conduct (Rose & Miller 1992, p. 
191-198). In contrast, currently, according to Rose and Miller, neo-liberal political 
rationality perceives markets to be the best regulators of economic activity, including 
welfare (Rose & Miller 1992, p. 198). It is an attempt to address a perceived 
problematic 'crisis' of the Keynesian welfare state. 
Governmental technologies are "the complex of mundane programmes, 
calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which 
authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental ambitions" (Rose & Miller 
1992, p. 175). Or, in simpler words, governmental technologies are the tools for 
managing populations. Some examples are statistics (Procacci, 1978, p. 68-69; 1991) 
and the government of the self through surveillance (M. Dean, 1995; 1998; 1999). For 
example unemployment statistics such as the number of people who are unemployed 
were not always recorded-this is a relatively recent practice. William Walters refers to 
the discovery and invention of unemployment in Unemployment and government: 
geneologies of the social (Walters, 2000, p. 12-52). He argues that the categories of 
employed and unemployed were created, and were not a naturally occurring 
phenomenon. 
However, Foucault can be criticised for perce1vmg society as a perpetual 
autonomous machine. It is argued that if the techniques of power explicated above 
continually create human subjectivity-then there is no escape from them. If we can't 
yearn for or even conceptualise an escape from them, then how are we ever to break 
free from them? This, however, misunderstands Foucault's intention. Foucault does not 
claim these techniques always work-rather, he says they inevitably fail (see Malpas & 
Wickham, 1995). They are so fallible that they are more like an imagined ideal world 
than concrete reality. Indeed, no prison works exactly like the Panopticon. It is an ideal 
schema that perpetuates certain ideas-like neo-liberalism or welfarism in Australian 
social welfare provision. 
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Interpretation of Current Breach and Appeal Numbers 
Through an analysis of the intricate inter-dependencies between political 
rationalities and governmental technologies, we can begin to understand the multiple 
and delicate networks that connect the individuals, groups and organisations to the 
aspirations of authorities in the advanced liberal democracies of the present. Patricia 
Harris (1 999; 2000), Barry Hindess (1 987; 1 993; 1 997a; 1 997b; 1 997c; 1 998a; 1 998b) 
and Mitchell Dean (1 995; 1 998; 1 999), for example, have applied this analytic to an 
Australian welfare context. 
Within neo-liberal political rationality "the language of the entrepreneurial 
individual, endowed with freedom and autonomy, has come to predominate over almost 
any other in evaluations of the ethical claims of political power and programmes of 
government" (Rose & Miller 1 992, p. 200). But "through this loose assemblage of 
agents, calculations, techniques, images and commodities, individuals can be governed 
through their freedom to choose" (Rose & Miller 1 992, p. 201 ). They aim to create 
"enterprising individuals" (Rose & Miller 1 992, p. 1 96). In another example, in the 
political rationality of welfarism, "payment would qualify an individual to receive 
benefits, and teach the lessons of contractual obligations, thrift and responsibility" 
(Rose & Miller 1 992, p. 1 96). The aim here is to create "responsible individuals" (Rose 
& Miller 1 992, p. 1 96). 
According to this approach, neo-liberal political rationality25, with its 
championing of market forces and envisaged population of ' enterprising individuals', 
expresses its mentality in some changes to the Australian welfare apparatus (Harris, 
1 999, p. 44). The privatisation of the CES to become the Job Network was championed 
for allowing YA and NSA recipients a choice of service provider. The neo-liberal 
language of choice permeates the governance of the Job Network; furthermore, how 
Centrelink clients can be "governed through their freedom to choose" (Rose & Miller 
1 992, p. 201 ) is clearly enunciated. Indeed, recipients must apply for YA or NSA in 
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order to choose a Job Network provider. Also, NSA and YA recipients must choose at 
least one Job Network provider, preferably more (FaCS, 2002), in order to continue 
receiving payment. Further, YA and NSA recipients must negotiate an activity 
agreement with their Job Network provider. 
If they choose to transgress their negotiated agreement (FaCS, 2002), they will 
be financially penalised (breached). As explained earlier, the Job Network Provider 
must report any transgression of the activity test to Centrelink, who may then impose a 
breach. Finally, if an ' enterprising individual' Centrelink client is unhappy with the 
service of either Centrelink or a Job Network Provider, they are free to call the customer 
complaints line (FaCS, 2002). Consequently, within the mentality and techniques of 
neo-liberal governance, breaching is tied to the discourse of individual freedom, despite 
being a governed punishment. Further, for an ' enterprising individual', the customer 
complaints line is the most obvious avenue through which to practice their freedom to 
complain, despite its inability to change decisions. 
The formal administrative appeal structure for Centrelink clients was 
conceptualised in a welfarist political rationality, with its championing of reciprocal 
obligations, social solidarity and the ' responsible individual'. It was intended to be a 
way of ensuring that responsible individuals were not harmed by a perceived possible 
excess of state power (Administrative Review Council, 1 995). 
According to the analytic of governmentality, the complaint line has not 
replaced the appeals structure. Rather, they coexist. Indeed, people do still seek appeals. 
However, customer complaints seem to translate more efficiently with the techniques of 
self-discipline that govern unemployed people through Centrelink offices and the JNAs 
in neo-liberal governance. According to Patricia Harris (1 999, p. 43), who writes about 
the Australian welfare system, "clients become customers" in advanced liberal 
governance. Centrelink clients see themselves as customers to the extent that they 
complain to a customer complaint line that cannot overturn a Centrelink decision rather 
25 Patricia Harris ( 1999, p. 41 -48) uses the phrase "advanced liberal governance". 
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than to an administrative appeals system that can overturn Centrelink decisions. Further, 
they cannot seek an appeal of a JNA decision in the formal appeal system (see Chapters 
One and Five): as a customer who is an ' enterprising individual' they only have the 
freedom to make a customer complaint about a JNA. 
Mitchell Dean (1 995; 1 998; 1 999) has done much analysis of the techniques of 
the self in Australian social welfare. His work provides a window for understanding 
how Centrelink clients may be made into customers through disciplining power. 
According to Mitchell Dean, Centrelink clients are subjected to intense surveillance in 
an attempt to create their inner moral lives-in particular, to make them into active "job 
ready" individuals (M. Dean, 1 998, p. 93). In other words surveillance, 
individualisation, normalisation and distribution are used to create and recreate 
Centrelink clients. One significant way these disciplines are applied is through the 
activity test. Many Centrelink clients must pass this test each fortnight to receive 
payment. According to Mitchell Dean (1 998, p. 94-95), the activity test facilitates 
"intense supervision of the activities of the unemployed, by which the claimant must 
demonstrate not only active job searching but also training and job preparation 
activities". The activity test not only allows the surveillance of a Centre link client, but 
also the maintenance of an individual record about that client, and a technique to 
normalise a client as an active jobseeker. To evidence this point, Dean points to the 
focus on active job seeking manifest in the "various resume, application, interview and 
job-search techniques recommended in the Job Search Kit provided by the CES" (M. 
Dean, 1 995, p. 574). These are, "backed up by sanctions, such as the cancellation of the 
allowance for varying periods for various groups of the unemployed" (M. Dean, 1 998, 
p. 95). Although these observations relate to the CES, which has been replaced by the 
JNAs, similar disciplinary techniques are still administered to Centrelink clients. They 
are also backed up by sanctions such as breaches. 
Further, Hartley Dean (1 992, p. 1 36-1 74) shows how individualisation can also 
occur in the social security appeals system. He views seeking an appeal as an individual 
examination. Hartley Dean uses this concept to understand the different hearings in the 
Social Security Appeals Tribunal in the United Kingdom (H. Dean, 1 991 ,  p. 1 36-1 74). 
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In his analysis of the pre-hearing process, Dean shows that while most social security 
recipients in the United Kingdom usually do not meet the officials who administer their 
case, "to appeal against the determinations of such officialdom is to invite further 
scrutiny" (H. Dean, 1991, p. 145). He continues; "even if it is only a minority of 
appellants who appear in the full light of a tribunal hearing, in the act of appealing every 
appellant submits her/himself for examination" (H. Dean, 1991, p. 145). Similarly in 
Australia, not only are Centrelink clients created into customers who are more likely to 
choose a customer complaint line over a formal appeal, they may also be reluctant to 
seek a formal appeal because it invites further individual examination. Both processes 
would manifest as a relatively low number of appeals, even when breach numbers are 
increasing rapidly. 
Evaluation 
This interpretation of breach and appeal figures stands up well in relation to the 
case findings. This will be shown by locating evidence for how various governmental 
technologies create individual Centrelink clients who can be governed through their 
freedom to choose. Much evidence was found for the disciplining techniques of 
surveillance, individualisation, normalisation and distribution. As we shall see, much of 
the evidence adds flesh to this approach rather than challenges it. 
However, the depth of an analysis of Centrelink breach and appeal figures 
according to discipline and governmentality would stop around here. It would not seek 
to ask who does the training, who suffers through this failure, or who benefits. Nor 
would this approach ask if our current regime is particularly prone to failure. Rather, as 
explained earlier, it views power as more diffuse than this-there is no agent who 
orchestrates these disciplinary techniques. Further, failure is a characteristic of all 
rationalities of government and their techniques-not any particular one. According to 
this approach there is no hidden agenda or deeper meaning. This has led Gavin Kendall 
and Gary Wickham to describe Foucault's analysis as "a rather 'flat' description" 
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(Kendall & Wickham 1 999, p. 1 24). However, they do not mean this as a criticism. This 
is because they believe it is a deliberate attempt by Foucault to distance himself from 
established ideas, particularly Marxism. According to Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham: 
A central feature of Foucault's proj ect lies in the distinctive form of his 
engagement with the legacy of Marx . . .  What Foucault does is to ' use' 
Marx to set up a negative pole against which to elaborate his alternative. 
He did this as a strategic reaction to the significant influence of Marxism 
in French intellectual life. (Hunt & Wickham 1 994, p. 33-34) 
Foucault's deliberate distancing from Marx also means that he focuses principally on 
power as positive and creative rather than negative and oppressive. Hunt and Wickham 
explain that Foucault's: 
critical step is the equation and conflation of negativity with repression; 
the result is that in order to avoid a negative conception of power he first 
down plays (but does not exclude) the repressive capacity of power and 
then proceeds to elaborate an account of the modem forms of 
disciplinary power which is founded on non-repressive forms of 
domination. In order to secure this objective he sets out to purge all those 
elements associated with negativity and repression. (Hunt & Wickham 
1 994, p. 34) 
In analysing the case study findings for this section, different (but 
interconnected) disciplinary techniques were used as analytical categories. Research by 
Wright and Gore was particularly useful here. They adopted techniques of power 
derived from Discipline and punish as categories for analysing the disciplining of the 
human body in a classroom (Gore, 1 998; Wright, 2000). Wright (2000) recorded and 
transcribed a girls gym class lesson and analysed the text according to the following 
categories: surveillance, normalisation, exclusion, classification, distribution, 
individualisation, totalisation, and regulation. The categories of surveillance, 
individualisation, normalisation and distribution were useful in this research. This 
section will outline operational definitions of these categories, and then detail evidence 
for each category. 
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Surveillance. Gore's operational definition of surveillance is "supervising, 
closely observing, watching, threatening to watch or expecting to be watched" (Gore, 
1 998). Wright extends Gore's operational definition to include instructions for subjects 
"to become involved in the monitoring of their own performance" (Wright, 2000, p. 
1 56). This includes panoptic surveillance where, according to Foucault: 
He who is subjected to a [continuous] field of visibility, and who knows 
it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them 
play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power 
relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the 
principle of his own subjection. (Foucault, 1 977, p. 202-203) 
Evidence of surveillance from my study included the 'fortnightly' form (Centrelink, 2 
May 2000), The jobseeker diary (Centrelink, 2000c ), and repeated warnings that 
Centrelink may take any means necessary to investigate the accuracy of a client's 
claims. 
Individualisation. Surveillance works on the level of the individual. According 
to Foucault (1 977, p. 1 93) in a disciplinary regime "individualisation is 'descending"' 
(Foucault, 1 977, p. 1 93)  rather than ascending. This is in contrast to, for example, 
feudal society where "the more one possesses power or privilege, the more one is 
marked as an individual, by rituals, written accounts or visual reproductions" (Foucault, 
1 977, p. 1 92). He explains that: 
As power becomes more anonymous and more functional, those on 
whom it is exercised tend to be more strongly individualised; it is 
exercised by surveillance rather than ceremonies, by comparative 
measures that have the 'norm' as reference rather than genealogies 
giving ancestors as points of reference; by ' gaps' rather than by deeds. 
(Foucault, 1 977, p. 1 93) 
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Gore defined individualisation as "giving individual character to oneself or another" 
(Gore, 1998, p. 242). Wright (2000, p. 157) elaborated it to be naming, using "you", 
individual treatment, or using "I". I found much evidence of this in my research. 
Phrases like "your job search", "your obligation", and "your interview" occurred 
throughout the documents. 
Individualisation can also incorporate Foucault's concept of "the examination" 
(Foucault, 1977, p. 185, 192). Examples of individual examination include medical 
examination and scholarly examination. The examination is like a personal interview 
which implements "within a single mechanism, power relations that make it possible to 
extract and constitute knowledge" about an individual (Foucault, 1977, p. 185, 192). 
The examination is a mechanism that makes the subjected individual visible and 
objectifies them (Foucault, 1977, p. 187), documents them (Foucault, 1977, p. 189), and 
"makes each individual a 'case"' (Foucault, 1977, p. 191). In short, it "establishes over 
individuals a visibility through which one differentiates them and judges them" 
(Foucault, 1977, p. 184). As stated earlier, Hartley Dean uses this concept to understand 
the Social Security Appeals Tribunal in the United Kingdom (H. Dean, 1991, p. 136-
174 ). In his analysis of the pre-hearing process, Dean shows that "in the act of appealing 
every appellant submits her/himself for examination" (H. Dean, 1991, p. 145). Evidence 
of such examination in Australia includes claimants' personal, private interviews with a 
Centrelink officer when they apply for payment. 
Normalisation. Normalisation means, generally, the detailed and personal 
categorisation of 'normal' as distinct from 'abnormal' behaviour, with the aim of 
correcting abnormal behaviour or maintaining normal behaviour. Here "the non­
conforming is punishable", and "disciplinary punishment" is "essentially corrective" 
(Foucault, 1977, p. 179). Further, "punishment is only one element of a double system: 
gratification-punishment" (Foucault, 1977, p. 180). According to Foucault, "the power 
of normalisation [ not only] imposes homogeneity; but it individualises by making it 
possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialties and to render the 
differences useful by fitting them one to another" (Foucault, 1977, p. 178). Thus, in my 
research evidence of normalisation was threefold. 
1 1 7  
First was evidence of setting a criterion for normal behaviour-"invoking, 
requiring, setting or conforming to a standard-defining the normal" (Gore, 1 998). 
Evidence included defining "Centrelink approved activity" (Centrelink, 2 May 2000), 
outlining "steps you can take to help open the doors to employment" (Centrelink, 
2000c, p. 1 ), and "other things you need to do" such as "provide information requested 
by Centrelink" (Centrelink, 2000c, p. 2). 
Second was the training of "docile bodies" to maintain normal behaviour 
through repeated, specific activity (Foucault, 1 977, p. 135-1 69). There was much 
evidence of such repeated behavioural training. Examples of this training included 
continual job searching and repetitiously signing a pledge to look for work. 
Third, this training may involve a system of rewards and punishments for 
normal or other than normal behaviour. Evidence included what Gore (1 998) and 
Wright (2000, p. 1 58) consider "regulation" and define as rules, restrictions, sanction, 
rewards and punishment, expressed in words like "must", "need to", "have to", 
"should", and "required". An example of such regulation in my research was the 
common threat to reduce a Centre link client' s payment if a particular task was not 
completed properly. 
Distribution. According to Foucault, "discipline proceeds from the distribution 
of individuals in space" (Foucault, 1 977, p. 14 1 ). This might include some of the 
following specific technologies: ''partitioning" individuals into separate categories 
where "each individual has his own place; and each place its individual" (Foucault, 
1 977, p. 1 43); and ''functional sites . . .  particular places were defined to correspond not 
only to the need to supervise, to break dangerous communications, but also to create a 
useful space" (Foucault, 1 977, p. 143-1 44). Also included is "rank: the place one 
occupies in a classification" (Foucault, 1 977, p. 1 45). Gore and Wright defined 
distribution simply as pertaining to space (Gore, 1 998; Wright, 2000). This thesis found 
evidence of distribution where Centrelink warned clients to obtain permission to change 
address, because if they move to an area with a lower employment rate their payment 
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may be reduced or stopped. Other evidence included the architecture of the Centrelink 
office: placement of desks, and location of interview rooms. Case study evidence for 
each disciplining technique is detailed below. 
Surveillance 
As we will see, surveillance for a Centrelink client might occur at various levels, 
often simultaneously. They might be simply watched continually through such 
techniques as the 'fortnightly' form (Centrelink, 2 May 2000). However, a Centrelink 
client might also be threatened to be watched through continual reminders that they may 
be observed at any time, perhaps even without their knowledge. It follows that clients 
might also expect to be watched and alter their behaviour accordingly. Furthermore, a 
client might actively watch themselves on behalf of Centrelink. These different levels of 
surveillance will be detailed below with some of the practices that render them possible. 
Centrelink clients are continually being watched. Centrelink recipients must 
subject themselves to significant surveillance to receive, and continue to receive, 
payment. The most obvious form of this surveillance is through the extensive and 
repetitive filling out of forms that clients must complete to receive payment. Indeed, 
recipients may be required to complete an application for payment form fortnightly, and 
Thejobseeker diary (Centrelink, 2000c) every 12  weeks. These forms don't just require 
a client to request payment; they require detailed personal information-including who 
a client is living with and their relationship with this person, whether they went overseas 
for a holiday, what job they applied for and how they contacted the potential employer. 
For example, the 'fortnightly' form states in question 8 that "you must tell us if any of 
the things below happened in the period" and lists thirty specific things such as "you 
started living with a partner", "you separated from your partner", and "you and your 
partner are intending to go overseas ( even for a short period)" (Centrelink, 2 May 2000). 
Similarly, both the 'fortnightly' form (Centrelink, 2 May 2000) and Thejobseeker diary 
(Centrelink, 2000c) require details about an individual's behaviour. For example, the 
diary requires the Centrelink client to write details of every contact with a potential 
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employer-including name, contact details, person contacted, how they were contacted, 
when, and the type of position. 
Centrelink's gaze is not confined to the A4 oblong of a form, however. 
Centrelink can also "make any inquiries necessary to help us [Centrelink] work out how 
much we should pay you" (Centrelink, 2 May 2000). Further, anyone is encouraged to 
watch Centrelink clients and, if in doubt of their legitimacy, report them on Centrelink's 
web page (Centrelink, 2002). One person interviewed, whom I will call Jillian, even 
experienced being watched by her ex-husband: 
Jillian: Oh, I'm just trying to think what it was. It was, um, the parenting 
allowance. Yeah, um, and they received information from somebody else 
(background noise). 
Lynda! : Somebody who wasn't you? 
Jillian: Yeah. 
Lynda! : About your case. 
Jillian: Yes. Yep. 
Lynda! : Oooh. 
Jillian: Yeah. My ex-husband, so, but anyway, they fixed it. 
Centrelink clients are not simply observed, but they are continually reminded 
that they are being observed, maybe even without their knowledge. Below are four 
examples of clients being reminded of the gaze of Centrelink. 
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First, on forms and fliers, the client is frequently reminded that they are being 
watched. On all documents analysed in this research26, clients were reminded that they 
were being watched at least once on each page, usually more often. Phrases used 
include "this Diary is an important document and must be kept in a safe place. You may 
be asked to provide it to Centrelink at any time" (Centrelink, 2000c, p. 1 ), and "you 
must tell Centrelink of any changes that may affect your payment" (Centrelink, 2000e, 
p. 6). In The jobseeker guide (Centrelink, 2000d), clients are even reminded about their 
appearance during an interview. Under the title "appearance" they are told that 
"personal appearance is important", "plan your clothing in advance", "be careful with 
your choice of clothing-but be comfortable with what you wear", and "appear well 
groomed" (Centrelink, 2000d, p. 7). 
Second, Centrelink clients are also reminded that they may be observed at any 
time without their permission and without being aware of it. Indeed, every fortnight on 
their 'fortnightly' form, after the declaration and signature, clients are reminded that 
"we [Centrelink] can make any inquiries necessary to help us work out how much we 
should pay you" (Centrelink, 2 May 2000). Similarly, in The jobseeker diary they are 
reminded that "Centrelink may check with employers you list to make sure you 
approached them for work" (Centrelink, 2000c, p. 3). 
Third, Centrelink clients are even reminded that they are being watched as they 
line up at their Centrelink office. Indeed, the researcher observed a large sign in the 
Centrelink office which read: 
26 As detailed in Chapter Two this includes: 
• Application for payment of Newstart Allowance (Centrelink, 2 May 2000) (also 
known as the 'fortnightly' form), 
• The jobseeker guide (Centrelink, 2000d), 
• Thejobseeker diary (Centrelink, 2000c) (also known as the 'dole' diary), 
• What we can do to help each other: customer charter (Centrelink, September 2000), 
• Claim for Newstart Allowance (Centrelink, 2000b ), and 
• Notes for Newstart Allowance (Centrelink, 2000e ). 
WARNING 
VIDEO SURVEILLANCE 
IN OPERATION 
BY AUST GUARD 
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"WARNING" was in bold white type on a red background, while the other text was 
bold black on a white background. There was also a large convex mirror near the entry. 
This made it obvious to Centrelink clients that the staff could survey them easily from 
behind their desks. 
The fourth example of Centrelink clients being reminded that they are being 
observed is the act of completing the forms themselves. As people disclose personal 
information to Centrelink by writing it on a form, they are reminded that Centrelink is 
watching them. 
Centrelink clients are not only watched, reminded of being watched, but they 
expect to be watched. Indeed, the Centrelink clients that were interviewed expected to 
be watched. They made constant reference to filling out forms, needing to obtain correct 
documentation, and being assessed by Centrelink officers. A vivid example of a 
Centrelink client's awareness of being watched was expressed by a young man, Jack. 
When asked to reflect on his rights when disagreeing with a Centrelink decision he 
mused about how different institutions seemed to share information and said "Yeah. Big 
brother is watching. Anyway". 
In addition to Centrelink clients being watched, being reminded of being 
watched, and actually expecting to be watched, they facilitated Centrelink's surveillance 
of themselves. In short, not only did Centrelink watch them, but they also watched 
themselves. 
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This self-surveillance was encouraged by The jobseeker guide (Centrelink, 
2000d). Here, Centrelink clients were advised that "You may wish to make notes about 
your job search. These notes are for you to keep and may help you with your job search 
in the future" (Centrelink, 2000d, p. 14). Four of the eighteen pages are provided for the 
client's personal notes on themselves (Centrelink, 2000d, p. 13- 16). 
Also, every time a Centrelink client discloses their personal details on a form 
and submit it to Centrelink, they are effectively watching themselves for Centrelink. 
Indeed, interviews with Centrelink clients provided many examples of people watching 
themselves on behalf of Centrelink's gaze. 
One interviewee, Jack, when asked if Centrelink had made any decisions he 
disagreed with, succinctly stated "No. I follow the system and they don't really stuff 
you around". This reveals self-surveillance in two ways. First, Jack says that since he, 
"personally" follows the system, he does not find Centrelink difficult to deal with. And, 
provided he ensures that he follows the system himself, this will continue. Second, Jack 
implies that because he follows the system, including providing all information 
( documentation) required, then Centrelink will not make trouble for him. Indeed, all 
interviewees actively watched themselves by completing the forms required. When a 
Centrelink client discloses their personal details in a Centrelink form, they are actively 
participating in their own surveillance. They are helping Centrelink watch them. 
In a further example, a common complaint among interviewees was Centrelink 
claiming they had not received forms that clients had submitted. Although the complaint 
was usually about the loss or delay of income, it demonstrates how actively clients 
participate in their own surveillance. For example, Joe felt some Centrelink officer had 
taken a personal dislike to him and kept 'losing' his form. In other words, he felt that 
the officer was doing him an injustice by sabotaging his self-surveillance ( and thus 
denying him payment). Joe expressed his experience this way: 
Okay. They didn't like me. A personal dislike towards me. I mean if a 
person doesn't really like the person on the other side of the counter or 
that person has enemies that that person knows you're in shit. I might be 
an exception to the rule but it's true 'cause like I could even go into the 
forms like the Q 10 forms and what not which are rent assistance forms 
they've s'posed to be lodged you do a free thing and I lodged the same 
one three weeks running and they still reckon it didn't get put in. 
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So, Centrelink clients are subjected to intense surveillance. They are continually 
watched, reminded of being watched and facilitate Centrelink's gaze by watching 
themselves. They are thus created into individuals who can be governed. However, 
surveillance affects the individual Centrelink client. Thus surveillance is linked to 
processes of individualisation. 
Individualisation 
As Foucault states, while in the past only the powerful ( such as monarchs, with 
pomp and ceremony) were individualised, now "those on whom it [power] is so 
exercised tend to be more strongly individualised" (Foucault, 1977, p. 193 ). The 
techniques of ascribing individual character to each Centrelink client­
individualisation--can be demonstrated on many levels. Centrelink clients are 
continuously spoken of as individuals, they are also assigned activities and obligations 
that can be fulfilled only by themselves, individual personal records are kept, and they 
are repeatedly examined through individual interviews with Centrelink officers. 
Evidence for each level of the process of individualisation is detailed in this section. 
As explained in Chapter Six, the documents studied gave individual character to 
Centrelink clients. They did this by heavily using words like "you", "your", "you'll", 
"you're" and "yourself'. 
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The documents did not just give individual character to the client, but also 
explicated individual actions and responsibilities that the client alone was required to 
take. This is illustrated in page one of The jobseeker diary: 
This Jobseeker Diary is for you to record your efforts to find work. It can 
aid you in your search for work and will be used to show Centrelink that 
you are meeting your obligations to actively seek work. (Italics not in 
original Centrelink, 2000c, p. 1 )  
Indeed, stating "your obligations", "your efforts to find work" and "your search for 
work" reinforce that it is this individual activity that is a personal obligation to 
Centrelink. This personal individual obligation is reinforced by stating the diary is for 
"you to record your efforts" to show that "you are meeting your obligations". Further, it 
is a Centrelink client's individual responsibility to avoid being breached. The above 
quotation is followed by an "IMPORTANT!" reminder that payment "depends on you 
meeting your obligations. If you don't we may have to reduce your payment or even 
stop payment. Help us to avoid this" (Bold in original, italics not in original Centrelink, 
2000c, p. 3). Not only are you reminded that you will be punished if you do not meet 
your obligations but you are told that it is your responsibility to make sure this does not 
happen. You must "help us to avoid this" because we may "have to reduce your 
payment" even though we don't want to-it's up to you not Centrelink to ensure your 
payment continues! 
Not only are clients given individual character, given individual required 
behaviour and responsibility, but they are also required to help Centrelink maintain their 
individual records. Indeed, very personal and individual information about the recipient 
is continually recorded. Through the 'fortnightly' form (Centrelink, 2 May 2000), this 
occurs every two weeks. Clients are warned that "If you want this payment to continue" 
then you must "answer all the questions". They are asked to disclose their fortnightly 
earnings and information about their personal relationships. In question 8, which 
engulfs a quarter of the space of the entire form, it states "you must tell us if any of the 
things below happened in the period". The question encompasses "income", 
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"relationships" such as "you started living with a partner", "children" such as "a child 
under 1 6  left your or your partner's care", "rehabilitation", "prison", "studies", 
"approved activity", "bank details", "rent"; and for "youth allowance only", 
"parents/guardian/s" and "brothers and sisters". Further, Centrelink recently ran an 
advertising campaign to remind clients that "when your circumstances change, don't 
forget to tell Centrelink" because you must "support the system that supports you" 
(Advertisement, 2002). 
A Centrelink client is not only ascribed individual character, given individual 
responsibility, and their personal details stored, but they are also often required to 
undertake an individual examination with a Centrelink officer, where their individual 
record is reassessed. Individual examination is compulsory for receiving NSA. 
Generally a claimant must subjugate themselves to an examination, in the form of a 
personal interview with a Centrelink officer, in order to qualify for payment. The Notes 
for Newstart Allowance (Centrelink, 2000e, p. 2) illuminate some of the characteristics 
of this interview. These notes include a list of "4 easy steps" to "claim" NSA. Step four 
is titled "interview" and has the following instructions27: 
Contact Centre link in 13 1021  to make a time for your interview. 
What you should bring to your interview: 
• Your completed claim form; 
• Your completed looking for work form; and 
• All the additional forms and documents you were asked for in the 
claim form (see the checklist at the back of the claim form). (Bold in 
original Centrelink, 2000e, p. 2) 
27 Please note that a client may claim for the Newstart Payment without filling out the 
Claim for Newstart Allowance (Centrelink, 2000b) form. However, to do this they must 
contact Centrelink to claim payment. 
Further instructions follow: 
If you have been given an interview time, please arrive at the reception 
on time. Otherwise a new interview time will need to be made. If you do 
not attend your interview, you may not get your payment. [picture of 
a telephone is here] If you are asked to come in for an interview but you 
cannot attend, please phone 131021 for another interview time. (Bold in 
original Centrelink, 2000e, p. 2) 
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Here, not only must the client individually attend this private interview, but also 
individualisation is reinforced by being told it is "your interview" and you must bring 
"your completed claim form" and "your completed looking for work form". It is also 
the individual Centrelink client's responsibility to reschedule the interview if unable to 
attend. Being subjected to the gaze here are both the individual and the personal details 
on their forms. This gaze will become part of the permanent record of this client. 
However, an individual examination is not a singular experience for a Centrelink 
client. When a client personally lodges their ' fortnightly' form, they generally line up to 
hand it personally to a Centrelink officer. The officer then checks their details again 
before accepting the form. Individual Centrelink clients are examined and re-examined 
often. Jane was so accustomed to individual examination through her permanent record 
that when asked what rights she felt she had when she disagreed with a Centrelink 
decision, she replied: 
I don't know, like get as much back up into why you're right, you need 
back up of course. Document, show that you're correct, and why they're 
wrong, you know (unclear, background noise) you need, yeah, proof, 
why, cause if you ain't got any proof, no matter what you say, they're 
just not going to take notice of you, 'cause they've got documents to 
show that why your wrong. And that's what you do. 
Centrelink clients are so individualised that not only are Centrelink decisions 
directed to them personally, but any disagreement or appeal may be added to their 
127 
individual permanent record. Consequently they are disciplined to accept the decisions 
made about and for them by Centrelink. Thus Centrelink client Jim referred to his 
permanent record as his "slab"-as something solid, hard, and permanent. Jim explains 
vividly how he feels incidents are recorded: 
On, on my record, my slab, my record. I got it sticking on me. I should 
have been in fucking gaol. Why not put me in gaol over this, and finger 
print me and photograph me. It sticks on that too. 
However, not only is appealing a Centrelink decision an individual experience 
that may affect a client's personal record, but to appeal formally is to invite even further 
individual examination. As Hartley Dean points out about the Social Security appeals 
system in the United Kingdom, "to appeal against the determinations of such 
officialdom is to invite further scrutiny" (H. Dean, 1 991 ,  p. 145). John, who had never 
sought a formal appeal, was aware of his right to appeal and described the process as 
follows: 
Um. Fill out a form I think . . .  make an appointment. I 've never had to 
do it but I mean if they start breaching me or cut me off I would. 
Despite viewing the appeals process as inviting extra scrutiny though new 
documentation and interviews, John was still willing to seek an appeal if he felt he 
needed to. Another interviewee, Jonathon, who was awaiting an SSA T hearing when 
interviewed, but felt he had few rights, described some of the extra scrutiny he had 
experienced as follows: 
I just filled out the thing and they go over the statement of what I said 
happened, they went over it and sent me a letter saying no, if you want to 
take it further you can go to appeals. 
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Jonnah saw the extra examination more positively, although he still felt he had few 
rights. When asked what rights he felt he had when he disagreed with a Centrelink 
decision, he answered: 
Um. Not a lot really . . .  um you know if you disagree with something, 
normally you've got a specific person you can speak to, like the person 
that, who's done all your forms when you go in, and stuff like that, and 
so like the guy that I've got has said that if I ever have any problems, 
speak to him personally and, he'll do his best to sort it out because, I 
s'pose that's more interpersonal relationship that we've got going through 
the ... interview, which was, which was good. So yeah. 
Hence, Centrelink clients are made into individuals who can be governed 
through individual treatment. However, Centrelink clients are individually watched 
according to specific criteria of appropriate behaviour-according to "normalising 
judgement" (Foucault, 1 977, p. 1 77-184 ). 
Normalisation 
Centrelink clients are surveyed continually according to particular criteria of 
what is normal behaviour and what is not normal. The aim of this judgement is to 
maintain normal behaviour among Centrelink clients, or correct abnormal behaviour so 
clients behave appropriately. This process, which Foucault names "normalisation" 
(Foucault, 1 977) might consist of three stages, although these stages do not necessarily 
occur in this order, and could be simultaneous. The first stage is a normalising 
judgement-the criteria of normalcy are applied to a Centrelink client. Next, a client is 
trained to maintain appropriate behaviour. Finally, this training might involve a system 
of reward and punishment that encourage correct behaviour and discourage 
inappropriate behaviour. Each of these stages of the process of normalisation is detailed 
in this section. 
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So, by what criteria might a Centrelink client be judged as normal or other than 
normal? An important criterion is revealed in the customer charter (Centrelink, 
September 2000), ' fortnightly' form (Centrelink, 2 May 2000), The jobseeker guide 
(Centrelink, 2000d) and The jobseeker diary (Centrelink, 2000c). Indeed, all these 
papers explain that a Centrelink client must be judged to be a ' genuine jobseeker'. 
Indeed, The jobseeker diary states that: 
To make sure you keep getting your payment, Centrelink has to know 
that you are actively looking for work. It ensures that money goes to 
those who are genuine jobseekers. To demonstrate this you must satisfy 
the activity test and meet other obligations. (Centrelink, 2000c, p. 2) 
Centrelink clients must demonstrate that they are a ' genuine jobseeker'. To show 
Centrelink you are a ' genuine jobseeker', you must demonstrate that you abide by the 
activity test, do Centrelink approved activities and do other required activities. If you do 
not do the above, you will be judged to be something other than a ' genuine jobseeker'. 
The jobseeker diary continues to list things you "should" do and "other things 
you need to do" (Centrelink, 2000c, p. 2). These include being willing to take any work 
or training Centrelink deems suitable (including part time and casual work) and 
administrative requirements such as "fill in this Diary", "provide information requested 
by Centrelink" and "attend Centrelink appointments" (Centrelink, 2000c, p. 2). This 
implies, among other things, that a person must abide by Centrelink administrative 
requirements or be considered to be something other than a 'genuine jobseeker'. 
So, what governing practices allow a Centrelink client to be judged normal or 
otherwise? The ' fortnightly' form (Centrelink, 2 May 2000) and The jobseeker diary 
(Centrelink, 2000c) provide the information for this judgement. For example, the 
'fortnightly' form directly asks Centrelink clients to state whether they did a 
"Centrelink approved activity in the [previous fortnightly] period", where an approved 
activity includes "study, training, voluntary work, language courses and intensive 
assistance" (Centrelink, 2 May 2000, p. 2). Similarly, Thejobseeker diary explains that: 
The details you write in this Diary will be used to ensure that: 
• you're applying for enough jobs; 
• you're looking for different types of jobs (that is, any work you are 
able to); 
• you're looking for work beyond your immediate area (eg. up to 90 
minutes travel from your home); and 
• you're not relying too heavily on only one or two methods of finding 
work ( eg. only phoning employers may not be enough). (Bold in 
original Centrelink, 2000c, p. 3) 
130 
The normalising judgement that Centrelink clients are subjected to is not a 
singular event. Rather, it is repeated to train clients to behave in the correct manner. 
This is exemplified by the 'fortnightly' form (Centrelink, 2 May 2000), and The 
jobseeker diary (Centrelink, 2000c). The last question on the 'fortnightly' form requires 
a personal declaration and signature from the client: 
9. Declaration and signature 
I declare that I was willing to work and that I was actively looking for 
work, or doing a Centrelink approved activity (including full time or 
concession study) or was exempted from seeking work or had an 
incapacity for which I have provided a medical certificate. The 
information I have given is correct. (Bold in original Centrelink, 2 May 
2000, p. 2) 
Generally, every two weeks a client is reminded of the correct behaviour and personally 
signs their name against it. A Centrelink client is reminded of this every time they 
complete this form and fulfil any of its requirements, including accurate completion of 
this form. Similarly, The jobseeker diary (Centrelink, 2000c), if assigned to a client, 
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must be completed continually and regularly. Clients are required to complete the 
details of each job application in the diary, including the date they contacted each 
potential employer. An explanatory box attached states "complete your diary on the day 
you apply for the job" because "if you don't, you may forget some of the details" 
(Centrelink, 2000c, p. 5). This implies that you need to include all details and be 
organised enough to fill in the form on the same day as the activity. This correct 
behaviour must be repeated until the client successfully finds work. 
Centrelink clients are not simply judged to be normal or otherwise, and trained 
to improve and maintain appropriate behaviour. They are also managed through a 
system of gratification and punishment. The documents studied clearly imply that 
engaging in the correct behaviour will lead to gratification while incorrect behaviour 
will bring punishment. 
Gratification for correct behaviour can take many forms. The most obvious is to 
receive payment. Another common form of gratification is to increase one's 
employment prospects. For example, The jobseeker diary states that such gratification is 
yours if you plan your job search: 
There are steps that you can take to help open the doors to employment. 
One of the most important is to plan your job search. With a plan you 
increase your chances of finding work. Make use of the Jobseeker 
Diary and Guide. (Bold in original Centrelink, 2000c, p. 1) 
Further, actually completing your job search records properly, according to The 
jobseeker diary, can lead to the gratification of increasing your employment prospects: 
This Jobseeker Diary is for you to record your efforts to find work. It can 
aid you in your search for work. (Centrelink, 2000c, p. 1) 
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In addition, threats of punishment for incorrect behaviour pervade the 
documents. For example, Thejobseeker diary states that: 
You must complete your Diary and you must provide it when asked. If 
you don't we may have to reduce your payment or even stop payment. 
Help us to avoid this. (Centrelink, 2000c, p. 1) 
Similarly, the customer charter warns that "you need to do these [following] things or 
your payment may be affected": 
You need to: 
• tell us as soon as you know that your circumstances are about to 
change e.g. your address, income or relationship arrangements 
• reply to our requests on time 
• meet any mutual obligation requirements for the services or 
payments you are receiving. (Bullet points in original Centrelink, 
September 2000) 
These threats were common in the documents studied. Indeed, the word "must" 
is used four times on the 'fortnightly' form (Centrelink, 2 May 2000). It is also stated 
five times that a client may be penalised for not completing a particular task properly. 
The social security law is mentioned directly once. Further, in the Notes for Newstart 
Allowance (Centrelink, 2000e ), clients are threatened to complete an activity properly or 
be penalised eight times over the seven pages of text. Of these eight times, the law is 
mentioned four times, and social security law is mentioned a further three times. 
Further, legal justification is continually given for these punishments. For 
example, in the top right hand comer of the 'fortnightly' form (next to box for placing a 
client's name and address) it states: 
If you want this payment to continue: 
• Fill in and return this form 02 MAY 2000 
• Payment will stop if this form is returned late 
Answer all the questions (use a pen) . . .  
This is an information notice given under the social security law. (Bullet 
points in original Centrelink, 2 May 2000) 
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Here the client is told that they must complete this form by the date and do it properly 
or their payment will not continue, and also that Centrelink is legally able to do this. 
Further, at the end of the form, a client is reminded that "there are penalties for 
providing false or misleading information" and that "we [Centrelink] can make any 
inquiries necessary to help us work out how much we should pay you". Not only are 
Centrelink clients reminded that they may be punished for not filling in the form 
accurately, but they are told that Centrelink can do anything to catch them out­
implying that this is also legally sanctioned. 
So, Centrelink decisions are inextricably connected to a judgement of normalcy 
and the process of normalisation. To be normal is to behave like a ' genuine jobseeker' 
by passing the activity test, doing Centrelink approved activities, being willing to 
undertake any work or training and complying with Centrelink's administrative 
requirements. Indeed, complying with Centrelink is normal appropriate behaviour, 
which Centrelink clients are trained to accomplish and maintain through repeated 
behaviour and rewards (both promised and realised). Hence, through normalisation 
Centrelink clients are made into individuals who can be governed. 
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All the governmg practices shown so far in this thesis-surveillance, 
individualisation and normalisation-are facilitated by the layout of the Centrelink 
office. The effects of particular arrangements of Centrelink clients' bodies in space are 
collectively the subject of the next section. 
Distribution 
This section details some practices of distribution that discipline Centrelink 
clients and allow them to discipline themselves. Centrelink clients may be disciplined, 
and self disciplined, through the distribution of their bodies in space in many ways. 
Although Centrelink clients are not geographically trapped in a fishbowl cell, like the 
prisoners in Bentham's Panopticon, they are spatially governed. For example, clients 
are requested to obtain permission from Centrelink to shift to a new house. Every 
fortnight recipients are asked if they changed their home address with the 
"IMPORTANT" explanation that: "You may reduce your prospects of getting work if 
you change your address. Your payments may also be cancelled. Check with Centrelink 
before you move" (Capitalisation in original, Centrelink, 2 May 2000). Similarly, 
overseas trips and rental leases are also scrutinised. Generally a client is asked every 
two weeks whether they or their partners have gone overseas or intend to, and provide 
details about this (Centrelink, 2 May 2000). Also, Centrelink requires details about your 
lease, the people you live with and their relationship with you if applying for rent 
allowance. However, most of this section will focus on the spatial governing practices 
within a Centrelink office visited by the writer in early 2002. The layout of a Centrelink 
office may include many different disciplining techniques. Spaces might be partitioned 
for specific activities and people. Also, spaces might provide a specific function for 
disciplining a Centrelink client. For example, a particular space might be used for 
surveillance of clients, or to minimise political communication among clients. Space 
might also be organised hierarchically, where people of different rank occupy different 
spaces. Each of these practices of distribution will be detailed below. 
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The space in the Centrelink office studied in this thesis was divided into three 
general partitions (Foucault, 1977, p. 143). The first partition was the client area (see 
Map 2). I call it the client area because it was the only area in the office that clients 
could access without special permission. It was where clients lined up (behind the 
yellow and red tape on the floor (see E on Map 1), sat to wait to be called for their 
appointment, looked for jobs at the jobsearch computer screens, collected and 
completed forms and used the resources provided to look for work. 28 
28 The client area was also the vantage point from which I drew the map of the office. 
The staff ignored my map drawing, despite being the last ' client' to leave for the day at 
4:45 pm. 
Map 1. The layout of the Centrelink office in early 2002 
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D "Reception. Employment Services" 
E Yell ow or red coloured wide tape on floor for people to queue 
behind 
F Potted plants 
G Small circles indicate chairs 
H High desk 
I Job search computer screen 
J Photocopier 
K Approximately 50 cm wide blue supporting pillars 
1 "WARNING. VIDEO SURVEILLANCE IN 
OPERATION BY AUSTGUARD" 
2 "Welcome to Job Network Access. The equipment in this 
area is for you to use, free of charge, to help you look for a 
job as well as write resumes and applications." 
L Stand alone directory, bolted to floor facing entry 
M Notice board on wall 
N Large convex surveillance mirror above entry 
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Map 2. The partitions of the Centrelink office in early 2002 
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I call the second partition the 'invitation only zone' (see Map 2). Only invited 
Centrelink clients could enter this zone. When I was drawing my map, a person sitting 
beside me on the chairs near E (see Map 1) was called for their interview, and then 
proceeded past the comments and suggestions box at B (see Map 1) and into the 
invitation only zone (see Map 2). Also, I was given permission to exit through this area. 
The front doors were already closed for the end of the day when I followed the last 
client out the back door after gaining eye contact with a staff member and receiving a 
nod as I passed her. This area consisted of open floor space and partitioned interview 
desks. During a prearranged interview a client sits on a chair in the invitation only 
section, while the interviewing staff remain inside the semi-circular desk. 
The third partition will be called the ' staff only area'. It was the area inside the 
semi-circular desks where the staff work (see Map 2). Although a staff member may 
enter the other zones to greet and direct an interviewee, at all other times they spoke 
with clients over the desk. This area was barricaded in two ways. First, the semi-circular 
desks formed a barricade between the client and Centrelink staff. Each area was like an 
island that appeared to have only one entry point, which seemed to be on the furthest 
side from the clients' entry. Second, the desks seemed to be different heights, depending 
on the level of 'barricading' required. The desks in the client area were chest hight, 
providing a barrier that was nearly impossible for a client to jump over. Since this is 
where any client ( or member of the public like myself) could enter without invitation, 
and the bulk of clients were served, perhaps extra protection for staff was desired. In 
contrast, the desks in the invitation only area were waist hight. Both the client and 
Centrelink officer could sit during an interview. It seems less protection for Centrelink 
staff was desired here-fewer and only invited clients could enter, the risk of a violent 
occurrence was thus reduced. 
Within the client area of the office there was further partitioning according to 
type of allowance and task. Indeed, at C (see Map 1) the following sign hung from the 
ceiling, its orange and white type legible throughout the client area "Reception. Youth 
& Student". At D (see Map 1), a similar sign read "Reception. Employment Services". 
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Finally, at A, a similar sign read "Forms lodgement". It seemed that NSA recipients 
were separated from Austudy or YA recipients. These clients were further partitioned 
from those lodging forms. There were even separate places to line up for each of these 
categories-indicated by the coloured tape on the floor at E and potted plants at F (see 
Map 1 ). It seems those clients who simply lodged their forms, without requiring special 
attention, were partitioned from clients who were either applying for allowance or 
required special assistance. Further, perhaps the clients who required special attention 
( or are applying for the first time) were being shown that they were different and require 
special supervision. Indeed, the surveillance warning sign was behind the "Youth and 
Student" and "Employment Services" desks rather than the "Forms lodgement" desk. 
Different sites inside the Centrelink office may also provide different 
disciplining functions. Supervision seemed to be an important function of the client only 
area. The staff at desks A, C, and D could view the entire ' client' area of the Centre link 
office (see Maps 1 and 2). All the service desks formed a physical barricade between the 
client access areas and the staff only work areas. Also, a large sign which warned clients 
that they were under video surveillance was clearly readable throughout the ' client' area 
(see Map 2). The sign was positioned at K l  so a client would see it most clearly from 
the desk near C and D (see Map 1 ). The only passage for clients from the ' client' area 
area, besides the exit to the street, was at B (see Map 1 ). Here there were two high semi­
circular desks that formed a small passage through which clients may be invited. 
"Break{ing] dangerous communications " (Italics not in original Foucault, 1 977, 
p. 1 43-1 44) also seemed to be a disciplining effect of the layout of the Centrelink office 
studied. Although clients frequented the Centrelink office, it seemed to be designed to 
discourage communication among them. Indeed, there were few chairs in the client only 
area-only six office chairs along the wall near E (see Map 1 )  and a few in the job 
network access work area (K2 on Map 1 ). Clients were required to stand while using the 
job search computer screens, fill out forms (at H, see Map 1 )  and stand in line to be 
served at desks A, C or D (see Map 1 ). There were no meeting places, and clients were 
constantly surveyed while inside. This office was not designed for lingering or meeting 
people socially. There were metal benches outside the office, sheltered from the wind 
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and rain. However, it was uncomfortable to sit on these for a long period of time (as I 
discovered while conducting interviews) and, forming a single row along the wall, did 
not facilitate group discussions. 
The partitioned areas discussed above also suggest a "rank" (Italics in original 
Foucault, 1977, p. 145) order-from potentially dangerous for staff (client area, see 
Map 2), to moderately dangerous for staff (invitation only area, see Map 2) to safe for 
staff (staff only area, see Map 2) . The clients who posed the greatest perceived threat 
were in the client area closest to the entry (see Map 2). Also, a rank order was implied 
whenever a client was served at a desk. The client was outside in the higher danger area, 
while the staff member was in the 'safe' area. Furthermore, clients at C and D (see Map 
1) seemed to be ranked lower than those simply lodging a form, because, through a 
large sign (Kl on Map 1), they must be warned of being surveyed. 
So, a client's social behaviour and inner ethical life are not the only things 
disciplined; also disciplined is each client's body in space. Where they live, with whom 
they share a bedroom, and where and how long they travel is managed. Even within a 
Centrelink office clients are disciplined. They are disciplined when they queue for 
service, when they wait for partners, when they require an invitation to enter. They are 
governed to stand for certain tasks ( queuing and service in the client only area) and sit 
for others (an interview in the invitation area). Centrelink clients are also physically 
placed in a hierarchy. The location and posture of the clients' bodies are supervised 
throughout their visit to the Centrelink office. What a Centrelink client does with their 
body outside the office is also important. They must physically attend any job interview, 
they must actively write job applications and phone or visit potential places of 
employment. They must present and posture themselves in an employable manner (see 
above). They must locate and move their bodies like an 'active jobseeker' (see above). 
Most importantly, since Centrelink clients are a geographically dispersed group, 
the Centrelink office is one of the few places where they might meet other clients with 
similar experiences of Centrelink decisions. Since the office layout does not facilitate 
communication among Centrelink clients, they are governed (and self-governed) to 
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keep their experiences to themselves. It appears unlikely that clients will discuss 
Centrelink decisions, or any experience of challenging a decision. Their bodies are 
governed ( and self-governed) to minimise such communications. Even the layout of the 
Centrelink office seemed to discipline Centrelink clients to become governable 
individuals. 
Mechanism failure 
However no governing practice is perfect or complete (see Malpas & Wickham, 
1995). Inherent in any mentality of governing is failure. Thus, the governing practices 
of surveillance, normalisation, individualisation and distribution are inevitably limited. 
Interviews with Centrelink clients revealed many failures of the practices that attempt to 
govern them and train them to govern themselves. 
Surveillance of Centrelink clients meant not only the supervision of their 
behaviour, but also the threat to watch them at any time, so that clients expected to be 
watched and watched their own behaviour and attitude. However, interviews with 
Centrelink clients revealed one way in which this intense surveillance has failed. Some 
clients were so aware of the potential of being watched that they expected their rights to 
be violated. They distrusted Centrelink as an institution: 
Jack: Oh, none at all. Um. No. You can argue all you like but no, you 
don' t  really have any rights at all. I don't believe you have. From what I 
understand is that all your information goes to some private organisation 
actually. Centrelink send them all their information (unclear). They say 
that they don't disclose that information but I know for a fact that they 
must of because for some reason the electoral roll found me. 
Lyndal: Oh. Okay. 
Jack: Yeah. I was over in Sydney and they found me over here. And it 
wasn't  until I actually enrolled in Centrelink. 
L: (unclear) 
R: Yeah. Big brother is watching. Anyway. 
Jay saw the surveillance administered by Centrelink as more ambivalent: 
Oh. Not too bad. It's just a bit mechanical. It just, it 's not really humane 
if you know what I mean it's just here are the rules, which box do I tick 
for you? They're not really out to hurt you but they're not really out to 
help you either. It's just like OK fill out this form do you know what I 
mean it's just like which form do you fit into. That's about as far as it 
goes. Which is a bit of a pain because sometimes your situation isn't in 
one particular category but you're like more like do you know what I 
mean 
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Further, Jemma related the limited amount of rights she felt she had to the intense 
bureaucratic surveillance by Centrelink. Jemma replied, when asked what rights she 
thought she had when she disagreed with a Centrelink decision: 
Umm, probably depending on (unclear) because they've got a lot of 
paperwork that they have to go through and a lot of agreements that they 
have to go through and so basically there's not much room to move/for 
any, umm 
Through normalisation, Centrelink clients are also judged, trained, and rewarded 
or punished so that they adopt and maintain appropriate job seeking behaviour. 
However, this can go wrong in many ways. For example, on both the 'fortnightly' form 
(Centrelink, 2 May 2000) and The jobseeker diary (Centrelink, 2000c), clients are 
required to record their job search. The names and contact details of employers 
contacted, and the type of position applied for, are recorded. Effectively, this means a 
Centrelink client is required to record details of their job rejections. A possible 
unforseen consequence of this is that it is not really the job search that is repeated here, 
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but the recording of each job rejection. The training may not just be to diligently record 
the search for work, and appropriate job searching behaviour, but to get used to being 
rejected. 
Similarly Jackie described how the administrative requirements of Centrelink 
often embarrassed her. Jackie was very "embarrassed" to complete her jobseeker diary 
and "dole form". She found the direction to get a Centrelink form stamped by the 
interviewer at a job interview so humiliating that she said "there is no way that I'm 
going to go to a teaching interview and then say here's my dole form can you stamp it 
please". Complying with Centrelink administrative requirements does not mean being 
an ' active jobseeker' to Jackie, it means being humiliated. It seems such intense 
surveillance can lead Centrelink clients to associate compliance with shame rather than 
jobseeking. 
Also, punishment for non-compliance was not simply a reduction or temporary 
suspension of payment for some clients. For Jaques the punishment was homelessness. 
He was evicted from his home when unable to pay rent due to a reduction in his 
payment. His punishment was living on the street for 50 days. 
Not only are punishments potentially harsh, but many Centrelink clients 
perceive them as random. They do not associate being breached with any action of 
theirs, but with a Kafka (1 925/1 999) like sinister random quality in Centrelink 
administration. This was vivid in Jaques' statement about problems with Centrelink; 
"Hopefully nothing else happens this year, any day I'm expecting" and "every day 
(laugh) I wouldn't be surprised if something turned up". 
Jonnah provided another example: "Um, mainly 'cause I've only just started 
getting payments so I haven't been postponed as yet. Touch wood. (Laughs)". Despite 
only being a Centrelink client for a short period of time, and being generally happy with 
the experience, Jonnah still felt the need to "touch wood" that he would not have his 
payments postponed. He also implied that his payment had not been postponed yet 
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because he had only been receiving payments for a short time-Centrelink had had too 
few opportunities yet. 
In a slightly different example, Jacinta was aware of the policy which led to her 
incurring a breach, but it seemed absurd to her. She explains how she incurred a breach 
when Centrelink took too long to change her payment type, only to have them applied 
much later when her allowance was changed again: 
Jacinta: Oh, 'cause I was changed from pension to New Start and which I 
got breached which I should never have got breached. You know. 
Centrelink pension section was supposed to change me over to the 
pension before I got breached in New Start and they didn't so they were 
a bit late so I got two breaches on me from that 
Lyndal: Yow. 
Jacinta: and the when I went from pension back onto New Start that's 
when they found two breaches against my name so I was cut money 
because of that. 
Lyndal: What did you do about it? 
Jacinta: Um. Went and argued with them (laugh). (unclear) until they 
fixed it up (unclear) without pay. But I had to argue with them. 
If Centrelink clients do not connect punishment with their behaviour, they will not make 
an effort to behave according to Centrelink's expressed criteria for appropriate 
'jobseeker' behaviour. 
Not only has connection between punishment and non-compliance been severed, 
but also some Centrelink clients connect compliance with a lack of rights rather than 
reward or gratification. For example, Jasmine replied, in an assured voice, when asked 
what rights she thought she had when she disagreed with a Centrelink decision "Well, I 
think that, um, you should have at least fifty per cent of the rights, as a human, 
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birthright". Jenny replied even more negatively to the same question "Um, none really, 
it's their decision and what they say goes I guess". 
Surveillance and normalisation work on the individual Centrelink client through 
ascribing individual character to clients, assigning individual responsibility to each 
client, keeping each client's personal record and examining them repeatedly-that is, 
through individualisation. However, this focus on the individual Centrelink client fails 
to make individuals governable. Most importantly, governing practices are so intensely 
focused on each individual Centrelink client that three related failures may occur. First, 
individual treatment is so targeted to different clients with different needs, that some 
clients feel Centrelink is unsystematic and potentially vindictive. For example, Josh 
explained that: 
I lose my temper in there because they just, I don't know, very slow and 
don't seem to want to help or that much. Unless you sort of make friends 
with someone in there then they tend to be a bit more helpful, you know, 
and they start to tell you a few of the loopholes, and ways to get money, 
and yeah, they're a strange lot. 
Second, clients are treated so individually, and their allowances can change so 
much due to individual circumstances, that they might not know what type of allowance 
they are actually receiving or where to locate themselves in the system. Jackie, Jemima 
and Jock were all unsure what payment they were receiving. 
Third, individual practices are difficult to administer en masse-mistakes are 
made. For example, Jemima said she and her partner were breached due to not receiving 
mail that Centrelink officers claim they sent. 
The spatial distribution of Centrelink clients' bodies in a Centrelink office 
governs them through partitioning special zones for particular people, special functions 
such as supervision and minimising communications among clients, and hierarchal 
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zones. However, these practices also imperfectly govern (and self-govern) Centrelink 
clients. For example, the queuing that clients endure to consult with a Centrelink officer 
about a problem with their payment, discourages them from complaining. Indeed, Joe 
tried to question a Centrelink decision but "the lines were so long and it takes so long to 
get to see anyone that I had to go to work, I didn't have time to do it". 
Also, while the layout of the Centrelink office did seem to prevent clients from 
communicating with each other, its supervising function allowed them to observe each 
other's behaviour. This means that other clients observe both compliant and non­
compliant behaviour. Most importantly here, clients can see other clients "blowing off', 
"losing it" or "getting aggro"-they see that other clients are frustrated and angry at 
Centrelink decisions. This might not occur if the Centrelink office was not spatially 
designed for surveillance. Jim provides a vivid example of watching other clients' 
violent behaviour. He explains how, when most inquiries were taken in cubicles before 
the current office design was implemented: 
This is before they done all this up and that, they had the old cubicles, 
and I, ah, had a bit to say. Mind you I've watched the guy next to me 
beat the shit out of the cubicle next to me. I wasn't too bad I just abused 
the shit, I just threaten to drag them over the counter. That wasn't too 
bad, this guy wrecked the counter, ah, the cubicle . . .  so mine wasn't too 
bad. He was only gunna get dragged over the counter. 
If this occurred in the current open plan office, Jim would have been able to observe the 
other client's violent behaviour from further away than the next cubicle. 
Hence, analysing Centrelink breaches and appeals according to discipline and 
governmentality has much to offer. The case study data adds flesh to this framework, 
rather than challenges it. A particular strength of this approach is its rich detail about the 
micro-management of Centrelink clients. Such details are lacking in the other 
approaches considered. Also, unlike the approaches considered previously, it does offer 
a convincing account of the case study finding that Centrelink clients do not always 
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seek an appeal for an unsatisfactory decision even if they are aware of the possibility. It 
shows that this is both a success and failure of the disciplines. It is difficult to say 
whether the breach and appeal figures in Chapter One indicate a success or failure of the 
governmental technologies of surveillance, individualisation, normalisation, and 
distribution. It is also difficult (and somewhat off the point) to say which governmental 
rationality is most dominant. However, a conclusion that can be made is that the various 
governmental technologies can have unpredictable outcomes in relation to Centrelink 
breaches and appeals. This challenges the confidence of neo-liberalising based mutual 
obligation reforms. 
This forms the tentative conclusion of this thesis because, of all the different 
approaches considered in this thesis, this approach provides the most convincing 
account of the case study findings. Unlike the neo-liberal account, it does account for 
the vulnerability of Centrelink clients. It also does not suffer the neo-liberal's false 
assumption that clients who do not reapply after being cut have other sources of income, 
otherwise they appeal. 
Also, unlike the advocacy account, it does not deal with the vulnerability of 
Centrelink clients in a paternalistic manner. Also, it does not incorrectly assume that the 
relatively low formal appeal rate is due to Centrelink clients lacking the necessary 
knowledge and skills to seek an appeal. Also, unlike the advocate's approach, it does 
not limit its criticisms to the effectiveness of the current policy regime. 
Ziguras, Dufty and Considine (2003) also argue, from an advocacy persepective, 
that mutual obligation fails the most vulnerable Centrelink clients. They even found, in 
their research on Centrelink clients' experiences of mutual obligation, that particular 
activity test requirements, including the 'fortnightly' form and The jobseeker diary 
failed to improve the most vulnerable clients' employment prosects. For example, they 
found that: 
Continuation forms ['fortnightly' forms] were clearly seen by job seekers 
as a mechanism for demonstrating compliance with job search 
requirements and of little help in themselves. It was clear that people 
sometimes wrote down jobs, even if they were not really interested in 
them, simply to complete the requirements. (Ziguras et al., 2003, p. 35) 
Similarly, they found: 
Just over half of those who had been given a Jobseeker Diary felt it was 
primarily a bureaucratic requirement rather than a source of assistance. 
Jobseekers often found the diaries frustrating and annoying. (Ziguras et 
al., 2003, p. 35) 
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Both findings are similar to the mechanism failure found in this thesis. However, there 
are important differences between Ziguras, Dufty and Considine' s research and the 
conclusion of this thesis. These differences reflect the limitations of the general 
advocacy position that were identified in Chapter Four. While they did find that mutual 
obligation activity requirements failed to improve the employability of the most 
vulnerable Centrelink clients, they also said that it may succeed if it is administered 
better. They are not critical of the idea of mutual obligation as a basis for current social 
welfare administration: 
In effect, then, the system operates for many disadvantaged job seekers 
not as 'welfare to work' but 'welfare as work' .  This is a poor outcome 
for all concerned: job seekers fail in meeting their goal to find work, and 
governments bear the continued cost of providing social security 
payments and an ineffective service system. (Ziguras et al., 2003, p. vi) 
However, rather than criticise the mutual obligation basis of the current policy, they 
offer advice about improving the current policy's effectiveness for making Centrelink 
clients more active. They offer a list of reforms needed for a "more effective active 
labour market policy" (Ziguras et al., 2003, p. vi). They merely say that the problem lies 
with the current application of mutual obligation. In contrast, this thesis concludes that 
neo-liberal govemmentality inherently fails, as do all political rationalities (Rose & 
Miller, 1992). 
Also, Foucault's account of discipline and govemmentality provide a basis for a 
more appropriate account of the case study findings than the new-contractualism 
accounts offered by Camey and Yeatman. Unlike Camey's approach, it offers a 
relatively convincing account for the case study finding that some clients did not seek 
an appeal even if they disagreed with a Centrelink decision-because they were 
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disciplined not to, and because attempts to make them governable individuals failed to 
make them into active citizens. It also does not problematically assume that there was a 
golden age of TH Marshall type citizenship in Australia where social security provided 
a safety net for all, and that the appeals structure in Australia, as a final precious 
remnant of this time, successfully protects the rights of social security recipients. Also, 
unlike Yeatman' s approach, it does not neglect that advocacy groups are often 
paternalistic themselves. 
Also, unlike the approaches that focus on surveillance as oppression, the 
approach in this chapter does not neglect to address individualisation in its analysis. It 
thus offers an explanation for how oppressive surveillance works at the level of the 
individual. 
Conclusion 
Chapter Seven elaborated the usefulness of the concepts of surveillance and 
individualisation for explaining current breach and appeal numbers. The analysis that 
ensued relied heavily on the work of Michel Foucault, particularly his work on 
discipline and governmentality. 
Governmentality, according to this approach is concerned with the how of 
governing. Surveillance and individualisation are, according to this approach, imperfect 
techniques of disciplinary power which, along with a number of other techniques such 
as normalisation and distribution, imperfectly make Centrelink clients into governable 
individuals. The case study data provided much evidence for surveillance, 
individualisation, normalisation and distribution, and also their failure. 
The current breach and appeal figures reflect both the intention of neo-liberal 
political rationality to create governable individuals from Centrelink clients, and its 
failure to do so. Most importantly, it shows, through an analysis of the case study data, 
that governmental technologies have unpredictable outcomes. This challenges the 
confidence of neo-liberal based mutual-obligation reforms. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
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As established in Chapter Three, the current Australian social welfare system is 
essentially neo-liberalising. This neo-liberalising conservatism argues that the values of 
the market and competition should be upheld, , and it is individuals' lack of self 
motivation that has led to their poverty. Hence, governmentality should train people to 
be motivated and competitive enough to be able to compete successfully in a market 
economy. The current Australian policies of mutual obligation where Centrelink clients 
must not just seek work but take part in other activities that give back to society and 
prepare them to ' actively participate' ,  fall within this framework. So does the recent 
(but not new) concern about welfare dependence in the McClure report (2000a; 2000b) 
and parliamentary addresses in Australia (Hansard, 1 997; Hansard, 2000). The 
argument for the need for some coercive measures to ensure compliance, such as 
administering financial penalties known as breaches, also falls within this conservative 
neo-liberal framework. All these measures aim to manage Centrelink clients so they 
behave in a certain manner, and adopt certain values and self-perceptions. This thesis 
has shown that this is a somewhat overconfident aim. It has shown that the results of 
various social policies often have unforseen results that fail to create governable 
Centrelink clients. This means that social welfare policies that aim for more control over 
the lives, and, as Mitchell Dean (1 998) argues, ethical lives of social welfare 
participants are inherently flawed. In a local political climate of very confident neo­
liberalising conservatism, this conclusion challenges the very basis of many current 
policy reforms. However, please note that this analysis also applies to other political 
positions (see Leonard, 1 997). This conclusion was reached through an exploratory 
analysis of current Centrelink breach and appeal figures using a case study of a 
Centrelink office. This occurred in the following steps that comprised the chapters of 
this thesis, which were organised into Parts A, B and C. 
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Part A, comprising of Chapter One, Two and Three, provided the groundwork 
for the thesis. Chapter One revealed a growing disparity of Centrelink breach and appeal 
numbers between 1996-1997 and 2000-2001. This thesis then explored some possible 
explanations for this disparity. However, as explained in Chapter Two, these numerical 
figures alone provided insufficient evidence for any relationship between breach and 
appeal numbers. Therefore, a case study of a Centrelink office was conducted to obtain 
more information about the social context of Centrelink breaches and appeals. 
Information was collected via interviews with Centrelink clients, documents obtained 
:from the office, and direct observation. Some limitations inherent in the study were also 
considered here. Having established in Chapter Three that the current Australian 
welfare regime can be understood as essentially neo-liberalising, Parts B and C 
evaluated possible explanations for the disparity of breach and appeal numbers in the 
light of the case study findings. Part B considered the contemporary pragmatic 
approaches of the neo-liberals and the advocates in Chapter Four. New-contractualism 
accounts were considered in Chapter Five. In Part C, some approaches that elaborated 
ideas of surveillance and individualisation were evaluated in relation to the case study 
findings. Chapter Six evaluated accounts the view surveillance as oppressive, while 
Chapter Seven covered an account of surveillance and individualisation that drew :from 
Foucault's analysis of discipline and govemmentality. 
Chapter Four in Part B considered the neo-liberal and advocacy approaches. The 
neo-liberals (Hansard, 1997; 2000; 2000a; McClure, 2000b) dominate Australian social 
policy. They draw :from a belief in market forces and individual enterprise to criticise 
the post World War Two welfare states for creating welfare dependence. They argue for 
a more participatory system that, through measures such as breaching, punishes those 
who do not participate. They perceive the current breach and appeal numbers as a 
positive indicator that this approach is working. The advocacy view (ACOSS, 2000b; 
ACOSS, 2001a; ACOSS, 2001b; ACOSS & NWRN, 2000; The Salvation Army 
Australia, 2001; WRAS, 1999; WRAS, 2000) provided many valuable insights into how 
the current breach and appeal figures reflect the vulnerability of Centrelink clients to 
administrative error or misuse of power in an unnecessarily harsh breaching regime. 
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Both the neo-liberal and advocacy approaches represent contemporary pragmatic 
responses to welfare in Australia and have significant strengths, but serious weaknesses, 
for explaining the breach and appeal figures. The neo-liberal account of current breach 
and appeal figures was shown to be limited because it did not account for the vulnerable 
position of Centrelink clients with respect to the market. Their assumption that clients 
who do not reapply after being breached have other sources of income-otherwise they 
appeal-was also shown to be false. 
On the other hand, the advocate' s interpretation of the breach and appeal figures 
was found to be limited because it dealt with the vulnerability of Centrelink clients in a 
paternalistic manner. It thus did not account for the vulnerability of Centrelink clients to 
the state, or advocacy agencies themselves. 
Chapter Five in Part B considered the new-contractualism writers' applicability 
to the case study findings. According to this scholarship there is a contemporary 
contractualism in Australian social policy which uses the language of classical legal 
contract, but reinterprets it. Camey and Yeatman represent different general approaches 
in this literature that offer different understandings of this reinterpretation of the 
contract. 
Camey (1 998; 1 999; 2001 ) is critical of current new-contractualism which he 
argues is neo-liberalism embodied. He is particularly concerned that contemporary neo­
liberal based new-contractualism retracts TH Marshall type social citizenship to a 
citizenship based on individual agreements, such as individual activity agreements 
between a JNA officer and a Centrelink client. This is not a classical legal contract 
because the parties are neither equal or free. According to Camey's new-contractualism, 
the relationship between increasing breach numbers and low appeal numbers is 
connected to new administrative arrangements. In particular, the increase in breaches 
after 1 997-1 998 corresponds with the introduction of Centrelink and the JNAs and their 
more individualised quasi-contract approach, while the decreasing scope for 
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administrative appeal of welfare matters has prevented a corresponding increase in 
formal appeals. 
Camey's interpretation of current breach and appeal figures was shown to be 
compelling. Indeed, it clearly linked the increased number of breaches and stagnation of 
appeals with changing fundamentals of social policy. In particular both the increase of 
breaches since 1 997-1 998 and the continuing low number of appeals, despite the rise in 
breaches, was linked to new welfare architecture in Australia, especially the 
introduction of the Job Network. 
However, this new-contractualism approach had some serious limitations in 
relation to the case study data. It failed to account for why some Centrelink clients did 
not seek a formal appeal even if they disagreed with a Centrelink decision and were 
aware of the possibility of appeal. It also incorrectly assumed that the appeals structure 
is entirely benevolent. 
Yeatman (2001 ; 1 997; 1 998; 1 999) offers a different interpretation of new­
contractualism in Australian welfare. While she does locate the new-contractualism in 
contemporary Australian social policy within neo-liberalism, she partners this with a 
second influence-social movements on behalf of social welfare client groups. 
Although Yeatman stops short of supporting neo-liberalism, she is less critical of new­
contractualism than Camey because she views it as a less paternalistic development of 
neo-liberalism. 
An interpretation of current breach and appeal figures based on Yeatman's 
explication of new contractualism was shown to be compelling in many instances. First, 
it does not optimistically accept the benevolence of the appeals system like Camey. 
Second, unlike Camey, Yeatman does account for why Centrelink clients do not seek a 
formal appeal, despite disagreeing with a Centrelink decision and being somewhat 
aware of the appeal structure-because they know it is not in their "deeper preference" 
(Yeatman, 1 999, p. 267) to fight their activity agreement. Indeed, some research has 
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shown that Centrelink clients ultimately agree with being breached because it means 
they remain active. Further, some clients that were interviewed expressed similar 
sentiments-while they often found Centrelink requirements inconvenient, they also 
saw their necessity. 
However, although this approach does offer an explanation for a client not 
seeking an external appeal even when they know this is possible and disagree with a 
Centrelink decision-it is a flawed explanation. If Centrelink clients must be coerced to 
follow their own "deeper preference" (Yeatman, 1999, p. 267) in one area-active job 
seeking-how can we be sure they are acting in accordance to their own "deeper 
preference" (Yeatman, 1999, p. 267) by not appealing when breached. To claim any 
action to be a higher good is potentially arbitrary and, thus, risky. 
Although some clients interviewed did agree with the need for enforcing 
compliance through breaching, this agreement should not be considered in isolation 
from their other comments. They also felt that they had few or no rights when dealing 
with Centrelink. 
However, perhaps the focus should not be on what type of contract we have, as 
Camey and Yeatman assume, but why people have accepted this contract in the first 
place. In particular, the surveillance and individualisation of Centrelink clients might 
hold a key to explaining why some clients don't seek an appeal, despite being both 
unhappy with a Centre link decision and aware of the possibility of appeal. Surveillance 
generally means continual monitoring, while individualisation means, generally, giving 
individual character to someone or something. Two general accounts of surveillance and 
individualisation were considered in Part C-accounts of surveillance as oppressive in 
Chapter Six and an account that drew from Foucault's work in Chapter Seven. 
According to accounts which view surveillance as oppressive (De Maria, 1992; 
Fox Piven & Cloward, 1971; McMahon et al., 2000; Pateman, 1989/2000), the current 
disparity of Centrelink breach and appeal figures relate to welfare's relationship with 
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the powerful. In particular, the disparity might be due to the oppressive surveillance that 
Centrelink clients are subjected to. 
This approach's interpretation of current Centrelink breach and appeal figures 
was compelling. This interpretation of oppressive surveillance might explain why some 
Centrelink clients do not seek a formal appeal when they disagree with a Centrelink 
decision, even if they are aware of the appeals process-because they are too oppressed. 
This explanation does seem to fit with the powerlessness clients expressed in 
interviews. For example, Jim felt so surveyed that he said "It's [being a Centrelink 
client] like being in gaol". 
Despite these strengths however, this approach does not explain why people let 
themselves be so oppressed. Conley offers a partial explanation, that they have 
internalised their labels (Conley, 1 982, p. 281 ). However, this explanation is insufficient 
because it does not explain how this occurred. Although many oppressive surveillance 
writers prefer to focus on collectivity to show the class (Fox Piven & Cloward, 1 97 1 )  
(or gender (Pateman, 1 989/2000), race etc) based nature of individuals' experiences, 
this does neglect questions about how these processes work on the level of the 
individual. Hence, an approach which engages with both surveillance and 
individualisation was shown to be required. 
Much current work on surveillance and individualisation in social welfare draws 
from the work of Michel Foucault (1 977; 1 980; 1 99 1 ). This approach was considered in 
Chapter Seven. Surveillance and individualisation are, according to this approach, 
imperfect techniques of disciplinary power which, along with other techniques such as 
classification, normalisation and distribution, imperfectly make Centrelink clients into 
governable individuals. The case study data provided evidence for each of these 
disciplinary techniques, and also their failure. 
Governmentality, according to this approach is concerned with the how of 
governing. The current breach and appeal figures reflect both neo-liberal political 
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rationality to create compliant job seeking customer citizens, and its failure. Breaches 
and appeals reflect both the success of disciplinary techniques and their ability to create 
cynical Centrelink clients who expect their rights to be violated and do not appeal a 
decision even if they disagree with it and know of the possibility of appeal. 
This approach was shown to offer the best interpretation of the case study 
findings. Unlike the other approaches that were considered, it does offer a convincing 
account of the finding that Centrelink clients may not seek an appeal, even if they both 
disagree with a Centrelink decision and are ware of the possibility of an appeal. That 
this is both a result of their training to become compliant jobseekers, and the failure of 
disciplinary techniques to do so. A compliant jobseeker accepts punishment as 
deserved and thus would not seek an appeal. However these techniques may also create 
Centrelink clients who expect their rights to be violated and do not appeal when 
breached-even when they both disagree with a Centrelink decision and are aware of 
the possibility of formal external appeal. Thus, the current disparity of breach and 
appeal figures might also reflect the failure (or incomplete governance) of neo-liberal 
political rationality. It might reflect cynical Centrelink clients who expect their rights to 
be violated and disassociate breaches with their own non-compliance-not competent 
customer citizens. Such clients are more likely to accept a Centrelink decision rather 
than seek a formal appeal-even if they disagree with a decision Centrelink has made 
about them and are aware of the possibility of external appeal. 
Hence this thesis tentatively concludes that the current disparity of Centrelink 
breach and appeal figures might reflect neo-liberal political rationality and its governing 
techniques and, also, its incompleteness or failure. Or, in other words, when we pull 
down breaches (or appeals) for further analysis, the neo-liberalising conservatism that 
currently dominates Australian social policy reforms appears over confident about its 
potency to control individual Centrelink clients' and their subjectivities. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Interview schedule 
Opening 
"Hello, My name is Lyndal and I'm a postgraduate student with Edith 
Cowan University doing a study on why people do or do not formally 
question Centrelink decisions. 
1 69 
Could you spare me 10-20 minutes of your time to answer a few questions? 
Your answers will be treated as confidential. I needed you to read this so 
the university knows I am interviewing you with your informed consent." 
Decisions Made by Centre/ink 
"Thinking about your dealings with Centrelink, have there been any 
decisions taken which you have disagreed with?" 
O Yes O No 0 Not Sure 
If"Yes"-
"What did you do when you disagreed with the Centrelink decision? 
"What rights do you think you have when you disagree with a decision taken by 
Centre link?" 
"To what extent are you aware that you have a right to have decisions of 
Centrelink subject to a review by an Authorised Review Officer?" 
I I I I ------- -------- -------
Very aware Somewhat Aware Not Sure Not Aware 
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"To what extent are you aware that you have a right to have decisions of 
Centrelink subject to a review by an appeal to the Social Security Appeals 
Tribunal?" 
I I I I -------- --------- --------
Very aware Somewhat Aware Not Sure Not Aware 
"Have you ever taken a decision by Centrelink to a review by an 
Authorised review officer or to the Social Security Appeals Tribunal?" 
o ARO o SSAT o Neither 
If "yes" to either ARO or SSAT 
How did you find out about the ARO/SSAT? 
About You 
"To make sure that the people I interview are representative it would help if you would 
answer some questions about yourself. Please keep in mind that your answers are 
treated as confidential." 
First can I ask you what kind of Centrelink payment you are receiving? 
0 Disability Support Pension 
0 Sickness Allowance 
0 Newstart Allowance 
0 Youth Allowance 
0 Supporting Parent Payment 
0 Aged Pension 
0 Family Allowance/Family Payment 
0 AUSTUDY/ABSTUDY 
0 Special Benefit 
0 Other (please specify) _______ _ 
Into which age category do you fall? 
0 1 5  - 2 1  
0 2 1  - 24 
0 25 - 34 
0 35 - 44 
0 45 - 54 
0 55 - 59 
O 60 - 64 
0 65 + 
Interviewer to complete: 
O Male 
0 Female 
Do you have children living with you? 
0 Yes O No 
If "Yes" how many and what ages are your children? 
Child 1 
Child 2 
Child 3 
Child 4 
Age __ years 
Age __ years 
Age __ years 
Age __ years 
Were you born in Australia? 
0 Yes 
0 No 
What Language do you speak at home? 
0 English 
0 Other, please specify _____ _ 
Are you a person with a disability? 
0 Yes 
0 No 
If "Yes" what is the nature or type of disability(s)? 
1 7 1  
Are you of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander decent? 
0 Yes 
0 No 
What suburb or town do you live in ? 
Postcode: -------- ---
Thank you very much. 
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If you have any difficulties in dealings with Centrelink or wish to questions 
their decision you do have the right to do so. You can either talk to 
someone at Centrelink and request a review by an Authorised Review 
Officer, make a complain to the Commonwealth Ombudsman (Ph. 9220 
754 1 )  or contact the Welfare Rights and Advocacy Service (08) 9328 1 75 1  
Appendix B: Statement of disclosure and informed consent 
This study asks why unemployed people rarely challenge Centrelink 
when it breaches them. To answer this question, I wish to ask 
unemployed peoples themselves, by conducting unstructured interviews 
with unemployed people who have been breached. This will only take 
1 0-20 minutes of your time and will be tape recorded. This research 
hopes to help make Centrelink accountable to how it treats its clients. 
Participation in the interview is strictly confidential and voluntary. You 
are free to decline to participate or withdraw from the interview at any 
time. 
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Any questions concerning the project entitled: "Pulling up their 'breaches ': a 
Foucaultian discourse analysis of the power processes that lead unemployed 
people to accept 'breaches ' "  can be directed to Lynda/ Sleep of the School of 
Community Services and Social Sciences on (. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ) 
If you have any concerns about the project or would like to talk to an 
independent person, you may contact the research ethics officer on ( . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .) 
� . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 
CONSENT FORM 
Project (working) Title: "Pulling up their 'breaches ': an exploratory analysis 
of current Centrelink breach and appeal numbers from 1996-97 to 2000-01 ". 
I (the participant and parent or guardian of the participant if under 1 8  years old) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  have read the information above and any 
questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. 
I agree to participate in this activity and for the interview to be tape recorded, 
realising I may withdraw at any time. 
I agree that the research data gathered for this study may be published provided I 
am not identifiable. 
Participant or authorised representative Date: 
Investigator Date: 
Appendix C: List of interviewee pseudonym and brief description 
Table 3: Interviewee pseudonym and brief description 
Pseudonym 
John 
Jock 
Jack 
Joe 
Josh 
Jenny 
Jemma 
Jed 
Joan 
Jebidiah 
Jemima 
Jay 
Jacinta 
Jaques 
Jackie 
Age group and gender 
15-21 year old male YA recipient 
21-24 year old male, thinks he's on YA, 
but not sure 
21-24 year old male NSA recipient 
25-34 year old male NSA (intensive 
assistance) recipient 
25-35 year old male AUSTUDY 
recipient 
15-21 year old female YA (student) 
recipient 
21-24 year old female NSA recipient 
25-34 year old male AUSTUDY 
recipient 
25-34 year old female has two children 
35-44 year old male NSA recipient 
21-24 year old female, thinks she's on 
NSA, Supporting Parent and Family 
Allowance, but not sure, one child 
21-24 year old male NSA recipient 
21-24 year old female NSA recipient 
with two children 
25-34 year old male AUSTUDY 
recipient, approached me and asked to 
be interviewed while I was interviewing 
another, period of homelessness 
25-35 year old female, thinks she's on 
NSA, but not sure 
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Jonathon 
Jasmine 
Jeff 
Jillian 
Jim 
Jane 
Jonnah 
25-35 year old male NSA recipient, 
currently seeking an appeal at the SSA T 
25-35 year old female NSA recipient 
35-44 year old male NSA recipient 
35-44 year old female NSA recipient 
45-54 year old male long term 
unemployed 
21-24 year old female YA recipient 
1 5-21 year old male NSA recipient 
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